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RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION OF
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Andrea J. Boyack*
ABSTRACT

The federal government has been heavily involved in promoting
housing affordability since the 1930s and continues to have a critical
role to play. Over the past several decades, the federal government
has financed affordability by promoting development and income
subsidies, but specific allocation decisions have devolved. Housing
inequities can best be addressed locally, but only if localities are held
to high standards of fairness and regional coordination is facilitated.
Successful and sustainable local solutions to housing affordability will
also require a substantial financial investment, one that the federal
government can and should reliably and adequately provide. Each
year, Congress permits households with the least household need to
receive billions of taxpayer dollars in unnecessary housing subsidies
— Congress must correct this misallocation of funds in order to help
those facing the severest housing burdens.
Much of federal affordable housing policy today involves a
patchwork of insufficient and ineffective measures mitigating
affordability harms. These measures provide critical short-term relief
for the minority of genuinely needy households who receive
assistance, but the federal government has inadequately invested in
long-term solutions for housing instability. The federal government’s
responsibility to address persistent housing inequity arises in part
from decades of its own harmful, racist housing policies. Although
the inherently local nature of housing markets suggests that the actual
*

Professor of Law, Co-Director of Business & Transactional Law Center, Washburn
University School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; M.A.L.D.,
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University; B.A., Brigham Young
University. I would like to thank Dan Hagedorn for his able research assistance and
Traci Krasne, Kaitlyn Laurie, Sacha Urbach, Jennifer Mockler, Christopher Trafford
and the staff of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for organizing a superb symposium
and providing helpful edits.

1183

1184

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

implementation of housing assistance programs should continue to
devolve, responsibility for ensuring fair access to quality housing
ultimately lies with the federal government.
Part I of this Article describes the ubiquity and impacts of the
problem of unaffordable housing. Part II examines the spectrum of
approaches that a government can use to address housing
unaffordability, from police power mandates to supply- and demandside subsidies. Part III makes the normative case for significant but
reimagined federal involvement in the affordable housing sphere.
Part IV points out the risks inherent in relying on federal funding and
oversight and suggests ways the law might mitigate such risks.
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INTRODUCTION
At its inception in 1934, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) established underwriting guidelines to ensure that taxpayerfunded home mortgage insurance would be channeled to
neighborhoods with stable or increasing property values, defined by
the government as white-only neighborhoods.1 For many decades,

1. The FHA greatly impacted U.S. homeownership by introducing the thirty–
year, self–amortizing, fixed–rate residential mortgage loan as the primary lending
tool for “prime mortgage loans” and through offering generous homebuying
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homeowners in the United States have had the particular benefit of
deducting mortgage interest payments from their federally taxable
income, a tax policy that has provided a disproportionate benefit
(80%) to the highest income quintile, at a fiscal cost of more than $70
billion a year.2 Federal programs helped to raze entire urban
communities and replace them with concrete mega-block public
housing structures, simultaneously concentrating poverty and
entrenching racial housing segregation.3 Five million households
assistance in the form of mortgage insurance for first-time homebuyers. David Reiss,

Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration
and the Low Down Payment Loan, 50 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1023–24, 1073 (2016). For

decades, white homeowners in white neighborhoods were the exclusive beneficiaries
of FHA’s programs and funding. See generally Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law:
A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America, 26 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 5 (2017). See also RICHARD R.W.
BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 109 (2013); KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190–91
(1985). The FHA’s own Underwriting Manual mandated that mortgage funding be
used primarily in non-diverse communities and advised communities to preserve their
property values by creating real covenant-based barriers to minority occupancy. FED.
HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING AND VALUATION
PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT § 980(3), 980(3)(g)
(1938) (“Recommended restrictions should include provision for the
following . . . [p]rohibition of the occupancy of properties except by the race for
which they are intended.”).
2. Until 1986, all interest payments could be deducted by taxpayers, but the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 limited interest deduction to certain specified types of loans,
including loans on up to two residences. Although mortgage interest deductions are
politically popular, economists have shown that the vast majority of households who
receive a benefit under the mortgage interest deduction have incomes in the highest
quintile. WILL FISCHER & CHYE-CHING HUANG, MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
IS RIPE FOR REFORM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1–3 (2013),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage-interest-deduction-is-ripe-for-reform
[https://perma.cc/7AWR-F4LV]; BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., CUT TO INVEST:
REFORM THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION TO INVEST IN INNOVATION AND
ADVANCED
INDUSTRIES,
(2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/06-mortgage-interest-deduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYL6PD6Q]. The cost of the mortgage interest deduction has been estimated as
somewhere between $70 billion and $100 billion (or even more) annually. See infra
notes 218–28 and accompanying text.
3. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and Slum Housing, 32 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1967) (discussing displacement and slum clearance in public
housing development in the 1960s). Public housing was not originally designed to be
low-income housing, but by the 1960s it was reconceived and employed to create
large multi-family developments in urban centers. By the 1980s, “living conditions in
the nation’s most dilapidated public housing developments were deplorable, and a
complex layering of problems left these developments mired in the most destructive
kind of poverty.” SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., URB. INST., A DECADE OF HOPE VI:
RESEARCH
FINDINGS
AND
POLICY
CHALLENGES
7
(2004),
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411002_HOPEVI.pdf
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currently live in rental homes subsidized by and ultimately under the
supervision of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD),4 but thousands of these dwellings are
uninhabitable, infested with rodents, covered in mold, or exposing
children to poisonous lead.5 Half of low-income households cannot
afford their housing costs, but for every one such household receiving
government housing assistance, another three go without.6
Affordable housing need is critical and increasing, but funding is
erratic. When it comes to achieving lasting and equitable housing
improvements, the government’s record is abysmal.
Housing costs today are so high relative to income that
affordability is deemed a national “crisis.”7 The federal government’s
inequitable and ineffective historic impact on housing markets
suggests that, when it comes to promoting housing affordability,
perhaps Uncle Sam is not the right man for the job. Housing markets
are quintessentially local, and the affordability challenges facing
a given community may arise from any of a number of different
underlying factors. In some communities, the lack and misallocation
of affordably priced housing units inflates housing prices.8 In other

[https://perma.cc/46LA-X86F]. “These developments had become dangerous and
destructive communities in which to live, undermining the welfare of families and
children.” Id.
4. National and State Housing Fact Sheets & Data, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (May 9, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/national-andstate-housing-fact-sheets-data [https://perma.cc/EU8J-4VKU].
5. Suzy Khimm et al., Under Ben Carson, More Families Live in HUD Housing
That Fails Health and Safety Inspections, NBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:17 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/under-ben-carson-more-families-livehud-housing-fails-health-n935421 [https://perma.cc/FG2K-3GE8]; MSNBC FOIA
request
documents,
available
at
http://media1.snbcnews.com/i/today/z_creative/InfillFoiaReacReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8YDQYPS].
6. Will Fischer & Barbara Sard, Chart Book: Federal Housing Spending is
Poorly Matched to Need, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/chart-book-federal-housing-spending-ispoorly-matched-to-need [https://perma.cc/6AT5-GXT4].
7. For example, in 2014, Shaun Donovan, Secretary of HUD, said that the
United States is facing “the worst rental crisis in this nation, ever.” Ben Lane, HUD’s
Donovan: “This Is the Worst Rental Crisis in This Nation, Ever,” HOUSINGWIRE
(Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/29757-huds-donovan-this-isthe-worst-rental-crisis-in-this-nation-ever [https://perma.cc/9EWF-6MTU]. See also
Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues
Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 415 (2003) (pointing out
— 15 years ago when housing affordability was better than it is today — that for
several decades there had been an “acknowledged crisis in affordable housing”).
8. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 230 (2001); see also
Andrea J. Boyack, Limiting the Collective Right to Exclude, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
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communities, there are a sufficient number of housing units, but
affordable units are of unacceptable quality.9
Impoverished
neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color face disparate residential
realities in terms of the quality of schools, transportation, and
community services.10 In many areas, unaffordable housing is
primarily a symptom of intractable poverty.11 Different housing
problems require different strategic responses, and the specific
challenges faced by a given locality are likely best understood and
addressed at the local level.
Nevertheless, there are several justifications for broader, federallevel involvement in the realm of housing. National funding for local
housing projects is likely necessary to create sustainable and equitable
housing support in all parts of the country, particularly in more
impoverished areas.12 Coordination among jurisdictions in a given
region is critical for assessing and addressing problems of housing and
poverty, particularly in cases where communities individually would

451, 469–70 (2017) [hereinafter Boyack, Exclude]; infra notes 47–77 and
accompanying text.
9. See Steven Hwang et al., Housing and Population Health: A Review of the
Literature, Sociology and Criminology Faculty Publications 126 SOC. CRIMINOLOGY
FAC. PUBLICATIONS 1, 28 (1999); see also Michael Weitzman et al., Housing and Child
Health, 43 CURRENT PROBS. IN PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 187, 187–
189 (2013) (describing the effects that low-quality housing and housing instability
have on child health); Williams, supra note 7, at 419–20. See generally Gary
Adamkiewicz et al., Moving Environmental Justice Indoors: Understanding

Structural Influences on Residential Exposure Patterns in Low-Income
Communities, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S238, S238 (2011).
10. Andrea J. Boyack, Sustainable Affordable Housing, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 455, 465
(2018) [hereinafter Boyack, Sustainable]; BARBARA SARD & DOUGLAS RICE, CTR.

ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CREATING OPPORTUNITY FOR CHILDREN 1, 6
(2014); see also infra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.
11. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN
CITY 296–97, 302–03 (2016) [hereinafter DESMOND, EVICTED]. See generally
Matthew Desmond, Unaffordable America: Poverty, Housing, and Eviction, 22 INST.
FOR RES. ON POVERTY 1, 5 (2015) [hereinafter Desmond, Unaffordable].
12. There is a wide fiscal disparity among municipalities and states in terms of
resources and availability of financing. Some states grapple with fiscal gaps and
others enjoy budget surpluses. See, e.g., TRACY GORDON ET AL., URB. INST.,
ASSESSING FISCAL CAPACITIES OF STATES vi-vii, 1–5, 11–33 (2016),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/140136/2000646assessing-fiscal-capacities-of-states-a-representative-revenue-system-representativeexpenditure-system-approach-fiscal-year-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PNY-LF2T];
Hal Wolman et al., Comparing Local Government Autonomy Across States, NAT’L
TAX
ASS’N
PROCEEDINGS
377
(2008),
https://www.ntanet.org/wpcontent/uploads/proceedings/2008/046-wolman-comparing-local-government-2008nta-proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8M2-Y723].
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prefer to offload and ignore affordability issues.13
Negative
externalities from local housing affordability crunches impact the
country as a whole.14 Furthermore, it was the federal government,
through its policies and programs, that created some of the biggest
obstacles to accessing affordable housing today.15
Regional
inequalities and the need for regional coordination, economic
externalities of inequitable housing systems, and the persistent,
adverse effects of historic federal housing policies all justify a national
framework to adequately address housing affordability.
Part I of this Article describes the ubiquity and impacts of the
problem of unaffordable housing. Part II examines the spectrum of
approaches that a government can use to address housing
unaffordability, from police power mandates to supply-and-demandside subsidies. Part III makes the normative case for significant but
reimagined federal involvement in the affordable housing sphere.
Part IV points out the risks inherent in relying on federal funding and
oversight and suggests ways the law might mitigate such risks.

13. For example, Kansas City straddles the state line, and the metropolitan area is
in both Missouri and Kansas. Recognizing the imperative of a metropolitan region
approach rather than one artificially separated into states, HUD provided funding for
coordinated planning efforts spearheaded by the Mid-America Regional Council.
Results of regional planning evidence the absolute necessity of a regional approach.
See, e.g., MID-AMERICA REG’L COUNCIL, HOUSING ELEMENT: CREATING
SUSTAINABLE
PLACES
9
(2014),
http://marc.org/RegionalPlanning/Housing/pdf/Housing_Element.aspx
[https://perma.cc/M8PR-YMKQ].
Nevertheless, Kansas City’s public housing funds and planning are ultimately
controlled by state-specific public housing agencies: The Housing Authority of
Kansas City, Missouri, and the Kansas City Kansas Housing Authority, and each
state develops its own housing plan for the city. See also AMERICAN PLANNING
ASS’N, REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING PAS REPORT 513/514
(2003). See generally URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE, A HOUSING POLICY FOR
KANSAS CITY (2018), https://uni-kc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/KCMO-DraftHousing-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FGW-32RH]. Ironically, this plan, which starts
by invoking Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, deals only with the part of
Kansas City located within the state of Missouri, without recognizing that a
significant part of the “two cities” in Kansas City is the part of the metropolitan
region within Kansas.
14. See Ed Glaeser & Joe Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing
Supply 21 (Zell/Lurie Real Estate Ctr., Working Paper No. 802, 2017),
http://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/802.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AGW-CEL4]; Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities
Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate Growth 34–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 21154, 2015).
15. See supra note 1; infra notes 302–13 and accompanying text.
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I. DIAGNOSIS OF THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS
Housing today is unaffordable for one-third of all U.S. households,
and nearly half of Americans who rent.16 Because of rapidly inflating
purchase prices and rental rates, more than 38 million households in
the United States spend more than 30% of their income on housing
costs (an allocation that renders housing “unaffordable” according to
HUD metrics).17 Half of all renter households cannot afford to pay
their rent and still have sufficient income remaining for food,
healthcare, childcare, transportation, and other necessities.18 Housing
unaffordability deepens inequalities and leads to housing instability

16. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUS. 2018 30–31 (2018) [hereinafter STATE OF HOUSING 2018],
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations
_Housing_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ8S-QNY9]. Housing affordability is typically
measured by calculating the percentage of a household’s gross income that must be
allocated to housing costs, with anything more than 30% rendering the household
“cost burdened” and anything more than 50% causing the household to be “severely
cost burdened.” CHAS: Background, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/cp/CHAS/bg_chas.html
[https://perma.cc/CBN9-S5DG].
17. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 5. The 30% figure evolved from the
1969 “Brooke Amendment” to the 1934 Housing Act, proposed in response to
complaints that rents in public housing were going up. The amendment capped the
rent charged in public housing at 25% of a tenant’s household income, but Congress
raised the cap to 30% in 1981, and that percentage has remained the industry
standard for whether housing costs are considered “affordable” ever since. Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1969 (Brooke Amendment), Pub. L. No. 91-152,
§ 213, 83 Stat. 379, 389 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (2012)). The
income to housing comparison is not universally recognized as the appropriate
measure of housing unaffordability. See, e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at
2–3; Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 458–62. See generally CHRISTOPHER
HERBERT ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., MEASURING
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: ASSESSING THE 30 PERCENT OF INCOME STANDARD (2018)
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_Herbert_Hermann_
McCue_measuring_housing_affordability.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6N4-JY8Z].
18. Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 463. See generally Ezra Rosser, Laying
the Foundation: The Private Rental Market and Affordable Housing, 44 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 499, 522 (2017); Press Release, MacArthur Found, Pessimism About
Prolonged Housing Affordability Crisis Is On the Rise, 2016 How Housing Matters
Survey
Finds,
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.macfound.org/press/pressreleases/pessimism-about-prolonged-affordable-housing-crisis-rise-2016-howhousing-matters-survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/REE4-3MQS] (quoting MacArthur
President Julia Stasch). The tradeoff between housing and other necessities is
particularly difficult for low-income households with children. Such households have
an average of $490 to spend after paying housing costs, but by the Economic Policy
Institute’s estimate, the minimum needed to support families with children in even
affordable metro areas is $2700 per month for non-housing expenses. See STATE OF
HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 31.
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with its myriad ill-effects.19 Unaffordable housing is not a new
problem,20 but over the past decade, the issue has broadened and
deepened.21 From 2001 to 2015, the number of “very low-income”
renter households (making less than 50% of the area median income)
has increased by 4.181 million, with 2.551 million of those households
earning less than 30 of the average median income.22 In 2018, the
average amount of monthly rent that a very low-income household
(family of four) could afford was only $660, but the average cost of a

19. Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershensen, Housing and Employment Insecurity
Among the Working Poor, 63 SOC. PROBS. 46, 49–50 (2016). “High housing costs

have eroded renter incomes and exacerbated inequality among renter households.
After paying for their housing, the amount of money that lowest-income renters had
left over for all other expenses fell 18 percent from 2001 to 2016.” JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 31 (2017)
HOUSING
2017],
[hereinafter
RENTAL
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_americas_rental_housin
g_2017_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KGP-LRD5]. For median rentals in lower income
quartile, only $500 a month of gross household income is left after paying for housing.
Id. For further discussion of the broad and persistent impacts of housing instability,
see generally DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 11; KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE
SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015); Raj Chetty
et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational
Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553 (2014); Rosser, supra note 18.
20. See JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL
HOUSING 3 (1987).
21. HUD’s most recent report to Congress on housing indicated that 8.3 million
households have “worst-case housing needs,” meaning they are very low-income
renters who receive no government housing assistance and pay more than half of
their income for rent, live in severely inadequate conditions, or both. The number of
households with worst-case housing needs has increased from 7.72 million in 2013.
OFF. OF HOUS. POL’Y DEV. & RES., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WORST CASE
HOUSING NEEDS: 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ix–xi, figs.1–3 (2017),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Worst-Case-Housing-Needs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YH4U-BLZU] [hereinafter WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017];
see also JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S
HOUSING
1–6
(2016),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs_2016_state_of_the_natio
ns_housing_lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/45M9-9G6A]; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR.,
HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 7 (2013);
MEGAN BOLTON ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 4 (2015),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2015_FULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y82AUN3L] (“the number of renters spending more than they can afford on housing is
unacceptably high and growing”).
22. WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at 60. The number of
households to which HUD provided rental assistance during this period actually
decreased by 720,000. Id. at 29. See also STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 5
(tracking the gap between housing needs and housing assistance).
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two-bedroom apartment that year was $1149.23 From 2001 to 2015,
median rental rates increased by 8.6%, but median income for renters
decreased by 6.2%.24 Seventy-five percent of low-income, costburdened households obtain no government assistance to help them
afford a home.25
Part I of this Article explores the complexity of the problem of
unaffordable housing, conceptualizing it along a spectrum of need
with variations driven by multiple factors including, for example,
income, location, race, marital status, and job type. After Section A
frames the problem as involving different levels of housing
inadequacy, Section B then examines the extent to which
unaffordability is driven by lack and misallocation of affordable
housing unit supply. Section C discusses the problem from the other
side of the equation, namely, the lack of adequate household income.
Finally, Section D focuses on a less quantifiable but equally important
aspect of affordability, specifically, the cost of poor-quality housing
and poor-quality neighborhoods.
A. Prioritizing Housing Need
Affordability concerns exist both in the context of homeownership
and in the context of renting. In the two decades from 1998 to 2018,
the median sales price of homes in the United States has more than
doubled, from $153,000 (Q4 1998) to $322,880 (Q4 2018).26
Household incomes grew during this same period, but only at a
modest 4.7%, from $58,612 (1998) to $61,372 (2017),27 and nearly all

23. ANDREW AURAND ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH:
THE HIGH COST OF HOUSING (2018) [hereinafter NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018],
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/424A-V62Z].
24. See Fischer & Sard, supra note 6.
25. See id.
26. Median Sales Price of Houses Sold for the United States, FED. RES. BANK ST.
LOUIS:
FRED
ECONOMIC
DATA
(updated
July
24,
2019)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSPUS [https://perma.cc/37VX-Z44X]. Even a
decade ago, in the depths of the great recession, the median home price of $222,500
(Q4 2008) was still up 45% from 1998. Id. Median home prices rose 41% faster than
overall inflation in the period from 1990 to 2016. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note
16, at 1.
27. Real Median Household Income in the United States, FED. RES. BANK ST.
LOUIS:
FRED
ECONOMIC
DATA
(updated
Sept.
12,
2018)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N [https://perma.cc/FD98-B9XA];
Erin Duffin, Average (Median) Household Income in the United States from 1990 to
STATISTA
(Sep
24,
2019),
2017
(in
US
Dollars),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/200838/median-household-income-in-the-unitedstates/ [https://perma.cc/4TT8-YFNF]. Incomes, particularly those in the lower four
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income gains have been concentrated in the top income quintile.28
The disproportion between the growth in home prices and the growth
in incomes makes buying a home relatively less affordable today than
it was 20 years ago, and comparisons over a longer period (three or
four decades instead of two) show an even larger disparity.29
Increases in rental rates during the past two decades are steeper than
home purchase price increases, however, and incomes of renters as a
group have grown at a slower pace than owners’ incomes. Rental
unaffordability, therefore, continues to be an even more pronounced
problem than unaffordability caused by high home prices. In 1990,
the median monthly rental rate for an unfurnished apartment was
$600; in 2017, the median monthly rental rate was $1492, nearly 150
higher.30 In the 1960s, less than a quarter of renter households were
cost burdened, but today, nearly half of all renter households are cost
burdened — a statistic that has been called “the new normal.”31
Housing affordability affects households at most income levels, but
its impact is the greatest among the lowest income households,
particularly low-income renter households. Renters are on average

quartiles, have not grown in tandem with GDP per capita growth, which has
increased 52% from 1988–2017. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 2.
28. See Jill Mislinkski, U.S. Household Incomes: A 51-Year Perspective,
PERSPECTIVES
(Oct.
16,
2018),
ADVISOR
https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2018/10/16/u-s-householdincomes-a-51-year-perspective [https://perma.cc/G73Q-E9Z3]. The bottom four
income quintiles have remained virtually flat since 1998 and have increased less than
10% since 1980. Id. The real median income of households in the bottom quartile has
increased only 3%. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 1.
29. For example, the median price for a new home in December 1967 was $22,200,
3.08 times the median income that year of $7200. In December 2017, 40 years later,
the median price for a new home had increased to $343,300, a price that represented
5.60 times the median income of 2017, $61,327. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN
AND AVERAGE SALE PRICES OF NEW HOMES SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/uspricemon.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TNEX4KC]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1967 AND SELECTED
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS (July 15, 1969),
https://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-062.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD4J-6SDV];
Mislinkski, supra note 28.
30. Jennifer Rudden, Asking Rent for Unfurnished Apartments in the U.S. 1980–
2017, STATISTA (July 17, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/200223/medianapartment-rent-in-the-us-since-1980/ [https://perma.cc/63VC-FERG]. Median rent
rose 20% faster than overall inflation in the period from 1990 to 2016. STATE OF
HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 1.
31. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 4; STATE OF HOUSING 2018 supra
note 16, at 5. There are also more renter households today than in prior decades,
both in real and relative numbers. Id. at 2–3. See generally Andrea J. Boyack,
Equitably Housing (Almost) Half a Nation of Renters, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 109 (2017)
[hereinafter Boyack, Equitably].
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more housing cost burdened than owners, low-income households are
more likely to rent than own, and among renters, the poorest
households bear the most significant housing cost burdens.32 For
example, in 2016, 80% of rental households earning less than $30,000
were cost burdened, and 55% were severely cost burdened.33 Among
owner households earning less than $30,000, 63% were cost burdened,
and 42% were severely cost burdened.34 As a comparison, only 6% of
renter households with an income of over $75,000 in 2016 were cost
burdened.35 Low-income households, those earning less than 80% of
the local area median income (AMI) are often further categorized
into very low-income, earning between 30% and 50% of AMI, and
extremely low-income, earning below 30% of AMI.36 The rough
estimate snapshot of housing burdens faced by low-income families is
stark. The majority of low-income households spend half their
income on housing, and a quarter of such households must dedicate
more than 70% of their income to stay sheltered.37 Low-income

32. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 4. Demographic changes, financial
downturns in the wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, increasing student debt, and
changed perceptions regarding homeownership mean that this decreased
homeownership level is unlikely to rebound anytime soon as evidenced by the
decreased homeownership rate for people under age 45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
QUARTERLY RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, SECOND QUARTER
2019, Table 6 (2019), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XTF3-FY46]. Note that the average median income of renter
households has recently increased, but this increase represents a shift among higher
income households to renting rather than an improvement in income among the
lower income households. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 26.
33. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 30. HUD uses the terms “cost
burdened” and “severely cost burdened” to refer to households respectively spending
more than 30% and 50% of gross income on housing. Affordable Housing, U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
HOUS.
&
URB.
DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/
[https://perma.cc/T5V3-Y4F2] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
34. See STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 30; see also supra note 13.
35. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 28.
36. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP REPORT: A SHORTAGE OF
AFFORDABLE HOMES 2019, 2–3 (2019) [hereinafter NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT],
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZD8Q-ST7W]. There are 10.7 million severely housing costburdened renter households: approximately 7.8 million are extremely low-income, 2.1
million are very low-income, and 684,000 are low-income. Id. at 5.
37. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27. The housing instability
associated with paying such a high percentage of income to housing costs is often
coupled with job instability, leading to a situation that has been called “double
precarity.” Desmond & Gershenen, supra note 19, at 47–50. “Extremely low-income
renters are much more likely to be severely housing cost-burdened than other income
groups. Thirty-two percent of very low-income, eight percent of low-income, and two
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households are disproportionately composed of seniors, disabled
persons, and adult caregivers.38
Minority households (Native
American, black, and Hispanic) are more likely to be extremely lowincome than are white households.39 The 11 million extremely lowincome households in the United States face the most severe cost
burdens in the country: 71% (7.8 million) of extremely low-income
households spend more than half of their income on housing.40
Extremely low-income renter households make up 73% of the
severely cost-burdened renters in the country.41
Many commentators on housing affordability challenges focus on
urban areas, particularly in large coastal cities, but affordable housing
shortages plague populations in all areas of the country, albeit driven
by slightly different factors from place to place.42 For example, the
states of New York, Florida, California, Colorado, and Hawai’i all
have about the same percentage of cost-burdened households (51–
54%), but the housing and income realities of each of these states
differ.43 In California and Hawai’i, nominal housing prices are sky
high, but median incomes are as well. Meanwhile, in Florida,
Colorado, and New York, the median incomes are lower, but lack of
supply keeps housing costs high.44 Generally speaking, more rural
areas are relatively less cost burdened, but rural America does not
escape the housing affordability crunch, even in places where housing

percent of middle-income renters are severely cost-burdened.” NLIHC 2019 GAP
REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
38. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
39. “Among renters, 38% of American Indian or Alaskan Native households, 35%
of black households, 28% of Hispanic households, and 22% of white non-Hispanic
households have extremely low incomes.” Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 7.
A majority of extremely low-income renters are severely housing costburdened in every state. The states with the greatest percentage of
extremely low-income renter households with severe cost burdens are
Florida (80%), Nevada (79%), Arizona (78%), California (76%), and
Colorado (76%). Maine has the smallest, but still significant, percentage of
extremely low-income renters with severe cost burdens (53%).

Id.

43. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27.
44. Id. “Median rents have risen at twice the national pace in markets with rapid
population growth, such as Austin, Denver, and Seattle. And within these fastgrowing metros, rents in previously low-cost neighborhoods rose nearly a percentage
point faster each year than in high-cost neighborhoods.” Id. at 4. Housing Needs by
State: Colorado, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, https://nlihc.org/housingneeds-by-state/colorado [https://perma.cc/7TRQ-BABQ] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
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costs are relatively low.45 Even in states with the smallest percentage
of cost-burdened renters (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Wyoming), more than a third of renter households still allocate
more than 30 of their income to housing.46
B. Supply Allocation and Demand Elasticity
Even though the size of the supply gap varies widely from place to
place, a gap between affordable housing need and available,
affordable dwelling units exists in every single state.47 Such a
ubiquitous problem of housing affordability seems to demand a
national solution, but specific local concerns shape housing challenges
in a given community.48 In many, but not all, areas, a lack of supply
of lower-priced housing units is the chief cause of expensive housing.
On a national basis, there is a significant lack of supply of housing
units affordable to the lowest-income households. There are 7 million
more extremely low-income households than there are homes that
can affordably house them; for every 100 extremely low-income
households, only 37 appropriately priced units are available.49

45. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27. Even though Alabama,
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi and West Virginia enjoy relatively low housing costs,
more than 40% of the renter households in these states are cost burdened. Id. “Costburdened households in rural areas are often more dispersed than in metro areas,
making it difficult to target effective policy interventions.” Id. at 28. In fact, some of
the nation’s worst housing situations are found in the most rural areas, particularly
among Native American tribes. Native American Housing, NAT’L LOW INCOME
HOUS.
COAL.,
https://nlihc.org/explore-issues/policy-priorities/native-americanhousing [https://perma.cc/YZY7-W6DK] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019); U.S. COMM’N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BROKEN PROMISES: CONTINUING FEDERAL FUNDING SHORTFALL
FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 136–38 (Dec. 2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/12-20Broken-Promises.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6UP-W4QG]; Tim Henderson, Housing
Affordability Crisis Spreads to Rural America, GOVERNING: STATELINE (March 25,
2019),
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/sl-housingaffordability-crisis-rural-america.html
[https://perma.cc/TEH2-VAH5];
RENTAL
HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27. Gillian B. White, Rural America’s Silent
Housing
Crisis,
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
28,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/rural-americas-silent-housingcrisis/384885/ [https://perma.cc/FZ3U-YJPP].
46. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27–28.
47. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra, note 36, at 1. “The current relative supply
ranges from 19 affordable and available homes for every 100 extremely low-income
renter households in Nevada to 66 in Wyoming” and “[t]he shortage of affordable
homes ranges from 5,800 in Wyoming to one million in California.” Id. “On average,
smaller counties have a higher ratio of supply to demand than larger urban counties,
while large urban counties have the greatest deficit.” RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra
note 19, at 30.
48. Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 458–66.
49. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
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Although there is a supply gap in all states (the size of that gap
varying significantly from place to place), there is not a supply gap
among all income levels. Basic economic forces of supply and
demand work well at the top end of the market, and higher-income
renters find an ample supply of units they can afford in most housing
markets.50 Although the recent boom in rental production has
created a sufficient number of market-level rental units to house the
number of renter households that can afford to pay market rents in
many areas,51 there is an insufficient number of units that are
affordable to lower-income renters.52 The gap between demand for
housing and affordable housing supply widens as the household’s
income decreases.53 Comparing rental stock at certain price points to
rental demand at those price points may itself reveal a shortage of
supply compared to demand, but it is misleading to compare existing
inventory to demand without considering actual availability of such
units. For example, there are 7.4 million rental homes in the nation
that are affordable to the 11 million extremely low-income
households, but only 4 million of those homes are allocated to
extremely low-income households — higher-income renters occupy
the remaining 3.4 million of those homes.54 This imperfect matching
50. SeAN CAPPERIS ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR. & CAPITAL ONE, RENTING IN
AMERICA’S
LARGEST
CITIES
5
(2015),
http://furmancenter.org/files/CapOneNYUFurmanCenter__NationalRentalLandscap
e_MAY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/238H-6EMY]; NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra
note 23; see also RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 2, 17.
Virtually all of the 88 metros with data available had more homes for sale in
the top third of the market by price than in the bottom third. In 46 of these
metros, more than half of the available supply was at the high end. The
largest imbalances were in moderately sized, moderately priced, and fastgrowing metros such as Boise, Charlotte, Des Moines, and Durham, where
about 65 percent of existing homes for sale were at the upper end of the
market.
STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 4.
51. In certain geographic locations, a shortage of market-level rental housing still
exists. For example, extremely low rental vacancy rates in the Atlanta, Dallas-Fort
Worth, New York-New Jersey-Pennsylvania, and Phoenix urban centers suggest that
a deficit of market-rate rental housing still exists in those markets. Natalia
Siniavskaia, What Do Vacancy Rates Tell Us About the Shortage of Housing?,
NAHB EYE ON HOUSING (Feb. 15, 2019), http://eyeonhousing.org/2019/02/what-dovacancy-rates-tell-us-about-the-shortage-of-housing/ [https://perma.cc/7DHS-DKFF].
52. Id.
53. As of 2019, the total rental inventory in the United States is 35.3 million units,
and some 26.6 million households rent. But this statistic belies the reality that at
every below-median-income level, households’ demand for rentals priced at
affordable levels far exceeds demand. See NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36,
at 3.
54. Id.
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of income levels and housing prices means that the actual number of
units available at each of the lower-income levels is far lower than the
number of existing units that rent at low-income-affordable levels. As
mentioned, only 37 available homes are affordable for every 100
extremely low-income households, and only 58 available homes are
affordable for every 100 very low-income households.55 The gap for
low-income households earning between 50% and 80% of Area
Medium Income (AMI) is much smaller: there are 94 available homes
affordable for every 100 such households.56 At 80% of median
income and above, there is no general shortage.57 Furthermore, a
simple comparison of available homes to housing demand in a given
community fails to account for location relative to employment
opportunities and in preferred neighborhoods with better schools and
community amenities.
The government has tried to promote affordability through supplyside incentives, but the problem with exclusively focusing on
increasing the number of dwelling units is that it may not — and
historically has not — ensured that such units are optimally priced
and placed.58 Because developers can make a higher profit in
creating and selling or renting higher-end units that rent at or above
the median levels, higher-income households can rely on the forces of
supply and demand to meet their rental needs.
However,
development at the high end of the market appears to crowd out
development affordable to lowest-income renters. For example, from
2005 to 2015, some 6.7 million housing units were added to the
nation’s rental stock, but there was a 260,000-unit decline in the total
number of rentals charging less than $800 a month.59 During that one
decade, the number of homes renting for $2000 or more a month
increased by 97% and the number of homes renting for $800 or less
per month decreased by 2%.60 Thus, the vast majority of new rental
units created during the decade following the Foreclosure Crisis61

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 29.
58. See, e.g., infra notes 204, 205, and 212–15 and accompanying text.
59. NLIHC Out of Reach 2018, supra note 23, at 6.
60. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 28, 36 (noting that between 1990
and 2016, 2.5 million occupied rental units priced below $800 per month were lost,
but an additional 2.6 million occupied rental units priced above $2000 were added to
the rental housing stock).
61. After eight years of rapidly inflating U.S. real estate prices, residential home
values plummeted in 2007 just as the interest rates for adjustable rate residential
subprime mortgages were adjusting upwards. The result was a wave of foreclosures,
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were medium- or high-priced rental units, but the increase in demand
for rental housing has been most pronounced among lowest-income
households.62
The economic theory of supply and demand63 suggests that,
although increasing demand motivates price increases in the short
term, it also motivates increases in supply which, in the long term, will
push prices down. This economic theory works imperfectly for
housing, however: because shelter is essential to survival, higherpriced housing will not necessarily reduce demand. Even if housing is
priced at unaffordable levels for lower-income households, people
must somehow pay that higher price, even if that means forgoing
other sorts of spending, including spending on other basic needs like
healthcare, childcare, transportation, and even food. Lack of

first in the subprime and then prime residential mortgage sectors, rapid devaluation
of mortgage-backed securities in both sectors, followed by credit downgrades of the
issuers and invested financial institutions. In October 2008, the federal government
intervened to provide capital to the market. During the decade following the
September–October 2008 securities collapse and bank bailouts, foreclosures and
home losses reached ten times the pre-crisis levels, and millions of homeowners lost
their homes and their nest egg in one fell swoop. Loss of an owned home coupled
with tight mortgage credit during and following the Foreclosure Crisis shifted a huge
number of households from owning to renting their homes, increasing the demand
for rental housing. Much has been written about the Financial Crisis in general and
about the shift from owner-occupancy to rental housing for millions of Americans.
See generally, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD (2013); ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI,
HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW
WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN (2015); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES OF
HARV. UNIV., RENTAL MARKET CONDITIONS
(2011),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ahr2011-2-rentalmarketconditions.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/2RCP-GJPM]. For a broader look at the worldwide causes and
impacts of the crisis, see ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL
CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD (2018). For a concise retrospective on housing market
changes during the decade from 2008 to 2018, see Michelle Lerner, 10 Years Later:
How the Housing Market Has Changed Since the Crash, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/10/04/feature/10-years-laterhow-the-housing-market-has-changed-since-the-crash/
[https://perma.cc/BP68Y8VU].
62. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 27–30. Between 1990 and 2016, 2.5
million occupied rental units priced below $800 per month were lost, but an
additional 2.6 million occupied rental units priced above $2000 were added to the
rental housing stock. Id.; see also NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 5–6.
63. Elementary economic theory posits that increasing demand for a product
relative to its supply will increase its price in the short term, and increasing the supply
of a product relative to demand will lead to a price decrease. ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 199 (Macmillan and Co. 1946) (1890). Studies have
confirmed that economic theory holds true for housing and that limited supply of
housing does indeed increase its cost. See, e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at
2–4.
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sufficient means to afford all their basic needs forces low-income
households to make “impossible choices.”64 The “invisible hand”
fails to respond the same way in the context of markets for survival
essentials, like housing, where demand is inelastic.65
Rising housing production costs further encourage housing
producers to build at the high end of the market, where it is easier to
turn a profit. Development costs are driven by the cost of inputs:
land, labor, and materials, all of which have become significantly
more expensive in the past few years.66 In the one year between 2016
and 2017, for example, estimated costs of building a “basic, threestory apartment building” increased by 8%.67 Land use regulations
inflate development costs and ultimately put downward pressure on
the supply of housing priced too low to recoup such additional
expenses.68 Zoning tools can also directly limit the supply of homes
in a community, driving up home values and increasing the wealth of

64. NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 3; see also NABIHAH
MAQBOOL ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUSING POL’Y, THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
ON
HEALTH:
A
RESEARCH
SUMMARY
1–2
(2015),
https://www.rupco.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/The-Impacts-of-Affordable-Housingon-Health-CenterforHousingPolicy-Maqbool.etal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3X4KNNMM].
65. Adam Smith’s foundational economic theory of the “invisible hand” posits
that at some point, prices will be too high and this will drive down demand. ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
349 (Metalibri 2007) (1776). Incidentally, Smith also opined that “[n]o society can
surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are
poor and miserable” and theorized that although laws interfering with the market
and favoring economic elites are by definition unjust, regulations that are “in favour
of the workmen” are “always just and equitable.” Id. at 66, 115.
66. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University:
Between 2012 and 2017, the price of vacant commercial land — a proxy for
developable multifamily sites — was up 62 percent. Over this same period,
the combined costs of construction labor, materials, and contractor fees rose
25 percent, far faster than the general inflation rate of just 7 percent. Cost
increases for key building materials, such as gypsum, concrete, and lumber,
have also outpaced inflation in recent years.
RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 17.
67. Id. at 3.
68. See Richard A. Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing
Mandates, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 64, 66–67
(Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keyes eds., 2017) (explaining that gaps in housing
supply “are only aggravated by stringent zoning and excessive permitting
restrictions”). Local governments can “promote construction of much-needed rental
units (particularly lower-rent units) by expediting approvals; guaranteeing by-right
development of small multifamily buildings, particularly those with affordable units;
reducing parking and other property requirements; and allowing higher densities for
projects that are transit-accessible.” RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 18.
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local “homevoters” as well as municipal tax revenues.69 Housing
prices in some of the country’s most expensive real estate markets are
largely affected by aggressive exclusionary zoning that keeps existing
home prices high and new homes out.70
Low-income rental housing supply has been hit with the double
whammy of rising development costs that crowd out new affordable
units and an accelerated loss of existing affordable units, either
through conversion from rented to owned homes or from low-income
to higher-income rentals, or through physical deterioration.71 In
markets where demand for rental housing is robust, financial
incentives lead owners to convert affordable units to luxury or
market-rate ones.72 In markets where demand is weak, there is little
incentive for the upkeep of low-income housing and, in some cases,
lack of landlord income to allocate to that effort in any case.73 Lack
of maintenance results in unit obsolescence and uninhabitability, and
under-maintained housing is likely to end up demolished or
abandoned.74 More than 8.7 million affordable units, a majority of
the nation’s low-income housing supply, exited housing inventory
between 1985 and 2013.75 The National Housing Trust estimated that

69. FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 69 (coining the term “homevoter” to reflect
homeowners whose policy choices are driven by their desire to maximize the value of
their real property assets); Boyack, Exclude, supra note 8, at 472–74; Kristine Nelson
Fuge, Exclusionary Zoning: Keeping People in Their Wrongful Places or a Valid
Exercise of Local Control?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 148, 159 (1996).
70. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building
Restrictions on Housing Affordability, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 21,
23, 28–30 (2003); Eliza Hall, Divide and Sprawl, Decline and Fall: A Comparative
Critique of Euclidean Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 915, 925–26 (2007).
71. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 469–70.
72. KAROLINA GORSKA & MITCHELL CRISPELL, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT,
UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION POLICY BRIEF 2 (2016). See
generally PETER MOSKOVITZ, HOW TO KILL A CITY: GENTRIFICATION, INEQUALITY,
AND THE FIGHT FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD (2017).
73. “If landlords are unable to charge enough rent to cover debt service, taxes,
insurance, ongoing maintenance and repair, and a fair return on their investment, the
most discretionary of these expenditures will be the most expendable.” SANDRA J.
NEWMAN, URB. INST. LOW-END RENTAL HOUSING: THE FORGOTTEN STORY IN
BALTIMORE’S HOUSING BOOM 16 (2005). “As one landlord put it, ‘A furnace is a
furnace, and it costs the same whether you put it in a $600 unit or a $300 unit.’” Id.
74. See RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 30; see also infra note 143 and
accompanying text.
75.
The biggest reductions were due to permanent removals, with 27 percent of
affordable rentals in 1985 (4.1 million units) demolished, destroyed in
disasters, or reconfigured into fewer units. About 18 percent (2.7 million
units) were converted to owner-occupied or seasonal housing, while 12
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“for every new affordable apartment created, two are lost due to
deterioration, abandonment or conversion to more expensive
housing.”76
In many places, therefore, one of the most effective ways to combat
affordability challenges is to enable and incentivize increases to the
supply and maintenance of lower-priced housing units. A preliminary
step to encouraging the development of lower-priced units is to make
the development of such units less expensive. Removing artificial
barriers to production, such as unjustifiable land use restrictions, can
help leverage natural economic forces to create affordable housing.77
For example, land use regulation can add up to 30% to the cost of
housing development, and any savings in reducing this burden can be
passed on to residents in the form of reduced rent.78 New housing
development can be channeled toward the lower end of the market by
offering subsidies and other incentive programs that provide offsets
or contributions to the cost of producing housing, in exchange for
commitments to keep the units priced at affordable levels. In
addition, supply deficits can be managed by preserving existing
affordable units, possibly through the government funding the gap
between net rental revenues and necessary maintenance costs.

percent (1.7 million units) were upgraded to higher rents through
gentrification.
RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 30.
76. What
Is
Preservation?,
NAT’L
HOUSING
TR.,
http://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/what-preservation
[https://perma.cc/Q7GFQXLW] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
77. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 466–67; Epstein, supra note 68, at
64, 76; see also WILLIAM APGAR, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING: EXPANDING THE
ABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
OPPORTUNITY 28 (2004) (arguing that reducing the costs of zoning and regulatory
approvals would positively impact housing affordability); James J. Hartnett,

Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and American Apartheid: Using Title
VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 97 (1993)

(concluding that “overregulation directly increases housing development costs both
through lengthy and expensive approval processes and the imposition of high permit
fees — costs that are passed on to home buyers and renters.”).
78. See AFFORD. RENTAL HOUS. A.C.T.I.O.N., BUILDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING
COMMUNITIES USING THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 6 (2015),
www.taxcreditcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Housing-Credit-Ed-DeckMarch-2015-ver-14-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9L-HQGH] (estimating that land
development costs would have to be reduced by 28% to make it profitable for the
private sector to create affordable housing).
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C. Ability to Pay
The problem of unaffordable housing not only represents a market
disequilibrium of undersupply, resulting in prices that are too high,
but it also represents the problem of incomes simply being too low.
The income piece of the puzzle is particularly salient in communities
with lower-priced housing, the modest cost of which is still out of
reach for the very poorest residents whose incomes are almost nonexistent. For people whose incomes cannot support the costs of a
modestly priced home, increasing supply of lower-priced units may
prove insufficient to address housing needs. Where the critical
component of housing unaffordability is poverty, viable solutions
must address the ability to pay and not just rental supply.
The long-term solution to a renter’s lack of income is for the
renter’s income to increase, ideally through improved employment —
but for a majority of the households that are severely cost burdened,
the problem is not as simple as a lack of employment. The majority
of low-income renters are already employed or suffer some
impairment that limits or prevents employment.79
Full-time
employment does not guarantee sufficient income to afford housing
in most areas of the country. A full-time employee in the United
States earning the federal minimum wage would have to work three
full-time jobs in order to afford a modest two-bedroom apartment.80
79. See Affordable Housing Advocates Tell HUD and Congress — Keep Housing
Affordable for Low Income Families, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION

(Apr. 25, 2018), https://nlihc.org/news/affordable-housing-advocates-tell-hud-andcongress-keep-housing-affordable-low-income-families [https://perma.cc/4986-5G96];
Ann Stevens, Employment and Poverty, ECONOFACT (Jan. 7, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/E3DV-3Y7S].
https://econofact.org/employment-and-poverty
Poverty and especially housing instability are factors that make it more difficult for
people to obtain stable and consistent employment. See generally AARP POL’Y
INST., 19 MILLION WORKING-AGE AMERICANS HAVE A DISABILITY THAT LIMITS OR
PREVENTS
WORK
(2009),
https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/fs153_ssdi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MT3T-ADGW]; Kristin F. Butcher & Diane Whitmore
Schanzenbach, Most Workers in Low-Wage Labor Market Work Substantial Hours,
in Volatile Jobs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 24, 2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/most-workers-in-low-wagelabor-market-work-substantial-hours-in [https://perma.cc/GSZ9-NGRW]; Desmond
& Gershensen, supra note 19.
80.
A full-time worker earning the federal minimum wage of $7.25 needs to
work approximately 122 hours per week for all 52 weeks of the year, or
approximately three full-time jobs, to afford a two-bedroom rental home at
the national average fair market rent. The same worker needs to work 99
hours per week for all 52 weeks of the year, or approximately two and a half
full-time jobs, to afford a one-bedroom home at the national average fair
market rent.
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Full-time workers earning the applicable federal- or state-mandated
minimum wage in their jurisdiction cannot afford a two-bedroom
home in any state, metropolitan area, or county in the nation.81 In
fact, such a worker would only be able to afford a one-bedroom home
in 22 counties in the United States (out of more than 3000 counties
nationwide), each of which is located in a state that mandates a
minimum wage higher than the $7.25 per hour federal minimum.82
Ability to pay is best considered at local levels rather than based on
national averages because not only does the price of housing vary
widely based on location, but income levels do too. Considering
housing costs in isolation tells only half of the affordability story.
Certain coastal cities, including San Francisco, New York, Boston,
Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Miami, have some of the
nation’s highest home prices and are easily perceived as housing
markets that are unaffordable or “out of reach” for many renters.
The median rent in San Francisco, California, for example, is a
whopping $4580 a month, whereas median rent in Topeka, Kansas is
only $800.83 Even though affordability is less apparent in cheaper
housing markets, however, such lower-priced homes may still be
unaffordable to local populations.84 Incomes in many areas with

NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 1. The NLIHC cautions that raising
the minimum wage will not, alone, solve housing affordability issues. The report
notes that “[t]hirty-eight local jurisdictions have their own minimum wages higher
than the state or federal minimum-wage, but all fall short of the local one-bedroom
Housing Wage.” Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. San Francisco Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/sanfrancisco-ca/home-values/ [https://perma.cc/4JAQ-PTMV] (last visited Sept. 25,
2019); Topeka Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/topekaks/home-values/ [https://perma.cc/PWL9-97H5] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
84. Although many more modestly priced housing markets are in the middle of
the country (as opposed to the coasts), this is an overgeneralization and there are
important exceptions. Growing markets like Boise and Austin are becoming more
and more expensive. See Dean Johnson, What’s Driving Boise’s Hot Housing
Market?,
IDAHO
HOUSING
&
FINANCE
ASS’N
(Oct.
19,
2018),
https://www.idahohousing.com/blog/boise-housing-market/ [https://perma.cc/H47ZWSM5]; Jonathan Silver, Here’s How Much Austin Prices Have Surged in the Past 5
Years,
AUSTIN
CULTUREMAP
(Mar.
20,
2019),
http://austin.culturemap.com/news/real-estate/03-20-19-austin-home-price-increasenorth-america-report/ [https://perma.cc/4TWB-WH5X]. Several population centers in
North and South Carolina, on the other hand, remain relatively inexpensive. Devon
Thorsby, The 25 Best Affordable Places to Live in the U.S. in 2019, U.S. NEWS (Apr.
9, 2019), https://realestate.usnews.com/real-estate/slideshows/best-affordable-placesto-live-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/2P8E-ZNNP].
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moderate housing costs are disproportionately depressed.85 Just as
growth in GDP has been unevenly distributed among income
quintiles, economic improvement is also geographically diverse. For
example, the nation’s median household income increased 2.4%
between 2015 and 2016, but different states experienced strikingly
disparate financial realities during that one year.86 In Louisiana and
Wyoming, median income fell by 1–2%; in Kansas and Oklahoma,
median incomes remained virtually flat; and in California, Idaho, and
Massachusetts, median income increased by more than 4%.87
Unequal housing cost burdens represent not only location, but also
reflect job type, race, and marital status of members of a household.
The most severe housing cost burdens are associated with jobs in
certain low-paying sectors such as personal care, service, food
preparation and service, building and grounds maintenance, and
healthcare support.88 Households with young children are more
likely to be cost burdened — particularly those headed by only one
parent — and some 63% of single-parent households pay more than
50% of household income toward shelter.89 A glimpse into the
hardships such renters feel helps humanize and explain the impact of
inadequate wages and resulting housing instability. The Guardian
interviewed a single mother of two in Philadelphia, Alicia Hamiel,
who earns $7.75 an hour working at McDonald’s.90 She works full

85. Income levels vary widely by employment sector and do not move in lockstep
with housing costs. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 460–62 (explaining how
regional variation in incomes does not track housing costs).
86. See GLORIA C. GUZMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME 2016,
COMMUNITY
SURVEY
BRIEFS
(2017),
AMERICAN
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/acs/acsbr1602.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF3P-8WX7]; Gross Domestic Product by State, First
Quarter 2019, U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (July 25, 2019),
https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state [https://perma.cc/HL4C-83VQ]; supra note
29 and accompanying text.
87. GUZMAN, supra note 86, at 3.
88. NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 3–4. The number of jobs
available in these lower-paying employment sectors are growing, suggesting that
affordability problems are not necessarily indicative of inadequate employment level
but rather of inadequate wages. See Naema Ahmed, Most Jobs Created Since the
Recession
Have
Been
Low
Paying,
AXIOS
(Sep.
7,
2018),
https://www.axios.com/most-jobs-created-since-recciu-1536269032-13ccc866-5fb044e8-bd14-286ae09c296f.html [https://perma.cc/5WHP-VRPJ]; Andrew VanDam &
Heather Long, How the U.S. Economy Turned Six Good Jobs into Bad Ones, WASH.
POST (Sep. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/04/how-useconomy-turned-six-good-jobs-into-bad-ones [https://perma.cc/CLM8-PGPE].
89. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 28–29.
90. Alastair Gee, Outside in America: Minimum Wage, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2017)
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/08/minimum-wage-affordable-
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time and lives in a low-priced one-bedroom apartment with her two
children, paying only $400 a month, well below the median rental
price for the region and even the nation.91 But her extremely low
income is insufficient to afford even that low monthly rent. “I feel
like I’m failing as a mom,” The Guardian quotes Hamiel as saying. “If
I can’t make sure they have a roof over their heads, what am I doing?
I feel like I’m doing the best that I can.”92
D. Quality of Home, Quality of Community
An associated housing problem, connected to both lack of
affordable units and lack of income, is the problem of uninhabitable
home quality. In some places, there may be nearly a sufficient
quantity of affordable housing units, but the biggest housing issue
pertains to housing quality. Many of the units still in use and
affordable to low-income households without government subsidy are
in disrepair.93 A majority of units that rent for very low prices, below
$650 a month, are at least 50 years old and face daunting maintenance
needs, some of which significantly threaten the health and safety of
their occupants.94 When weak local housing markets keep both rents
and landlord profits low, landlords lack the financial incentive and/or
ability to make improvements to their rental units — they cannot
recoup these costs through increased rental rates.95 Rents in these
areas stay mercifully low, but lack of housing quality, coupled with
lack of any better, affordable alternatives, effectively condemns
lower-income residents to life in a dilapidated, hazardous
environment.
Even housing units that are subject to HUD inspection
requirements may fail to meet minimal quality standards. Rondesha
housing-rentals-study [https://perma.cc/7U8W-USMY]; see also Libertina Brandt,

Here’s How Much it Costs to Rent a One-Bedroom Apartment in 15 Major US
Cities, BUS. INSIDER (July 24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/cost-of-one-

bedroom-apartment-rent-major-us-cities-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/TVZ3-JLCX].
91. Gee, supra note 90.
92. Id.
93. In 2012, the National Association of Homebuilders estimated that “[o]ver 10
million homes in the U.S. are physically inadequate, about double the number usually
reported as having even moderate problems,” and explained that “[r]enters of
inadequate housing are concentrated at the lower end of the income scale.” PAUL
EMRATH, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, QUALITY OF THE EXISTING HOUSING
STOCK:
AS
GOOD
AS
YOU
THOUGHT?
(2012),
http://www.nahbclassic.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=180537
[https://perma.cc/YGY5-ZA54].
94. See RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 3, 15.
95. NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 6.
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Brooks, for example, lives in a housing unit that receives projectbased Section 8 subsidies from the government under a contract with
HUD, pursuant to which the unit is required to be habitable.96 Yet,
according to an NBC News report, “every corner” of her apartment,
including the living room walls, the back of the sofa, and even her
daughter’s shoes, is covered in mold.97 HUD is required by law to
ensure the quality of subsidized housing units to ensure that
recipients of federal housing assistance do not live in squalor.98 Yet
nearly 2000 subsidized rental properties failed inspection in 2018, and
still more technically passed inspection in spite of being beset with
worrisome health and safety threats such as holes in the ceiling, pest
infestation, serious mold, and the like.99 In a private meeting with
tenants in October 2018, HUD officials admitted that “the system is
broken,” and that understaffed local HUD offices could not
adequately respond to complaints or thoroughly inspect properties.100
Tenants like Brooks are not solely dependent on HUD inspectors
because landlord-tenant law also protects tenants’ right to a habitable
home.101 But local practices of blacklisting and retaliatory evictions
undercut tenant legal protections, which can render the right to live in
a safe and healthy home illusory.102 Professor Paula Franzese
interviewed several tenants in New Jersey who resided in
uninhabitable housing, some of it federally subsidized, and found
widespread fears of landlord backlash kept tenants from asserting
their rights to habitability: if a landlord evicted or blacklisted a tenant

96. See Khimm et al., supra note 5.
97. Id.
98. Federal law authorizing Section 8 subsidies requires that subsidies only be
provided to units that pass inspections for habitability. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(p) (2016).
99. Khimm et al., supra note 5; see also the results of NBC’s FOIA request,
available at http://media1.s-nbcnews.com/i/today/z_creative/InfillFoiaReacReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QX67-3Y69]. Local authorities in cities including Houston, St.
Louis, and Chicago, have attempted to address habitability deficits that HUD has not
addressed. Molly Parker, “Pretty Much a Failure:” HUD Inspections Pass Dangerous
Apartments Filled with Rats, Roaches, and Toxic Mold, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16,
2018),
https://www.propublica.org/article/hud-inspections-pass-dangerousapartments-with-rats-roaches-toxic-mold [https://perma.cc/XKE6-HQ4N].
100. Khimm et al., supra note 5.
101. See Paula Franzese et al., The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives:
Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 1
(2016); Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1446 (1974). Uniform laws have
endorsed granting tenants the legal ability to withhold rent during the time that the
rented premises are uninhabitable. REVISED UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD &
TENANT ACT § 402 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005).
102. See generally DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 11.
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in retaliation for complaints about habitability, the tenant would have
no other affordable options for shelter.103 In one example, Yanira
Cortez, having lived with mold, rats, and roaches for some time,
finally withheld rent in protest when her bathroom ceiling
collapsed.104 In retaliation, before the eviction suit against her had
even been decided, Cortez’s landlord added her name to a list of
tenants who had been evicted for nonpayment of rent, a list that was
used by local landlords to determine whether to rent to a given
applicant.105 Lack of affordable rental options ties the hands of
tenants and forces them to accept illegal living conditions. The
market in many places offers no good choice to these low-income
tenants: They can put up with poor quality homes or spend an
unsustainably high percentage of their income on housing.
Sometimes, they do both.106
In addition to facing the problem of uninhabitable housing units,
lower-income households are also more likely sited in poor quality
neighborhoods. Affordable housing is predominantly located in areas
of concentrated poverty, many of which are unsafe, unsupported, and
even toxic.107
A majority of the residents of many such
neighborhoods are people of color, condemned to live in poor quality
neighborhoods by a history of systemic housing segregation,
persistent poverty, and inequitable opportunities for advancement —
all of which directly resulted from federal policies over the past
several decades.108 Even when residents of such communities pay no

103. Paula Franzese, A Place to Call Home: Tenant Blacklisting and the Denial of
Opportunity, 65 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 662, 674 (2018).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 11.
107. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:

SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 20–24, 54–55, 81 (1993).
“Ironically, almost every attempt to alleviate housing costs and encourage housing
equity has resulted in at least some degree of segregation retrenchment.” Andrea J.
Boyack, Side by Side: Revitalizing Urban Cores and Ensuring Residential Diversity,
92 CHI.-KENT L. Rev. 435, 448–49 (2017) [hereinafter Boyack, Revitalizing].
“Neighborhood matters. Equality of opportunity is a myth when segments of the
population live in high-crime, distressed neighborhoods.” Id. at 449. To put it another
way, “where you grow up affects where you wind up.” MANUEL PASTOR & MARGERY
AUSTIN TURNER, URB. INST., REDUCING POVERTY AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS AFTER
ARRA: POTENTIAL ROLES FOR PLACE CONSCIOUS STRATEGIES 3 (2010).
108. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 107; Andrea J. Boyack, A New
American Dream for Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 573, 576–77 (2016)
[hereinafter Boyack, Detroit]; Kelly DeRango, Discrimination and Segregation in
Housing, 8 UPJOHN EMP. RES. 1 (2001); Charles L. Nier III, Perpetuation of

Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal Interpretation of Relining Under
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more than 30% of their income toward housing costs, they still bear
significant, if less measurable, costs from living in depressed areas.
The country’s most impoverished neighborhoods have some of the
least effective and least supported schools, and children who attend
these schools have a consequentially diminished potential.109 Crime is
higher in areas of concentrated poverty, threatening financial and
physical well-being of area inhabitants.110 Residents of low-income
neighborhoods lack access to quality jobs, stores with fresh, healthy
foods, and adequate healthcare.111 There are few neighborhood
amenities in low-income tracts, and there are more locally
undesirable land uses (so-called LULUs) that create significant health
and environmental harms.112 Those unable to pay for shelter in

the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617 (1999); Florence W. Roisman,
The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and Means of Promoting
Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479 (1995); Jacob S. Rugh &
Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM.

SOC. REV. 629, 630–634 (2010).
109. Not only are poorer neighborhoods more likely to have low-performing public
schools, but families receiving every type of federal housing assistance (public
housing, housing vouchers, or living in tax-credit-created low-income housing) are
actually even more likely than other non-assisted poor families to be located near a
state’s most disadvantaged schools. INGRID GOULD ELLEN & KEREN HORN, POVERTY
& RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, HOUSING AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY:
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL SCHOOLS NEAR FAMILIES WITH FEDERAL HOUSING
ASSISTANCE 1 (2018). Children in high-poverty neighborhoods attend worse schools
and are more likely to drop out and are less likely to go to college. See PASTOR &
TURNER, supra note 107, at 2.
110. See ANNA AIZER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, NEIGHBORHOOD
VIOLENCE AND URBAN YOUTH 279–89 (2008) (finding that poorer neighborhoods
increase exposure to crime); ANNE C. CASE & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, NAT’L BUREAU
OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE COMPANY YOU KEEP: THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY AND
NEIGHBORHOOD ON DISADVANTAGED YOUTHS 3, 10, 17 (1991) (finding that
neighborhood can substantially increase a person’s “probability of being involved in a
crime”); Maqbool et al., supra note 64, at 6.
111. See Chiquita A. Collins & David R. Williams, Segregation and Mortality: The
Deadly Effects of Racism?, 14 SOC. F. 495, 499–504 (1999); Thomas A. LaVeist,

Segregation, Poverty, and Empowerment: Health Consequences for African
Americans, 71 MILBANK Q. 41, 45–46, 55 (1993); Maqbool et al., supra note 64, at 2–

3.

112. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1389–90 (1994);
Antoine M. Thompson, Environmental Racism — A Quiet Killer in Black
Communities,
N.Y.
AMSTERDAM
NEWS
(Apr.
22,
2019),
http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2019/apr/22/environmental-racism-blackcommunities/ [https://perma.cc/J2ZD-R7J6]. Disparate exposure to pollutants has
been shown by multiple scientific studies. For example, a 2012 study of air quality
demonstrated a significant inequality of exposure to poor air quality based on
neighborhood, which also created a disparate impact based on race and ethnicity.
Michelle L. Bell & Keita Ebisu, Environmental Inequality in Exposures to Airborne
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healthy communities are therefore often condemned to live and raise
their family in a neighborhood with deficits that diminish current and
future opportunities for advancement. Living in poor quality
neighborhoods perpetuates intergenerational poverty and results in
lower quality and duration of life.113
II. TREATING SYMPTOMS AND SEARCHING FOR A CURE
Housing unaffordability is a plague on our society. Federal, state,
and local governments have been attempting to treat this socioeconomic disease for decades. Methods of treatment vary, from
limiting prices that housing providers can charge or mandating the
production of affordable housing units,114 to creating governmentowned low-price housing,115 to providing offsets and subsidies that
either encourage increased affordable housing supply or subsidize
households’ ability to pay housing costs.116 Many of these treatments
have directly or indirectly improved certain people’s housing burdens,
but only a fraction of those affected by unaffordable housing receive
publicly funded benefits, and some of the efforts to make housing
affordable have caused troubling side effects.117
In addition,
federalism complexities and poorly designed policies make some
government housing expenditures haphazard, inequitable, and

Particulate Matter Components in the United States, 120 ENV’T. HEALTH PERSP.

1699, 1700–01 (2012).
113. See generally Maqbool et al., supra note 64. Children relocated into higheropportunity neighborhoods enjoy measurably better health outcomes. See MEGAN
SANDEL ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUSING POL’Y, HOUSING AS A HEALTH CARE
INVESTMENT: AFFORDABLE HOUSING SUPPORTS CHILDREN’S HEALTH 4 2016. The
Moving to Opportunity experiment showed that if young children were relocated to
higher-quality neighborhoods, they were more likely to be able to break the multigenerational cycle of poverty, but that moving to higher-quality neighborhood later
in life had significantly fewer measurable positive effects. See Raj Chetty et al., The

Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the
Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 855, 889–891

(2015). For the purposes of the Moving to Opportunity experiment, a “high
opportunity neighborhood” was defined as a neighborhood with poverty rates below
15 , labor force participation rates above 60%, more than 20% of adults having
completed college, and more than 70% of the neighborhood being occupied by nonHispanic white households, with more than 200,000 low-wage jobs located within five
miles of the center of the neighborhood. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., URB.
INST., BENEFITS OF LIVING IN HIGH OPPORTUNITY NEIGHBORHOODS: INSIGHTS FROM
THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY DEMONSTRATION 2 (2012).
114. See infra Part II.A.
115. See infra Part II.B.
116. See infra Parts II.C and II.D, respectively.
117. See, e.g., Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 487–90.
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wasteful.118 Furthermore, the spending allocated primarily to treat
unbearable symptoms of housing unaffordability may not translate
into helping to cure the problem.119
Part II of this Article discusses four categories of governmental
responses to the problem of housing unaffordability. Section A
examines government limits on housing prices through rent control
regulations and inclusionary zoning requirements.
Section B
considers public housing. Sections C and D discuss supply-side and
demand-side housing subsidies that allocate public funds to, on the
one hand, offset the cost of creating and rehabilitating housing units,
and, on the other hand, to offset the costs charged to households for
housing, on the other.
A. Controlling the Price
In an unregulated market, housing consumers (renters and buyers)
bear the burden of increasing housing costs — and in most of the
country, the law does not change this cost allocation baseline.
Generally, when market prices increase for any good or service, a
would-be buyer must either pay more to obtain that good or service
or go without it. In the context of housing, however, some
jurisdictions have enacted local laws establishing direct and indirect
price controls, even though many states’ laws explicitly prohibit local
price controls for housing except in a temporary “emergency”.120

118. “As a nation, we both pay too much and pay too little toward housing.” Id. at
458 (discussing inefficiencies and unsustainable program design and implementation
in the context of housing).
119. Id. at 457–58.
120. At the end of 2018, local rent control only existed in four states (California,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York) and the District of Columbia. See Residential
Rent
Control
Law
Guide
by
State,
LANDLORD.COM,
[https://perma.cc/TS6Lhttp://www.landlord.com/rent_control_laws_by_state.htm
UMC9]. In each case, state law constrains municipal authority to impose controls on
rents. In California, for example, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act of 1995
limited local governments from expanding then-existing price controls on rental
housing, so that homes built after 1995 are free from local rent controls and cities’
rent stabilization regimes are unable to expand beyond what they covered in 1995. A
ballot initiative to remove these state-level restrictions on municipal rent control was
defeated in 2018, but in 2019, state legislators proposed various bills to roll back the
1995 Act to give local governments more flexibility to set rental rates. See, e.g., A.B.
36, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (allowing rent controls to apply to housing more
than twenty years old), A.B. 1482, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (preventing
landlords from increasing rents by more than a specified percentage above yearly
inflation); Caroline Basile, Rent Control Back on the Table in California,
HOUSINGWIRE (Mar. 15, 2019), housingwire.com/articles/48443-rent-control-back-onthe-table-in-california [https://perma.cc/2PQW-N3FQ]. In other areas of the country,
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Historically, rent control ordinances were exclusively matters of local
law, but in 2019, Oregon became the first jurisdiction to establish rent
control at the state level.121 Controlling the price that can be charged
for housing shifts costs onto housing providers, a move that is
controversial and allegedly counterproductive in the long term.122

state statutes explicitly prevent localities from creating rent control regimes unless
there is a “housing emergency.” For example, Florida law provides:
No law, ordinance, rule, or other measure which would have the effect of
imposing controls on rents shall be adopted or maintained in effect except
as provided herein and unless it is found and determined, as hereinafter
provided, that such controls are necessary and proper to eliminate an
existing housing emergency which is so grave as to constitute a serious
menace to the general public.
Fla. Stat. § 166.043 (2001). Local rent control legislation is most common in New
York. See supra note 120. New York City amended its rent control laws in 2019, and
the amended rent control laws are currently the subject of litigation claiming that the
legislation violates the Constitution. See Complaint, Cmty. Hous. Improv. Program v.
City of New York Rent Guidelines Bd., No. 1:19-cv-04087 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2019).
Among other things, the complaint alleges that “[t]he New York City Housing
‘Emergency’” has been “declared every three years for the last 50 years with no
rational basis for the decision[.]” Id. at 59; see also Bobby Allyn, New York
Landlords Call Rent Control Laws “Illegal Taking” in New Federal Lawsuit, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (July 17, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/17/742875001/new-yorklandlords-call-rent-control-laws-an-illegal-taking-in-new-federal-lawsu
[https://perma.cc/L48Y-BNHB].
121. Sasha Ingber, Oregon Set to Pass the First Statewide Rent Control Bill, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/698509957/oregon-setto-pass-the-first-statewide-rent-control-bill [https://perma.cc/V9QQ-FPHL]; Elliot
Njus, Oregon Gov. Kate Brown Signs Nation’s First Statewide Rent Control Law,
OREGONIAN (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2019/02/oregongov-kate-brown-signs-nations-first-statewide-rent-control-law.html
[https://perma.cc/ED7E-XHFZ]. The Oregon law caps annual rental increases at 7%
above inflation, with certain rental housing excepted. Id.
122. Richard Epstein, one of the most outspoken legal critics of rent control
legislation, claims that economists are “well nigh unanimous in their condemnation of
rent control statutes.” Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient
Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 759–60 (1988) (citing Bruno S. Frey et
al., Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 986 (1984) (noting that over 98% economics surveyed believed that rent
control would negatively impact housing supply)). Critiques of rent control from
Epstein and economists, however, have been criticized in turn by some urban
planners, social scientists, and some other legal theorists. See, e.g., Kenneth K.
Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore A Free Market?, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 1231, 1232–33 (1989) (citing several studies that purportedly show a lack of
negative impact of rent control on housing supply); Note, Reassessing Rent Control:
Its Economic Impact in A Gentrifying Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835,
1843–55 (1988) (making empirical, analytical, and policy arguments for rent control
to counteract the negative implications of gentrification). A recent comparative study
of 40 years of municipal rent control in New Jersey concluded that moderate rent
control regimes have no impact on quality or quantity of housing. Joshua D.
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Homebuying markets in the United States operate independently of
government price controls — homes are bought and sold for whatever
price a willing buyer and a willing seller agree on. Unregulated
pricing is the reality in a majority of US rental markets as well, with
the exception of a few local governments that have enacted price
controls for certain rental units, typically in the form of rent
stabilization and vacancy decontrol regulation.123
Rent control is a politically divisive, much-debated concept in the
law. The federal government has, for the most part, allowed states
and municipalities self-determination on the issue. Although housing
price regulations have been challenged as unconstitutional takings,
the Supreme Court has never (yet) invalidated a rent control
ordinance on constitutional grounds.124 Economists criticize rent
control regulations for their market disrupting effects, pointing out
that decreasing landlord profits will push housing providers out of the
Ambrosius et al., Forty Years of Rent Control: Reexamining New Jersey’s Moderate
Local Policies after the Great Recession, 49 CITIES 121, 123 (2015).
123. In five of the six jurisdictions that permit rent controls, local governments
have enacted a variety of regulations affecting rental rates, including rent ceilings,
limitations on rental increases, and, in many cases, vacancy decontrols. Although
applicability of local rent control is limited by state law in California, see supra note
116, local rent regulation is still quite popular. See, e.g., BERKLEY, CAL. MUN. CODE §
13.76.060 (2018) (establishing a board that sets and periodically adjusts rent ceilings
for rental units as permitted by state law); S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 37.8(b)(1)(A)
(2019) (limiting annual rent increases to a maximum of 7%). New Jersey permits its
municipalities to enact rent controls, and there are over 100 different rent control
regimes in that state. See generally N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, DIV. OF CODES &
STANDARDS, LANDLORD-TENANT INFO. SERVS., 2009 RENT CONTROL SURVEY (2019)
https://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/rnt_cntrl_srvy_2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8W3-44P4]. For a discussion of various types of rent control
statutes and legal vulnerabilities of each type, see Jakob S. Harle, Challenging Rent
Control: Strategies for Attack, 34 UCLA L. REV. 149, 155–70 (1986). In 2019, Oregon
became the first jurisdiction to pass a statewide rent control law. See supra note 121
and accompanying text.
124. In 1919, the Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia law granting a
commission temporary oversight of lease terms for properties in the city, holding that
the rental housing market in Washington, D.C. was monopolized. Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135, 157 (1921). More than 60 years later, in the case of Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), the Court upheld a California rent control ordinance,
specifically holding that it did not amount to a taking and did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because the ordinance was designed to promote “consumer
welfare” and took into account a landlord’s financial situation. Id. at 13–15. The
Supreme Court reiterated its holding from Pennell in later cases. See, e.g., Yee v. City
of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 529 (1992). Rent control ordinances, like any statute,
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose to be valid. See
Pennell, 485 U.S. at 859. This modest burden is easily met in the case of rent control
ordinances, since those ordinances are established to fulfill the legitimate government
purpose of ensuring adequate affordable housing. See id. (“tenant hardship
provisions are designed to serve the legitimate purpose of protecting tenants”).
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market, ultimately driving down housing supply.125 Some critics also
cite unfair distributive effects of rent control ordinances, arguing that
such regulations inequitably allocate the costs of unaffordable
housing to impacted landlords rather than to the taxpaying public as a
whole.126 Market dysfunction — perhaps due to monopolistic or
exploitative pricing — might provide an economic justification for
rent controls, but most rental regulations do not specifically target
inefficiencies of poorly functioning markets, but instead are largely
politically motivated quick answers to widespread complaints that
rents are “too damn high.”127 It may be cheap, fast, and easy for
governments to reduce rents by using their police power to pass a law
restricting prices, but involuntary price controls may be
counterproductive in the long term and create fairness concerns akin
to regulatory takings.128
In recent years, local governments have increasingly employed an
indirect tool to indirectly mandate affordable rental pricing:
inclusionary zoning.129 Like rent regulation, inclusionary zoning is

125. Economic theorists assert that rent control reduces both the quantity and
quality of housing in a market. In the short run, there will be wait lists for housing
units or units will be misallocated based on favoritism, bribes, and discrimination. In
the long term, the supply of rental housing will diminish, particularly if conversion to
condominium ownership is an available alternative. Empirical studies have posited
that rent control is net wealth reducing for society because the benefits to tenants do
not exceed the costs to landlords. See Epstein, supra note 122, at 759–63.
126. In his concurrent opinion in Pennell, Justice Scalia opined that,
The traditional manner in which American government has met the
problem of those who cannot pay reasonable prices for privately sold
necessities — a problem caused by the society at large — has been the
distribution to such persons of funds raised from the public at large through
taxes, either in cash (welfare payments) or in goods (public housing,
publicly subsidized housing, and food stamps). Unless we are to abandon
the guiding principle of the Takings Clause that “public burdens . . . should
be borne by the public as a whole,” Armstrong [v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960)], this is the only manner that our Constitution permits.
Pennell, 458 U.S. at 21–22 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. “Rent is too DAMN high!” was the slogan popularized by habitual fringe
New York mayoral and gubernatorial candidate Jimmy McMillan and his self-named
“Rent Is Too Damn High Party.” See generally Rent Is Too “Damn” High,
http://www.rentistoodamnhigh.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/23BE-WNEN].
128. Economics Professor Richard Muth likened rent control to “drinking to
excess,” theorizing that in both cases, “its benefits are realized first and the costs are
paid at a later date.” Richard F. Muth, Redistribution of Income Through Regulation
in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 691, 693–94 (1983).
129. Inclusionary zoning refers to local land use laws that mandate the construction
of affordable housing as a condition for other housing development. For a helpful
overview of inclusionary zoning, see Michael Floryan, Cracking the Foundation:

Highlighting and Criticizing the Shortcomings of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning
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attractive to local governments grappling with housing unaffordability
because it requires no outlay of funds.130 Inclusionary zoning is more
than merely the absence of exclusionary zoning, a legal construct that
creates a myriad of ill effects on housing markets, including inflated
costs, segregation, and sprawl.131 Instead, inclusionary zoning is the
use of land regulation tools to mandate the creation of low-priced
rental units as a prerequisite for new development in a community.
Inclusionary zoning increases the supply of affordable housing in a
community (at least initially), but achieves such increases without
purchasing voluntary commitments to produce affordable housing, as
does the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, for example.132 When a
government employs grants, tax credits, and financing subsidies to
grow the supply of affordable housing, it pays a private entity to
produce low-priced rental units. But when a government uses
inclusionary zoning to increase the supply of affordable housing, it
merely mandates that same result by law, without expending public
funds.133
Although inclusionary zoning schemes have been
challenged as unconstitutional takings in the form of exactions, courts
have determined inclusionary zoning can be a valid exercise of police
power — promoting the public purpose of increasing affordable

Practices, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (2010). Inclusionary zoning has become
increasingly popular, and by 2018, over 500 municipalities have enacted some form
of inclusionary zoning. William J. Diehl, An Olympic Relay Race-Passing Atlanta’s
Public Housing to Public-Privative Partnerships from the 1996 Olympic Games to
Today, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L., 575, 601 (2018). On the

other hand, other states have recently specifically prohibited local inclusionary
zoning mandates. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 66.1015 (2018) (“No city, village, town, or county
may enact, impose, or enforce an inclusionary zoning requirement”).
130. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
1167, 1188 (1981) (“Inclusionary requirements are essentially excise taxes on the
activity of homebuilding.”); Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s
Contributions to Both Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 585, 600 (2015); Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary
Zoning: Successfully Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 972–74
(2002); EPSTEIN, supra note 68, at 64; Floryan, supra note 129, at 1053.
131. Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781–82 (1969); Boyack, Exclude,
supra note 8, at 454 (discussing exclusionary zoning); Iglesias, supra note 130, at 600
(discussing the need to enact inclusionary zoning ordinances to counteract the
adverse effects of decades of exclusionary zoning).
132. For a discussion on LIHTCs, see infra notes 192–205 and accompanying text.
133. Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning — The Answer to
the Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383, 385–86 (2006);
Iglesias, supra note 130, at 600.
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housing supply.134
Nevertheless, inclusionary zoning remains
controversial and continues to be criticized on both legal and
economic grounds on bases similar to critiques levied against rent
controls.135
Both rent control and inclusionary zoning occur at the local
government level, and although they are technically revenue neutral,
economists caution that both could negatively impact affordable
housing supply and ironically drive up housing costs in the long
term.136 In addition, both approaches potentially raise takings issues
that would not exist with government expenditure of public funds to
promote housing affordability. Sustainable solutions to unaffordable
housing, therefore, will likely involve an investment of public funds
even though doing so can be politically fraught.
B. Public Ownership
Public ownership of housing allows governments to ensure
affordable pricing without the potential adverse market effects and
takings concerns that arise over regulatory controls of housing costs.
When a government controls the resource itself, it can act to price the
resource to achieve consumer affordability rather than to maximize
profit. Public control and pricing can be economically justified in
cases of a “natural monopoly” (like a city’s water or sewage system)
and in cases where demand is inelastic and public welfare concerns
support universal access.137 Public housing can be conceptualized as a

134. 2910 Ga. Ave. LLC v. D.C., 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 316 (D.D.C. 2017); Home
Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. City of Chi., 213 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1029 (N.D. Ill.
2016); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979 (2015).
135. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 68, at 69–70. Epstein cites to the experience of
San Jose, California to illustrate his contention that inclusionary zoning adversely
affects housing supply. Id. In the seven years before inclusionary zoning was enacted
in San Jose, 28,000 new homes were built, and in the seven years after the
inclusionary zoning program was enacted, only 11,000 new homes were built, of
which 770 were affordable. Id. at 70. Epstein then queries, “is the community better
off with 770 affordable units at the price of 17,000 aggregate units?” and concludes
that it is a “terrible tradeoff.” Id; see also Ellickson, supra note 130, at 1188
(concluding that the inclusionary zoning requirements “are essentially excise taxes on
the activity of homebuilding.”).
136. See supra notes 122, 125, 130.
137. See Frank A. Wolak, Public Utility Pricing and Finance, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 2 (Steven N. Durlaf & Lawrence E. Blum
eds., 2008) (explaining the concept of economic justifications for and proper pricing
of public utilities). There is a compelling argument that low-income housing is not a
“natural monopoly,” and that public utility theory does not therefore apply to the
resource, but demand inelasticity may create an alternate basis to apply the theory in
this context.
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public utility, and its justification turns on finding that because the
resource (housing) is a necessity with inelastic demand, and is subject
to out-of-reach costs (for lower income people), making public
distribution and pricing of the resource is optimal. When the
government owns a resource, any gap between the cost to produce
the resource and the cost consumers pay to enjoy it will be borne by
the public at large rather than by certain private landlords (as is the
case under price control legislation).138 Public management of a
resource means that the government chooses its pricing rather than
allowing it to be set by the market. Although government ownership
can ensure lower prices, it also means that resource management and
allocation are not subject to market discipline.139 Public ownership
schemes must grapple with such issues.
Public ownership does, however, enable consumers to obtain
access to resources at reasonable prices. Thus, in the abstract, the
publicly owned, affordably priced housing could be a good way to
provide homes to low-income renters who cannot afford to pay
market rates for shelter. Public shelter programs currently exist at
state and local levels, targeting populations with critical, but often
temporary, housing needs, such as women fleeing domestic abuse and
people who are homeless.140 There are also about one million
138. After all, regulatory takings claims are essentially based on the argument that
it is unfair to impose the costs of a public benefit on a handful of private owners
rather than on the public at large. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 139 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The question in this case is
whether the cost associated with the city of New York’s desire to preserve a limited
number of ‘landmarks’ within its borders must be borne by all of its taxpayers or
whether it can instead be imposed entirely on the owners of the individual
properties.”). Public ownership of a regulated resource avoids this problem by
distributing the cost of subsidized access across all taxpayers.
139. See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 543, 548 (1995) (analyzing accountability concerns that arise over federal
government corporations).
140. HUD’s Office of Special Needs Assistance Programs provides funding to state
and local governments as well as non-profit entities to be used to “quickly rehouse
homeless individuals and families.” Homelessness Assistance, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING &
URB.
DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/homeless
[https://perma.cc/YTT6-R85D] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). Because the number of
homeless individuals and families is rapidly increasing, such state and local run (and
partially federally funded) shelter programs continue to be a critical element of
housing policy. Scott Greenstone, Is Seattle’s Homeless Crisis the Worst in the
Country?, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/homeless/is-seattles-homeless-crisis-the-worst-in-the-country/
[https://perma.cc/BA76-58MC] (quantifying and discussing the ten cities with the
most extreme homeless challenges). See, e.g., GISELLE ROUTHIER, COALITION FOR
THE
HOMELESS,
STATE
OF
THE
HOMELESS
2018
2,
4
(2018),
https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-
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federally funded public housing units — the remnant of twentiethcentury federal public housing programs — in our rental housing
inventory.141 But those housing programs were implemented in
problematic ways that further concentrated poverty (and crime) and
exacerbated racial inequality throughout the country.142 Some of the
problems with public housing came from siting of the properties —
predominantly in very low-income, high-crime, often racially
segregated tracts — and some of the problems came from the physical
design and maintenance of the projects themselves.143
By the 1990s, in reaction to the notorious failings of public housing
projects, the federal government essentially ceased producing public
housing and created programs transitioning many existing public
housing developments away from government ownership and
control.144 Since then, a quarter million public housing units — an

content/uploads/2018/03/CFHStateoftheHomeless2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASX4RNYK] (tracking and projecting the homeless population and demand for emergency
shelter in New York City). Federal funding is available to help shelter victims of
domestic violence through the Family Violence Prevention and Services Program.
Family
Violence
Prevention
Services,
BENEFITS.GOV,
https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/626 [https://perma.cc/5N7H-CRAG] (last visited
Aug. 28, 2019). The number of homeless people in the United States has increased
over the past few years, most recently by 3800 in 2017. Some 1.4 million people,
including 147,000 families with children, used a homeless shelter at some point during
2016. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 34.
141. HUD’s
Public
Housing
Program,
HUD,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/U8AA-D5HV]
(last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
142. Joseph Heathcott, The Strange Career of Public Housing: Policy, Planning
and the American Metropolis in the Twentieth Century, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 360,
367–70 (2012); Gregory A. Byrne et al., Taking Stock of Public Housing, PUB.
HOUSING
AUTHORITY
DIRECTORS
ASS’N
2
(2003),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/doc_25737.doc [https://perma.cc/7AQE-97NJ];
Joseph Heathcott, The Strange Career of Public Housing: Policy, Planning and the
American Metropolis in the Twentieth Century, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 360, 367–70
(2012).
143. Policy Basics: Public Housing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 15,
2017) [hereinafter CBP on Public Housing], https://www.cbpp.org/research/policybasics-public-housing [https://perma.cc/KSV3-VCEC].
144. “Congress has abandoned public housing properties, public housing residents,
and the notion that the federal government should continue to own affordable
housing.” Shamus Roller & Jessica Cassella, The Promise and Peril of HUD’s RAD
Program, SHELTERFORCE (July 30, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/07/30/thepromise-and-peril-of-huds-rad-program/ [https://perma.cc/GLK3-SV7P] (opining that
what is really “broken” is Congress’s perception of “the value of public housing,
based largely on racist mythologies about the people who live in subsidized
properties, about violence, and the ‘undeserving’ poor”). With some limited
exceptions, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 banned nearly
all construction of net new public housing units after 1999. Quality Housing and
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average of 10,000 each year — have been demolished or otherwise
removed from the housing stock.145 Another 60,000 public housing
units have been converted to units supported by project-based
subsidies through Section 8.146 Even though public housing has been
subject to harsh criticism, some 2.6 million people still live in just
under one million public housing units throughout the country.147
Eliminating public housing units can cause low-income families to
lose access to affordable housing if they are not provided with
equivalent options and supports.148
Moreover, HUD has an
inconsistent record in adequately providing for displaced low-income
public housing tenants.149
Although funding and oversight for public housing come from
HUD, these properties are managed locally by about 2900 public
housing agencies (PHAs).150 Public housing provides homes for some
of the most impoverished households in the country, the
overwhelming majority of which (90%) are composed of the elderly,
those with disabilities, or those who meet work requirements.151

Work Responsibility Act of 1998, PUB. L. No. 105-276, § 9, 112 STAT. 2461, 2256
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
145. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., ADVOCATES’ GUIDE 2017: A PRIMER ON
FEDERAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 4–8
(2017),
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/2017_Advocates-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GML3-XNWS]; see also Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD),
Nat’l Housing L. Project (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nhlp.org/resources/rentalassistance-demonstration-rad/ [https://perma.cc/8GWB-Y39F]; CBP on Public
Housing, supra note 143.
146. The voucher programs were established by HUD in 1974 under the authority
of Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937. Vouchers provide for payment from HUD to
landlords for a portion of rents in excess of 30% of the tenant’s gross income. Section
8 Rental Certificate Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/programdescription/cert8 [https://perma.cc/K3EG-7GF2]; Policy
Basics: Housing Choice Voucher Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 2
(2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics-housing-1-2513vouch.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS4C-L7CG]; see also CBP on Public Housing, supra
note 143. HUD has authorized another 185,000 additional public units to be
converted in the future. Id; see infra notes 245–63.
147. “HUD data indicate that the number of public housing units fell from 1.1
million in 2006 to 1.0 million in 2016.” RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 32.
“[P]ublic housing units are located in all 50 states and several territories, one in five
of them in rural areas.” CBP on Public Housing, supra note 143.
148. Roller & Cassella, supra note 144.
149. Id.
150. CBP on Public Housing, supra note 143.
151. Units are available only to low-income families, with incomes at 80% of the
local median income or lower. At least 40 of new families admitted to public housing
each year must be “extremely low-income,” defined as having an income at or below
30% of the local median. Id.
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Families housed in such units pay 30% of their income as rent, while
the federal government supposedly bears the operating and
maintenance costs associated with the housing that are not covered by
rental receipts.152 But in practice, however, Congress has consistently
underfunded public housing.153 In 2010, HUD estimated that decades
of deferred maintenance and lack of upgrades had created a public
The public housing
housing upkeep deficit of $26 million.154
approach to reducing the costs of housing is critically important to the
people who live in such units and, for certain populations (disabled
veterans, for example), may be the best housing solution.155
Government housing has, in many cases, been dismissed as a
failure,156 but public ownership and provision of housing for

152. Id.
153. Id. Funding for public housing comes from both the Public Housing Operating
Fund (to cover operating costs) and the Public Housing Capital Fund (to cover
capital improvements), but in all but two years since 2002, the Public Housing
Operating Fund has been deliberately underfunded. Id. In a similar vein, necessary
capital improvements to public housing have been consistently deferred, however
Congress did fund The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative in 2010 and the HOPE VI
program, which provided a small number of grants to revitalize distressed public
housing developments. Id. Douglas Rice & Barbara Sard, Decade of Neglect Has

Weakened Federal Low-Income Housing Programs: New Resources Required to
Meet Growing Needs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 15 (2009),

https://www.cbpp.org/research/decade-of-neglect-has-weakened-federal-low-incomehousing-programs [https://perma.cc/YJR6-S4DC].
154. MERYL FINKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., CAPITAL NEEDS
IN
THE
PUBLIC
HOUSING
PROGRAM
(2010),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PH_CAPITAL_NEEDS.PDF
[https://perma.cc/TFX9-NBU5].
Congress’s failure to adequately fund public housing, along with many
instances of mismanagement in sites across the country, has left housing
authorities in untenable positions: demolish or convert to other types of
HUD housing assistance through RAD. The program serves as a powerful
tool for the preservation of public housing units, but it comes with a host of
challenges.
Roller & Cassella, supra note 144.
155. The majority of public housing inhabitants today are elderly or disabled (or
both). Public Housing: Image Versus Facts, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV. (May
1995),
https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/ushmc/spring95/spring95.html
[https://perma.cc/VX9K-EDVK].
156. See, e.g., Edward G. Goetz, The Audacity of HOPE VI: Discourse and the
Dismantling of Public Housing, 35 CITIES 342, 342–46 (2013) (comparing public
housing residents’ positive perspective regarding public housing with the “discourse
of disaster” generally used to vilify public housing in order to justify dismantling
public housing as something “deviant, dysfunctional, or obsolete”); Ben Austen, The
Last Tower: The Decline and Fall of Public Housing, HARPER’S MAG. (Apr. 2012),
https://harpers.org/archive/2012/05/the-last-tower/
[https://perma.cc/2BML-V5DV]
(calling Cabrini-Green in Chicago a “nightmare vision of public housing, the
ungovernable inner-city horrors that many believe arise when too many poor black
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vulnerable populations would be an effective tool to combat housing
unaffordability if appropriately designed and implemented.157
C. Subsidizing Production Costs to Increase Affordable Housing
Supply
The gap between the supply of and demand for low-cost rental
housing is a significant part of the housing affordability puzzle, and
government spending to encourage an increase in the supply of
affordable rentals and the preservation of existing affordable units is
a critical part of the solution to the affordable housing crisis.158
Economists prefer efforts to increase housing supply over efforts to
mandate pricing or subsidies of consumers’ housing costs because
increasing the supply of units can help stabilize the supply-demand

folk are stacked atop one another in too little space”); Howard Husock, How Public
Housing Harms Cities, CITY J. (2003), https://www.city-journal.org/html/how-publichousing-harms-cities-12410.html [https://perma.cc/C3V6-UXTL] (“Housing projects
radiate dysfunction and social problems outward, damaging local businesses and
neighborhood property values.”).
157. In the case of the extremely low-income residents of public housing with
special needs for additional supportive services, housing challenges cannot be solved
through increasing the supply of affordable units in the broader market. For these
populations, public housing is likely the best solution. See, e.g., Ehren Dohler et al.,
Supportive Housing Helps Vulnerable People Live and Thrive in the Community,
ON
BUDGET
&
POL’Y
PRIORITIES
(May
31,
2016),
CTR.
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/supportive-housing-helps-vulnerable-peoplelive-and-thrive-in-the-community [https://perma.cc/C38J-GRGK]; Peter W. Salisch,
Jr., Does America Need Public Housing?, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 689, 730–31, 736
(2012).
158. There are numerous government programs encouraging housing supply and
supporting housing demand for both owners and renters, funded through HUD, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the
U.S. Treasury Department. See generally CAROL N. BROWN, EXPERIENCING
HOUSING LAW 626 (2016). Many of the programs focus on increasing housing supply,
reasoning that increasing supply of a good will result in reducing its market price. See
Vicki Been, City Nimbys, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 227–28 (2018). Some
affordable housing advocates and scholars caution that although increasing the
supply of affordable housing units will help affordability, merely increasing the
supply of housing units in general might not improve affordability if the overall
supply of land in a given market is artificially constrained, by local land use
regulations. VICKI BEEN ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR., SUPPLY SKEPTICISM: HOUSING
SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, 3–8 (2017) [hereinafter BEEN, SUPPLY SKEPTICISM]
https://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HYB-6HDZ]; see also What is Preservation?, NAT’L HOUSING TR.,
[https://perma.cc/6XPJhttp://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/what-preservation
5SCC]. See generally JOSEPH GYOURKO & RAVEN MOLLOY, REGULATION AND
HOUSING SUPPLY 1 (2014).
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disequilibrium in the housing market for lower price points.159
Creating more affordable units leverages natural economic forces160
and theoretically produces longer-term benefits for housing
adequacy. Increasing the supply can be framed as an investment in
the housing system as a whole, not just a stop-gap measure to
minimize the impact of costly housing on specific households.161
Federal programs play a huge and vital role in helping to fund the
production costs and encouraging the growth of affordable housing
supply.162
The various federal programs providing financial
incentives designed to increase the supply of affordable housing are
legion, and a description of all the various methods and specifics is
beyond the scope of this Article.163 Subsidy and incentive programs
exist for both saleable homes and rental units.164 Financial assistance

159. See generally Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14 (focusing on creating an
economic justification for supply-side housing initiatives).
160. Basic economic theory holds that increasing supply of a good while holding
demand constant will lead to a decrease in price. See OPENSTAX, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS ch. 3.2 (2018), https://opentextbc.ca/principlesofeconomics/chapter/3-2shifts-in-demand-and-supply-for-goods-and-services/ [https://perma.cc/25MP-95SY];
see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
161. For a lengthier discussion on the import of supply-side affordability programs,
see Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 473–81; see also Boyack, Equitably, supra
note 31, at 132–47.
162. It is difficult to precisely allocate the share of affordable housing funding
among federal, state, local, and non-profit and for-profit sources because these
various governmental and private providers often act in concert and combine efforts.
For example, federal funding is provided to state housing finance entities who
employ both federal and state-level tax credits and bond financing options, combined
with federal grants and non-profit contributions and private debt or equity financing.
See, e.g., State Housing Finance Agencies: At the Center of the Affordable Housing
System, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. HOUSING AGENCIES (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.ncsha.org/resource/hfas-at-the-center/ [https://perma.cc/6N6S-FF5E]; see
also Declining Federal Housing Funding, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING,
https://inclusionaryhousing.org/inclusionary-housing-explained/what-problems-doesiz-address/declining-federal-housing-funding/ [https://perma.cc/Y9JS-UYEK] (last
visited Oct. 11, 2019). Some housing finance providers are difficult to categorize as
federal or local. For example, the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) are local
lenders established by federal law and administered both federally and locally. The
FHLBanks have funded the creation of more than 800,000 affordable housing units.
See Affordable Housing, FHLBANKS, http://www.fhlbanks.com/affordablehousing.html [https://perma.cc/W6LS-N7UK] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
163. For a more complete list of federally funded or managed programs that
promote the supply of affordable housing, see HOME Tenant-Based Rental
HUD
EXCHANGE,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/
Assistance,
[https://perma.cc/4572-MFBK] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). Federal programs intersect
with multiple other affordable housing programs administered through state and
local agencies as well as public-private partnerships. Id.
164. See infra Section II.D.
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delivered may be in the form of a tax credit,165 a grant,166 financing
assistance decreasing the cost of capital,167 low-cost government
financing,168 direct funding of specific production or rehabilitation
costs,169 public-private partnerships,170 or one of a myriad of other
structures.171 The essential goal and impact of all these incentive
programs are similar: the government offers a financial incentive in
exchange for a commitment to produce a certain number of housing
units, rented at specified affordable levels for specified periods.172

165. See, e.g., infra notes 192–205 and accompanying text (discussing the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit).
166. See, e.g., infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text (discussing the HOME
Investment Partnerships Program and the Community Block Development Grant
Program).
167. Bond financing is often used to supplement tax credits when amassing capital
for affordable housing projects. See, e.g., Michael J. Novogradac, Financing
Affordable
Housing,
CIRE
MAG.,
https://www.ccim.com/ciremagazine/articles/financing-affordable-housing/?gmSsoPc=1 [https://perma.cc/9KYPGQ8Z] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
168. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide loans to multi-family developers, but
focus on lending on for market-rent housing developments. Although subsidizing
market-rent housing units does not directly increase the supply of affordable housing,
it increases overall housing supply, and this can lead to more existing affordable units
becoming available for rent by lower income households. See, e.g., Andrea J. Boyack,

Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U.L. REV. 1489, 1547–51 (2011) [hereinafter Boyack,
Fannie/Freddie]; see also Boyack, Equitably, supra note 31, at 147–59.
169. See, e.g., infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text (discussing the Housing

Trust Fund).
170. See, e.g., PETER W. SALSICH, JR., AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 69–91 (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds.,
2009); Hunter L. Johnson, New Funding for Affordable Housing Encourages PublicPrivate Partnerships, CCIM INST., https://www.ccim.com/cire-magazine/articles/newfunding-affordable-housing-encourages-publicprivate-partnerships/?gmSsoPc=1
[https://perma.cc/CJ3P-Y66U] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019); see also infra notes 181–91
and accompanying text (discussing federal programs that established private-public
partnerships for affordable housing, such as the HOPE VI program and the Rental
Assistance Demonstration).
171. Urban Institute has an online interactive tool that provides much information
about the options available for funding affordable housing creation. See Pamela
Blumenthal et al., How Affordable Housing Gets Built, URB. INST. (July 26, 2016),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/how-affordable-housing-gets-built
[https://perma.cc/E8CZ-JELA] (referencing the online tool available at
http://apps.urban.org/features/cost-of-affordable-housing/
[https://perma.cc/2SJGMNK2]). Inventive developers create new combinations and processes each year. See
Stockton Williams, Preserving Multifamily Workforce and Affordable Housing: New
Approaches for Investing in a Vital National Asset, URB. LAND INST. 19–21 (2015),
http://uli.org/wp-content/uploads/ULI-Documents/Preserving-MultifamilyWorkforce-and-Affordable-Housing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MHN-ZZRA].
172. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) offers a 10-year tax credit in
exchange for an investment in affordable housing and requires that a developer set
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One of the most cost-effective ways to support supply adequacy in
affordable housing is to preserve and maintain existing affordable
housing units, many of which are aging badly and rapidly exiting the
national rental unit inventory.173 Approximately 10,000 affordable
units a year are lost to obsolescence and poor management and
upkeep.174 The Housing Trust Fund (HTF) is one source of federal
monies that can be used for preservation and rehabilitation of existing
affordable housing. The HTF was established in 2008 under the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act to “provide[ ] block grants to
states to build, rehabilitate, or preserve housing affordable to
extremely low income households . . . .”175 The HTF received no
funding from Congress for the first eight years of its existence, but in
2015, Congress finally authorized funding.176 Congress provided a
total of $660 million to the HTF in the three years following.177 To
date, states have used or earmarked most of the HTF funds they have
and will receive for projects serving “people experiencing
homelessness, people with disabilities, elderly people, or other special
needs populations.”178 Many projects funded in part by the HTF
employ other affordable housing resources as well, particularly the

aside either 20% of the constructed or rehabilitated units as rent restricted and
occupied by households with incomes below 50% AMI or 40% of the units as rent
restricted and occupied by households with incomes below 60% of AMI during a 30year affordability period (inclusive of a 15-year compliance period an another 15-year
extended use period). See infra notes 192–205 and accompanying text. During the
affordability period, rents are set at 30% of the 50% or 60% AMI respectively. See
Brown, supra note 158, at 628–29.
173. “Rehabilitating an existing affordable apartment can cost one-third to onehalf less than building a new apartment. Without preserving existing affordable
housing, we fall two steps back for every step we take forward.” What Is
Preservation?, NAT’L HOUS. TR., https://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/whatpreservation [https://perma.cc/Q48N-22MP] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
174. See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., BALANCING PRIORITIES:
PRESERVATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD OPPORTUNITY IN THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDIT PROGRAM BEYOND YEAR 30 8 (2018) [hereinafter LIHTC Beyond 30],
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Balancing-Priorities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BSTT529];
175. ED GRAMLICH, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., GETTING STARTED: FIRST
HOMES BEING BUILT WITH 2016 NATIONAL HOUSING TRUST FUND AWARDS 1
(2018),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/NHTF_Getting-Started_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VA9Q-4BEK].
176. Id. at 1–2.
177. Id. Failure to fund the HTF was blamed on the Financial Crisis and,
specifically, the government bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, entities that
pursuant to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, were intended to contribute to the
HTF. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not deemed financially able to make these
contributions until 2015. Id.
178. Id. at 2.
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LIHTC, the HOME program, and the FHL Banks’ Affordable
Housing Program, in addition to state or local funds.179
Other preservation efforts have attempted to revitalize poorly
maintained public housing units by leveraging private capital. A
series of programs have created public-private partnerships to
improve the quality of public housing units.180 Some of these
programs have reduced the number of publicly held units or
converted some publicly held units into privately held low-income
units (or both) in exchange for improvements to unit and
neighborhood quality.181 From 1992 to 2011, HUD’s primary publicprivate partnership program was the controversial HOPE VI
program.182 Beginning in 2010, HOPE VI was gradually replaced by
the Choice Neighborhoods program, which focused on rehabilitating
severely distressed public housing and improving the energy
efficiency of such units.183 In 2012, HUD launched the Rental
Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, which enabled the
government to “leverage public and private debt and equity” to

179. See infra notes 186–195, 200–204 and accompanying text (discussing these
programs).
180. Some grant programs, such as the Capital Magnet Fund, requires $10 of
private financing to leverage every $1 of public funding provided. The Capital
Magnet Fund provides development and other loan capital for economically
distressed, underserved communities and is funded with a portion of the assessments
made on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s new business. Federal Funding for
Affordable
Housing,
LOCAL
HOUSING
SOLUTIONS
(2019),
https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/fund/federal-funding-for-affordable-housing/
[https://perma.cc/YG6C-8MKN].
181. For the history of programs reducing, rehabilitating, and privatizing public
housing, see Anne Marie Smetak, Private Funding, Public Housing: The Devil in the
Details, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3–4 (2014). For an extensive discussion of the
many programs currently available, see generally NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS.
COALITION, 2019 ADVOCATES’ GUIDE: A PRIMER ON FEDERAL AFFORDABLE
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY PROGRAMS (2019), https://nlihc.org/exploreissues/publications-research/advocates-guide [https://perma.cc/5GM9-96PR].
182. Failure to provide voucher replacements for destroyed public housing was
legally problematic under HOPE VI. See, e.g., Cabrini-Green Local Advisory
Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 96 C 6949, 1997 WL 31002, at *2 (N.D. Ill., Jan 22,
1997).
183. Choice Neighborhoods provides for rehabilitation or replacement of public
housing units in connection with a neighborhood “Transformation Plan.” The Choice
Neighborhoods program provided Housing Choice Vouchers for any units that were
not replaced or rehabilitated. Choice Neighborhoods, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB.
DEV., https://www.hud.gov/cn [https://perma.cc/355V-K3C2] (last visited Oct. 11,
2019).
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preserve and update public housing units.184 RAD allows for public
housing units to become privately owned, albeit subject to long-term,
mandatorily renewable contracts with HUD providing project-based
Section 8 rental assistance.185 Such public-private partnerships allow
for more flexible financing arrangements and may be able to achieve
rehabilitative goals with a smaller outlay of public funds.186 Congress
initially capped the RAD program at 60,000 units but later
authorized an additional 225,000 units.187 In 2018, the RAD program
rehabilitated its 100,000th unit.188 Because the RAD program uses
private equity and debt funding, albeit in concert with public funds
and government credit, the program is ostensibly more “cost neutral”
— a politically attractive selling point.189 Involving private money
and control in previously public housing saves the government money
and potentially allows for improvements that may not otherwise have
been funded by Congress, but partnering with private developers
comes at a cost. There have been troubling instances of HUD
delegating control of RAD housing to private entities to the

184. Rental Assistance Demonstration, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/RAD [https://perma.cc/8XYX-YTTH] (last visited Aug. 5,
2019).
185. See infra note 245, and accompanying text (discussing Section 8 rental
assistance).
186. Gordon Cavanaugh, Public Housing: From Archaic to Dynamic to
Endangered, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 228, 233, 235–37
(2005); Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), NAT’L HOUSING L. PROJECT (Sept.
7,
2017),
https://www.nhlp.org/resources/rental-assistance-demonstration-rad/
[https://perma.cc/9KYU-9DS7].
187. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 5.
188. HUD issued a press release and a flyer promoting the milestone. RAD, U.S.
DEP’T
HOUSING
&
URB.
DEV.
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/RAD_100000_Homes_20180813
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U34-R5H8]. RAD has been heavily marketed as the best
solution to an aging public housing inventory, and the HUD website celebrates
successful RAD conversions through photo essays and case studies (RAD Photo
Essays and Case Studies, RAD, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/case-studies [https://perma.cc/DW3F-CBQ5] (last
visited Oct. 11, 2019)), newsletters (RAD Newsletter, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB.
DEV., https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/newsletter [https://perma.cc/65BX-CCTF]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2019)), media coverage (RAD Events, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING &
URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/events [https://perma.cc/RA87-SMQ5]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2019)), design contests (Curb Appeal Project, U.S. DEP’T
HOUSING
&
URB.
DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/RAD/pha-curbappeal
[https://perma.cc/PF8B-TZ92] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019)), and “RADBlast!” listserve
email updates (RADBlast!, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/radblasts [https://perma.cc/S76N-SA6P] (last visited
Oct. 11, 2019)).
189. RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION, supra note 184.
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detriment of the low-income occupants.190 Moreover, RAD redevelopments often result in a net loss of affordable housing units,
even though the quality of remaining units typically improves.
Protections built into the RAD system ensure that additional housing
vouchers replace publicly owned units lost.191
In 1986, Congress created the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) program to incentivize the production of affordable
housing.192 LIHTC is currently the largest support for increasing
affordable housing supply, measured in terms of the number of units
it has created.193
LIHTC has financed the construction or
preservation of about three million housing units since 1987, about
70,000 affordable rental units per year.194 Under this program, the
IRS provides a ten-year tax credit to developers selected by local
PHAs who build housing units to be occupied by and affordable to
low-income households for 30 years.195 These tax credits are of
limited supply and have been in high demand since their inception
because their value can be immediately capitalized and used to offset
190. For example, in a RAD property in Hopewell, Virginia, private managers
refused disability-required accommodation requests of a resident, a denial which may
have contributed to the resident’s subsequent death. Roller & Cassella supra note
146. Roller and Cassella assert that violation of RAD tenants’ rights are examples of
“perils on the path” to privatization, and they caution that “[t]o deliver on its
promise, the program requires more oversight from HUD, and local advocates must
be involved in RAD conversions to support low-income residents.” Id. The
Government Accounting Office Report on RAD agrees; see generally, U.S. GOV’T
ACCT. OFF., GAO-18-123, RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION: HUD NEEDS TO
TAKE ACTION TO IMPROVE METRICS AND ONGOING OVERSIGHT (2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690210.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUR7-GUEZ].
191. See generally CAROLINA K. REID, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION, U.C.
BERKELEY, LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HOUSING: ASSESSING THE EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (2017),
http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/RAD_Report_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GY7R-GL8H].
192. The LIHTC was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and is codified at 26
U.S.C. § 42. The IRS provides guidance and advice for distributing and using the
LIHTCs. See LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 5–6; NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS.
COAL., supra note 181
193. See RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 32–33; see also LIHTC Beyond
30, supra note 174, at 4.
194. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 5.
195. LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 4. LIHTC affordability periods are
technically 15-year periods that can be renewed once. See, e.g., OFF. OF POL’Y DEV.
& RES., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND? (2012),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal//publications/pdf/what_happens_lihtc_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38DD-X6VD]. States receive low-income housing tax credits
equivalent to $2.35 per person (2016 figures), and local PHAs determine which
developers are awarded LIHTCs for which specific qualifying developments.
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development costs.196 Developments qualify as “low-income” for
LIHTC purposes if rents are affordable for low-income households,
but such rents are not necessarily low enough to be affordable for
very low-income or extremely low-income households.197 Many
households who rent LIHTC units, therefore, remain cost burdened
unless they obtain additional rental assistance, for example through
housing voucher programs.198
Although the LIHTC program has been a successful tool for
promoting affordable housing supply, it faces challenges, starting with
the fact that between 2020 and 2029, over 500,000 current LIHTC
units will reach the end of their 30-year affordability period.199
Extending affordability requirements for such units will likely require
additional federal funding, possibly cannibalizing funding that
otherwise would be allocated to create new LIHTC developments.200
Some states, foreseeing the problems that expiring affordability
periods would eventually cause, expanded the affordability period —

196. For several years running, California Senator Maria Cantwell has annually
proposed increasing the number of LIHTCs available as a way to grow the supply of
affordable housing units in areas of the country where supply is the biggest problem.
OFFICE OF U.S. SENATOR MARIA CANTWELL, MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE
GROWING AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS: EXPANDING AND IMPROVING THE
HOUSING TAX CREDIT (2017); see also Sarah Brundage, Cantwell & Hatch

Reintroduce Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act with Support of Over
2,000 Businesses and Organizations, AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING A.C.T.I.O.N.

BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017), http://rentalhousingaction.org/blog/2017/3/7/sens-cantwellhatch-reintroduce-affordable-housing-credit-improvement-act-with-support-of-over2000-businesses-and-organizations [https://perma.cc/9UP6-K9VR]. The Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act reduced corporate tax rates and therefore the value of investments in
LIHTC properties; the effect of this change on LIHTC value and therefore demand
has not yet been determined. Urban Institute Evaluates the Low Income Housing
Tax Credit, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Jul. 23, 2018),
https://nlihc.org/resource/urban-institute-evaluates-low-income-housing-tax-credit
[https://perma.cc/GS9Q-R37M].
197. Rents for designated low-income units created pursuant to the LIHTC are set
at the amount that is “affordable” for (namely, 30% of) a household with an income
of either 50% or 60% AMI, depending on the affordability designation chosen by the
developer. See supra note 172.
198. A Furman Center report found that LIHTC recipients tend to have higher
incomes than other assisted households and that 70% of ELI households in LIHTC
homes have other forms of rental assistance and nearly all of the remaining 30% of
ELI households in LIHTC homes spend more than 30% of gross household income
on housing. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 10.
199. LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 4. Affordability periods for 478,000
LIHTC units will expire by 2028. RENTAL HOUSING 2017 supra note 19, at 33–34.
200. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 33–34. Tax reform proposals to
expand funding in order to address the expiration of the initial affordability periods
are considering eliminating the 4% LIHTC program, which accounted for about half
of housing unit production in 2015. Id. at 6.
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under state law — for periods beyond the 30-year federal limit.201
Because, the few state-level extensions that exist were enacted only
after 2000 and do not apply retroactively, they will not affect any
LIHTC units in those states until 2030 or later.202 The federal
government has not yet addressed the issue of expiring LIHTC units,
although there are pending proposals to renew LIHTC affordability
periods, possibly in conjunction with proposals revisiting the of
optimal siting of affordable units.203
The LIHTC program faces objections primarily for its location of
units, not its affordability duration. Only 29% of LIHTC units are
located in neighborhoods that offer their residents enhanced
economic opportunity through local labor markets, high-quality
educational opportunity, transit access, and a healthy environment,
and only 9% of these are in mixed-income (as opposed to lowincome) neighborhoods.204 Like many other federal programs,
LIHTC seems to have increased the affordable housing supply
primarily in impoverished, poor-quality neighborhoods, thus
concentrating and perpetuating poverty in addition to the housing
need that federal affordable housing funding is supposed to
address.205
HUD also provides various grant funds to private developers to
build low-income housing rentals and homes for sale pursuant to
numerous criteria, including the Home Investors Partners Program
(HOME), a grant program designed to fund state and local efforts to
create housing affordable to low-income households, and the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), a HUD program
with broader housing objectives that has been active since 1975.206
HOME is the largest federal block grant used to create affordable

201. Id. at 34. California requires an addition 25-year affordability period for
LIHTC properties, and New Hampshire, Utah, and Vermont require an additional 69
years of affordability. Id.
202. Id.
203. LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 18–21 (discussing possible approaches
that include neighborhood quality considerations in addition to renewing or replacing
expiring LIHTC units).
204. Id. at 13–14.
205. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Incl., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2525-26 (2015); In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit
Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 7–8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); LIHTC
Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 13–18 (giving details regarding the poor neighborhood
quality for places where most LIHTC units are located).
206. Home Investment Partnerships Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/programs/h
ome/ [https://perma.cc/RNT2-K27R] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
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housing and provides flexible funding for states and localities that can
be used for “building, buying, and/or rehabilitating affordable
housing for rent or homeownership or providing direct rental
assistance to low-income people.”207 HOME provides both housing
grants to local governments and tenant-based rental assistance
(subsidizing demand) and requires matching grants from other
sources.208 CDBG funds are allocated to create and rebuild low-cost
housing for sale or rent in areas with particular needs, including
locations that have faced significant destruction due to disaster or
financial collapse, but these grants also can be used for demand
subsidies such as down-payment assistance.209 Federal funding for
CDBG grants has been significantly reduced over time, and in 2018,
the Trump administration threatened to eliminate the program before
finally agreeing to retain CDBG under lower funding levels than
previously provided.210
The various supply-enhancing programs, mostly federally funded,
have created a significant number of affordable rental units, without
which the affordable housing crisis would be far worse. But
affordability relief from such programs may be kicking the proverbial
can down the road. First, mandated affordability for federally
incentivized, but not publicly owned, units is bound by a fixed period,
and it is not always clear what happens to such units when the period
expires.211 Second, siting of units produced under the various supply-

207. Id.
208. Home Tenant-Based Rental Assistance, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/home/topics/tbra/#policy-guidance-and-faqs
[https://perma.cc/3NXC-KBWU] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
209. Ed Gramlich, Community Development Block Grant Program, NAT’L LOW
INCOME
HOUSING
COALITION,
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG2017/2017AG_Ch08-S02_Community-Development-Block-Grant.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AG4Z-BS6H] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
210. DARIA DANIEL, NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., 2019 POLICY BRIEF: SUPPORT LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS THROUGH THE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
BLOCK
GRANT
(CDBG)
PROGRAM
(2019),
https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/CDBG 202019 20Leg 20Conferenc
e 20- 20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN23-HP4T]; URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE,
supra note 13.
211. The concern regarding imminent expiration for LIHTC units is a case in point.
Some policy analysts and scholars have floated the idea of creating permanent
affordability mandates for certain properties, but permanent land use requirements
can be tricky and raise concerns of how to handle future needs for flexibility. At least
one proposal includes making project-based voucher properties “permanently”
affordable. Amy Glassman, Project-Based Voucher Reforms Will Facilitate
Development of Affordable Units but Should Be Taken Further, 18 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 71, 76 (2008). Housing for especially vulnerable
populations in need of additional supportive services is sometimes conceived of as
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side programs is problematic. On the one hand, it makes sense to
place affordable housing in areas where lower-income households
currently reside and where land costs are relatively low, but such
placements keep lower-income households in poor neighborhoods
and limits opportunities and future outcomes for such renters, their
children, and grandchildren. Poor siting of affordable housing can
increase the likelihood that a perpetual need for government housing
assistance is passed on to future generations. HUD directives
regarding affordable housing siting are somewhat contradictory on
this point, simultaneously preferring siting in places where the largest
low-income populations are located and where land is cheapest, but
also requiring that HUD monies be used to “affirmatively further fair
housing,” as required under the Fair Housing Act, by promoting
desegregation.212
Furthermore, PHA attempts to locate affordable housing
developments in higher-income communities are more likely to be
resisted by community residents.213 Current legislative proposals

“permanently affordable” rather than affordable for a particular period of time. Peter
W. Salsich, Jr., Toward A Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 507–08
(2007). Community land bank structures attempt to achieve permanent affordability
by separating out the price for land and for improvements on the land and holding
the ownership of the land separately, by the land bank entity, thus reducing the price
paid for property by the proportion of the property’s value allocated to the land
itself. The government could potentially explore a similar method of permanent
affordability where ownership is split among residents or landlords and the public
land bank company. See Julie Gilgoff, Local Responses to Today’s Housing Crisis:
Permanently Affordable Housing Models, 20 CUNY L. REV. 587, 590–95 (2017);
James J. Kelly, Jr., Sustaining Neighborhoods of Choice: From Land Bank(Ing) to
Land Trust(Ing), 54 WASHBURN L.J. 613, 619–24 (2015); Julia Bartolf Milne, Will

Alternative Forms of Common-Interest Communities Succeed with Municipal
Involvement?: A Study of Community Land Trusts and Limited Equity
Cooperatives, 38 REAL EST. L.J. 273, 275 (2009).

212. In 2015, HUD released a final rule to require and support local efforts to
deliberately desegregate housing patterns through aid allocation decision-making at
the local level. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42, 272 (July
16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 576, 903),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/affht_pt.html#final-rule
[https://perma.cc/9U7HUY7P]; see also, AFFH Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/AFFH-Fact-Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UD9A-2XYQ] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). In January 2018,
Secretary Carson announced that HUD would delay implementing the AFFH Rule
until 2020. See Kriston Capps, The Trump Administration Just Derailed a Key
Obama Rule on Housing Segregation, CITYLAB (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/the-trump-administration-derailed-a-keyobama-rule-on-housing-segregation/549746/ [https://perma.cc/B3AT-7PRD].
213. Local resistance to affordable housing in more affluent communities is an
aspect of a tendency sometimes known by its descriptive acronym NIMBY, meaning
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specifically incorporate mandates to place affordable housing in
neighborhoods offering better opportunities to their residents.214
Appropriate placement of affordable units can be conceived of as an
investment in reducing poverty and its associated housing cost needs
for the future. Sustained housing self-sufficiency not only requires an
increase in the number of quality affordable housing units; it also
requires that those units provide low-income households access to
quality neighborhoods.215

“not in my backyard.” NIMBYism with respect to affordable housing has occurred
throughout the country. See, e.g., JOSHUA M. ZEITZ, WHITE ETHNIC NEW YORK:
JEWS, CATHOLICS, AND THE SHAPING OF POSTWAR POLITICS 190–94 (2007)
(describing resistance to affordable housing in Forest Hills, Queens, New York City);
see also Jake Blumgart, Integrating Whitman, SHELTERFORCE (May 4, 2016),
https://shelterforce.org/2016/05/04/integrating-whitman/
[https://perma.cc/5XCBPYUH] (describing resistance to affordable housing in Philadelphia); Maya
Dukmasova, Opposition to Affordable Housing in Jefferson Park is Nothing New for
READER
(Feb.
23,
2017),
Chicago, CHI.
https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2017/02/23/opposition-toaffordable-housing-in-jefferson-park-is-nothing-new-for-chicago
[https://perma.cc/2BER-LU53] (describing resistance to affordable housing in
Chicago). More recently, there has been a movement in reaction to the dearth of
affordable and market housing to resist all development except for housing, with new
housing developments being expressly welcomed in communities. This tendency is
known by the acronym YIMBY, meaning “yes in my backyard.” “YIMBYs push for
reductions on zoning restrictions to increase the supply of housing, reasoning
that all new housing, market-rate as well as subsidized, helps to keep housing prices
under control.” Roderick M. Hills, Why Do So Many Affordable Housing Advocates
Reject the Law of Supply and Demand?, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/09/18/why-do-so-many-affordablehousing-advocates-reject-law-supply-demand/ [https://perma.cc/28J3-97LD]. Most
affordable housing advocates agree that any housing supply increase will eventually,
directly or through filtering, improve affordability. Vicki Been of the Furman
Institute points out that adding supply of higher-rent units may increase prices but
not affordability if land use is constrained. See BEEN, SUPPLY SKEPTICISM, supra note
158, at 5, 8–10.
214. See Chetty et al., supra note 113, at 897–98; see also Ingrid Gould Ellen &
Keren Mertens Horn, Points for Place: Can State Governments Shape Siting Patterns
of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Developments?, HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 13–14
(2018). Case in point: the proposed American Housing and Economic Mobility Act
not only provided for increased funding for housing production, but takes specific
steps to make higher quality neighborhoods accessible to low-income individuals. S.
3503, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/3503/actions [https://perma.cc/N6F3-EB2Q]. A new version of the proposal was
introduced in the Senate in March 2019. S. 787, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/787/actions
[https://perma.cc/UR53-HDY5], which the National Low Income Housing Coalition
has endorsed. See American Housing and Economic Mobility Act, NAT’L LOW
INCOME HOUSING COALITION, https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Warren-HEOMBill.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU2Z-97DR] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
215. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 464–65.
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D. Subsidizing Households’ Ability to Pay for Housing
The federal government spends billions of dollars annually
subsidizing housing costs, but the vast majority of such spending
disproportionately benefits the wealthiest homeowners rather than
the neediest renters. Federal funds can pay for or offset a consumer’s
housing costs in various ways, including through payment vouchers
(paid to consumers or housing providers), federally funded reductions
of home acquisition costs, or tax benefits that offset the cost of
housing.
The vast majority of federally funded housing benefits come in the
form of tax deductions, capital gains deferrals, and other U.S. Tax
Code preferences for homeowners.216 There are no equivalent tax
subsidies available for renter households. Many homeowner tax
benefits technically offset the cost of financing home acquisition
rather than the home’s purchase price itself, but because the vast
majority of homebuyers pay for their homes in large part with
mortgage financing, the cost-subsidizing impact is almost the same.217

216. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U.L.
REV. 329, 339 (2009) (estimating the lost tax revenue cost of homeownership
subsidies at $207 billion); see also William G. Gale et al., Encouraging
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 Tax Notes 1171, 1171 (2007) (explaining
that the mortgage interest deduction “drains significant revenues from the treasury
every year,” does little to impact the homeownership rate, and “provides much larger
benefits to high-income households” than to other households); Mark Andrew
Snider,
The
Suburban
Advantage:
Are
the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 159–69
(2005) (calculating total tax subsidies for homeownership as aggregating over $400
billion, and identifying the mortgage interest deduction alone as “by far the single
largest itemized deduction,” costing $200 billion).
217. The mortgage interest deduction was not actually created in order to promote
homeownership. The deduction is a residual tax benefit that remained after tax
reform in the 1980s that disallowed deductions for other sorts of interest payments.
See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RES. SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST
AND PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 4 (2014); James R.
Follain & David C. Ling, The Federal Tax Subsidy to Housing and the Reduced
Value of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 147, 147–68 (1991)
(discussing how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 “reduced the value of the mortgage
interest deduction, especially for low and middle-income households” by increasing
the standard deduction and by making certain formerly deductible expenses
nondeductible). Retroactively, homeownership promotion and housing affordability
have been cited as justifications for allowing home mortgage interest payments to be
deducted from federal taxable income. President Reagan, for example, cited the
deduction as a key component of advancing “the American Dream.” Robert
Hardaway, Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and Effect, 35 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 33, 51 (2009). Although the mortgage income deduction has
become a fixture in tax policy, there is scant evidence that it does or has ever
increased the homeownership rate. In fact, the consensus of economists and other

2019]

RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION

1233

The largest and most notorious of the homeowner tax benefits is the
mortgage interest deduction (MID) which allows homeowners to
deduct their mortgage interest payments (up to a certain limit).218
The Tax Code grants owners other tax benefits as well, including
other sorts of deductions, for example, for property taxes paid, and
deferral of capital gains, none of which are available to renters.219
Tax benefits available to homeowners do not target low-income
populations, although caps on available deductions do provide some
limit on the size of the tax benefit a household can recognize.220

scholars is that the deduction either has no effect on homeownership or acts to subtly
reduce homeownership by contributing to higher home prices and larger home
mortgages. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The
Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1391
(2000) (“None of the evidence from economists or from other countries suggests that
the repeal of the home mortgage interest deduction would reduce demand for owner
occupied housing or home ownership rates.”); see also Christian A.L. Hilber & Tracy
M. Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and Its Impact on Homeownership
Decisions, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 618, 635 (2014) (finding that mortgage interest
deductions had no statistically significant impact on homeownership attainment in
aggregate); Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/magazine/who-needs-themortgageinterest-deduction.html [https://perma.cc/VG7E-V38Q] (“Economists don’t
agree on much, but they do agree on this: the interest deduction doesn’t do a thing
for homeownership rates. If you eliminated the deduction tomorrow, America would
have the same number of homeowners.”).
218. Although politically popular, the vast majority of taxpayers, and even the
majority of homeowners, do not benefit from the mortgage interest deduction
because they take the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing deductions on their tax
returns. See Phyllis C. Taite, Taxes, the Problem and Solution: A Model for
Vanishing Deductions and Exclusions for Residence-Based Tax Preferences, 59
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 361, 363, 378 (2015) (finding that the mortgage interest
deduction subsidizes wealthier homeowners while providing little-to-no-benefit to the
vast majority of the population because only a small minority of low income
homeowners itemized their deductions because the mortgage interest deduction was
not likely to exceed the standard deduction); see generally William C. Handorf,
Government Fiscal Policy and the Housing Market, 47 REAL ESTATE REV. J. 27
(2018) (describing the effect the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will have on MIDs).
219. In addition to the mortgage interest deduction, owners can also deduct
property tax payments, and can defer capital gains on home sales and need not count
imputed income for rental value of the home in which they live. See Patric H.
Hendershott & Michael White, The Rise and Fall of Housing’s Favored Investment
Status, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 257, 257–61 (2000); APGAR, supra note 77, at 11–12; see
also 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2017) (exclusion of gain from sale of principle residence); 26
U.S.C. § 164(a)(1) (2017) (state, local and foreign real property taxes are deductible);
26 U.S.C. § 280A(g)(2) (1999) (rental income generated from dwelling unit will not
be included in gross income).
220. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced the cap for the Mortgage Interest
Deduction to $750,000 (from $1,000,000) for mortgage loans made after 2017 and
increased the standard deduction. 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(F)(II-IV) (2018) (lowering
the cap on the deduction to $750,000 for mortgages but not retroactive); 26 U.S.C. §
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Meanwhile, increasing the standard deduction available to all
taxpayers makes deduction benefits less relevant to a majority of
households and reduces the disparate tax treatment among renters
and owners.221
Many discussions of federal affordable housing policy omit entirely
any discussion of the MID, reasoning that this tax benefit provides a
cost subsidy to any (itemizing) homeowner, not just low-income
households.222 But the MID is a federal expenditure that reduces the
cost of housing for those who own homes (if they itemize their tax
returns), and, at an annual estimated cost of between $70 and $100
billion, it represents the largest line item in the federal budget that
subsidizes housing costs.223 In stark contrast to the limited supply of
subsidies available to a mere quarter of low-income renters, the huge
MID subsidy is available to all homeowners with mortgage loans,
should they choose to itemize their tax returns.224 As with any tax
deduction, the MID provides the largest benefits to households with
the highest incomes, and because the amount of the deduction is
higher for taxpayers with bigger mortgages, up to the applicable cap,
it provides the most significant benefits to people with the most

63I(7)(A)(i-ii) (2017) (increasing the standard deduction). Increasing the standard
deduction makes the mortgage interest deduction even less broadly applicable — a
homeowner would have to have an outstanding mortgage principle of approximately
$460,000 or more for itemization to equal a deduction higher than the standard one.
See Handorf, supra note 218, at 3. The cap on the amount of mortgage interest that is
deductible does somewhat mitigate the deduction’s benefits to the very highest
income (and most expensive home-owning) taxpayers, though. See Dean Stansel &
Anthony Randazzo, THE REASON FOUND., UNMASKING THE MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION: WHO BENEFITS AND BY HOW MUCH? 9 (2011), https://reason.org/wpcontent/uploads/files/mortgage_interest_deduction_2013_update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BA8A-Q6PF].
221. Several states offer renters a tax credit under state income tax. See Logan
Allec, Here are the States that Give Renters a Tax Credit, RENT.COM (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.rent.com/blog/states-with-a-renters-tax-credit/
[https://perma.cc/JP9T9PH5].
222. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and
Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233
(2010).
223. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the cost of the mortgage
interest tax deduction in 2016 would represent a $79.2 billion tax expenditure in 2016.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 33 (Comm. Print 2013).
224. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV. 667, 672 (2017); Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax

Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How and Why the Mortgage Interest
Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 757–58 (2012); Boyack,
Sustainable supra note 10, at 473–74
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expensive homes and biggest mortgage loans.225 More than fourfifths of the MID cost subsidy accrues to those in the top income
quintile, and owners of expensive homes in expensive cities benefit
more than owners of modestly priced homes in less inflated housing
markets.226 Having the largest taxpayer-funded housing subsidy go
almost exclusively to offset housing costs for the wealthiest
homeowners is inequitable in the extreme. As Will Fischer and
Barbara Sard explained in a policy brief for the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, the federal government spends four times as much to
offset housing costs for households with annual incomes above
$200,000 as it does for households with incomes below $20,000.227
Overall, about 60 percent of federal housing spending for which
income data are available (counting both tax expenditures and
program spending) benefits households with incomes above
$100,000. The 7 million households with incomes of $200,000 or
more receive a larger share of such spending than the more than 50
million households with incomes of $50,000 or less, even though
lower-income families are far more likely to struggle to afford
housing.228

Housing cost subsidies to households that do not suffer a housing
cost burden do nothing to increase housing affordability — they are
simply publicly funded windfalls enriching the already rich.229

225. See, e.g., Hemel & Rozema, supra note 224, at 667–70. The benefit of the
mortgage interest deduction increases as the size, price, and indebtedness of the
home increases (up to the cap), suggesting that the main effect of the deduction is to
raise home prices and mortgage amounts, results that run directly counter to housing
affordability and stability goals. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The
Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37, 39
(2003) (“While the deduction appears to increase the amount spent on housing, it
also appears to have almost no effect on the homeownership rate.”); see also Dennis
J. Ventry Jr., The Fake Third Rail of Tax Reform, 135 TAX NOTES 181, 181–86 (2012)
(analyzing why higher-income households capture a disproportionate share of the
MID); Mann, supra note 217, at 1361 (“The home mortgage interest deduction thus
constitutes an upside-down subsidy — the greater the need, the smaller the
subsidy.”).
226. Fischer & Sard, supra note 6, at 1. “Most homeownership expenditures go to
the top fifth of households by income. More than four-fifths of the value of the
mortgage interest and property tax deductions goes to households with incomes of
more than $100,000, and more than two-fifths goes to families with incomes above
$200,000.” Id.
227. Id. at 2–3.
228. Id. at 1–2.
229. ADAM CARASSO ET AL., URB. INST., MAKING TAX INCENTIVES FOR
HOMEOWNERSHIP MORE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT, app. at tbl.2 (2005) (showing
how households in higher income percentiles are more likely to receive tax benefits
than households in lower percentiles and will benefit less from these benefits); Alfred
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There are, of course, federal housing cost subsidies that provide
targeted benefits to lower-income households. Several federal (and
some state) programs provide down payment assistance for first-time
and lower-income homeowners.230 The FHA, the Department of
Agriculture, and the Veterans Administration all have programs that
provide down payment assistance, reducing acquisition costs for
homebuyers, many of whom are low- or middle-income.231 The FHA
also provides mortgage insurance to qualifying homebuyers,
increasing access to and decreasing the cost of credit, thereby
subsidizing homeownership costs.232 Although not always categorized
as a subsidy, the federal government’s support and underwriting of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks
similarly operates to reduce the cost of home mortgage borrowing
and reduces acquisition costs for many homebuyers.233

M. Clark III, Homelessness and the Crisis of Affordable Housing: The Abandonment
of a Federal Affordable Housing Policy, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 85, 101–02
(2016); J. B. McCombs, Refining the Itemized Deduction for Home Property Tax
Payments, 44 VAND. L. REV. 317, 328–30 (1991). Furthermore, there is ample
evidence that the mortgage interest deduction does nothing to improve the
homeownership rate in the country. Gale et al., supra note 216, at 1171 (“Evidence
suggests . . . that the mortgage interest deduction . . . does little if anything to
encourage homeownership. Instead, it serves mainly to raise the price of housing and
land and to encourage people who do buy homes to borrow more and to buy larger
homes than they otherwise would.”).
230. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., ADVOCATE’S GUIDE 2018: A PRIMER ON
FEDERAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 4–10
(2018),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2018/2018_Advocates-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YXR4-UPS2].
231. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716–23 (1992); Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity
U.S.
DEP’T
HOUSING
&
URB.
DEV.,
Program
(SHOP),
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/shop/ [https://perma.cc/2HBR-7TN5]; Reiss,
supra note 1, at 1090–91.
232. Reiss, supra note 1, at 1090–91. Professor David Reiss questions the
appropriate level of government down payment assistance, pointing out that
homebuyers who do not contribute sufficient amounts of their own capital to
purchase homes are more likely to eventually default on their mortgages and lose
their homes, along with their subsidized housing benefits. Id. at 1079–81.
233. See Boyack, Equitably, supra note 31, at 126–30 (describing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, along with Federal Home Loan Banks and their various predecessor &
associated entities, purchase mortgage loans made to qualifying homeowners on
qualifying homes on the secondary mortgage market); Boyack, Fannie/Freddie, supra
note 168, at 1495–1500. Secondary market purchases provide liquidity to home
mortgage markets and reduce the cost of mortgage credit, making homebuying more
accessible and borrowing cheaper. Id. When the system works as anticipated, this cost
reduction is revenue neutral because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use private funds
for their secondary market purchases, but the federal government expended
significant money preserving and funding these secondary mortgage market
participants when the mortgage market crashed in 2008. Id. at 1520–21.
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Non-tax federal home mortgage subsidies have a problematic
history. Until the Fair Housing Act of 1968, these subsidies were
primarily — and sometimes exclusively — available to white
homebuyers acquiring homes in racially segregated, white-only
neighborhoods.234 The federal programs and policies subsidizing
home mortgage borrowing with federal money and credit were
instrumental in increasing the homeownership rate in the twentieth
century and establishing an intergenerational pattern for wealthbuilding through homeownership.235 But the housing and wealth
benefits distributed through these programs were provided
predominantly to white households.236
Persistent gaps in
homeownership and wealth between black and white households
reflect the lasting impact of this disparate allocation of federal
housing subsidies.237 Race-based underwriting criteria developed by

234. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63–75; see also JACKSON, supra note 1, at 191–
218. Although race-based and disparately provided mortgage assistance is illegal
today, federally subsidized access to credit still seems to be unevenly distributed. See
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, DESPITE GROWING MARKET, AFRICAN
AMERICANS
AND
LATINOS
REMAIN
UNDERSERVED
1–5
(2017),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/researchpublication/crl-2016hmda-policy-brief-sep2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/35NX-QY2N];
Drew DeSilver & Kristen Bialik, Blacks and Hispanics face extra challenges in
getting home loans, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/01/10/blacks-and-hispanics-face-extra-challenges-in-getting-home-loans/
[https://perma.cc/4AT5-SN8K]; Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, Kept Out: For
People of Color, Banks Are Shutting the Door to Homeownership, REVEAL (Feb. 15,
2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-shutting-thedoor-to-homeownership/ [https://perma.cc/AJF4-LWCD]; Sarah Mikhitarian, Black
Mortgage Applicants Denied at More Than Twice the Rate of Whites, ZILLOW (Apr.
19, 2018), https://www.zillow.com/research/black-white-mortgage-denials-19616/
[https://perma.cc/4QNK-TM4N].
235. DAVID RUSK, THE BROOKINGS INST., CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. STUDIES,
THE “SEGREGATION TAX”: THE COST OF RACIAL SEGREGATION TO BLACK
HOMEOWNERS
2
(2001),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/rusk.pdf [https://perma.cc/U294-55BJ] (“Home equity is the
typical American family’s most important financial asset, and an important vehicle
for transmitting wealth from generation to generation.”); Stephen G. Gilles, The
Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 670 n.300 (2006) (“According
to a 2004 study of census data by the Pew Hispanic Center, the median net worth of
renters is only 1% of the median net worth of homeowners.”); Brown, supra note 216,
at 332 (“Homeownership in America has historically been viewed as a solid
investment both financially and as a means of living the American Dream,” but
“homeownership has never been a good financial investment for either the vast
majority of African-American homeowners or for low-income homeowners.”).
236. See Brown, supra note 216, at 349; Rothstein, supra note 1, at 63–75, 177–93.
237. See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 177–93.
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the federal government also established the geography of residential
racial segregation that still exists today.238
The federal government has historically allocated a majority of its
financial support for housing to benefit white, wealthy owners of
expensive homes.239 Numerous politicians have justified supports for
homeownership generally based on purported autonomy-promoting,
citizenship-enhancing,
and
wealth-building
benefits
of
homeownership,240 but any such benefits have been distributed
unevenly.241 Furthermore, despite decades of government spending
that ostensibly promoted homeownership and subsidized housing
costs for owner households, the homeownership rate today has
decreased to 64%, the same level it was in the early 1990s.242 It is well
below the rate in several other developed countries that do not
subsidize home buying.243 At the same time, U.S. median home
prices in 2019 are higher than they have ever been, and
homeownership is therefore even more financially out of reach for an
ever-increasing segment of the population.244
The majority of federal housing expenditures benefit homeowners
rather than renters, but the federal government does spend a
substantial amount of money each year subsidizing low-income rental
housing costs. This is often done through Section 8 voucher

238. Id.
239. A. Mechele Dickerson, Public Interest, Public Choice, and the Cult of
Homeownership, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 858 (2012); Rothstein, supra note 1, at
63–75.
240. See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 225, at 38.
241. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 3, 19–20; Brown, supra note 216, at
349–62; see also Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, The Transition to Home
Ownership and the Black-White Wealth Gap, 84 REV. ECON. STAT. 281, 281 (2002);
Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and
Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1207–08 (2001);
Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
53, 68 (2006).
242. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 3 (stating that the national
homeownership rate has recently increased to 63.9%).
243. Laurie Goodman et al., The US Homeownership Rate Has Lost Ground
Compared with Other Developed Countries, URB. INST. (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/us-homeownership-rate-has-lost-groundcompared-other-developed-countries [https://perma.cc/T8DC-3F7K]; United States
Home Ownership Rates, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/unitedstates/home-ownership-rate [https://perma.cc/C852-P49J] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019,
2:13 PM).
244. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 1–2.
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programs.245 Housing vouchers obligate the government to pay the
difference between the rental amount that would be affordable to a
given renter, based on that renter’s income, and the lesser of the
actual rent charged and a reasonable market rent for the unit in
question.246 There are several different types of housing voucher
programs, the two most significant being project-based vouchers
(PBVs) and housing choice vouchers (HCVs), both authorized under
Section 8.247 There are currently 1.2 million project-based subsidy
units and more than 2 million HCVs,248 but HUD has never provided
sufficient subsidies to fund the affordability gap for all, or even a
majority, of low-income households with cost burdens.249 Because
federal funding for vouchers decreased (or at least insufficiently
increased) as the intensity of cost-burdens increased among an evergrowing number of renters, the percentage of low-income households
receiving federal subsidies has declined over the past 20 years. In
2000, HUD provided housing assistance to about a third of needy
low-income renter households; today, HUD only has funding to assist
one fourth.250 Because demand for vouchers exceeds supply, the local
PHAs who distribute the vouchers must determine who among the

245. The voucher programs were established by HUD in 1974 under the authority
of Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937. Vouchers provide for payment from HUD to
landlords for a portion of rents in excess of 30% of the tenant’s gross income. Section
8 Rental Certificate Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/programdescription/cert8 [https://perma.cc/452E-J84N] (last
visited Oct. 5, 2019); see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS:
HOUSING
CHOICE
VOUCHER
PROGRAM
1
(2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics-housing-1-2513vouch.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66B-W3J8].
246. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 245.
247. See generally Section 8 Rental Certificate Program, supra note 245.
248. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, RENTAL ASSISTANCE IS EFFECTIVE
BUT
SERVES ONLY A FRACTION OF ELIGIBLE HOUSEHOLDS
10,
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-24-09hous-sec2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ETX-TG7E] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
249. See BRUCE KATZ & MARGERY AUSTEN TURNER, BROOKINGS INST.,
RETHINKING U.S. RENTAL HOUSING POLICY: BUILD ON STATE & LOCAL INNOVATION
4–5 (2008); Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949
to 1999, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489, 497–98 (2000). Ironically, vouchers can also
create a problematic economic effect by nudging housing prices up in a market
because they increase tenants’ ability to pay. Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at
489–90.
250. The population of low-income renter households increased by 29% from 2001
to 2015 (from 14.9 million to 19.2 million), but during that period the number of very
low-income households receiving rental assistance rose only 14%, from 4.2 million to
4.8 million, causing the share of very low-income households receiving assistance to
decline from 28% to 25%. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 32; see also
STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 5.
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needy renters receive assistance and who does not.251 There are
various allocation schemes that PHAs use to distribute vouchers,
usually preferring certain categories of renters (often veterans or
recently homeless households), and then allocating remaining
vouchers (if any) either on a first-in-time basis or even by lottery.252
Waitlists for available vouchers can be long and wait times can exceed
two years.253
PBVs attach to a specific unit and are not portable, whereas tenant
recipients of HCVs can move and take their vouchers with them.254
Because PBVs apply to designated units, they could be deliberately
sited in higher opportunity areas, but most of them are not and,
instead, are located in low-income neighborhoods.255 PBVs are
therefore subject to the same sorts of criticisms that apply to public
housing and grant- and tax-subsidized low-income units located in
poor quality neighborhoods. HCVs are more numerous than PBVs
and avoid some of the siting problems that PBVs face because they
can be used anywhere a tenant finds housing as long as the landlord
agrees to accept the vouchers.256 But that is the rub. In most states,
landlords are free to refuse payment of rent in the form of HCVs.257

251. HOUS. COMM’N BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 11 (2013); NLIHC Out of Reach 2018, supra
note 23, at 3.
252. U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, PHA GUIDEBOOK TO
ENDING HOMELESSNESS 8 (2013).
253. In Boston, for example, more than 10,000 people applied for just 73 additional
vouchers issued in November 2014. Katie Johnson, Demand Soars for Affordable
Housing
in
Boston
Area,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Nov.
28,
2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/28/demand-for-affordable-housingsoars/hCb4RSkLTbpqdMJR1eCYTI/story.html [https://perma.cc/U8E3-TH7J]; see
also; Millions of Families on Voucher and Public Housing Waiting Lists, NAT’L LOW
INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/millions-familiesvoucher-and-public-housing-waiting-lists [https://perma.cc/8WR7-D5QM]; Bolton et.
al., supra note 21, at 5.
254. Barbara Sard, Project-Based Vouchers, in NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING
COALITION
2018
ADVOCATES’
GUIDE
4–48
(2018),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2018/Ch04-S12_Project-BasedVouchers_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD2N-QR2R].
255. Note that location itself may be far less objectionable than neighborhood
upkeep, amenities, and safety, and inner-city neighborhoods are likely better
conceived of as insufficiently supported economically than somehow inherently
“deficient” and “places of despair.” Lisa T. Alexander, Hip-Hop and Housing:
Revisiting Culture, Urban Space, Power, and Law, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 803, 805–07
(2012).
256. Brown, supra note 158, at 699.
257. Federal law does not require that landlords accept Section 8 vouchers towards
rent, but state law in 13 states and local law in several municipalities specifically
prohibits landlords from discriminating against voucher holders. Housing Choice
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Landlords are virtually guaranteed payment from the government for
the amount represented by an HCV but sometimes refuse to accept
vouchers, perhaps because of conscious or unconscious
discrimination, based on source of income, socio-economic class, or
other factors.258 A small handful of states have outlawed source-ofincome-based discrimination in rental housing,259 and Congress
periodically proposes expanding the Fair Housing Act protections to
cover people who are denied housing because they pay with a
voucher.260 Unless and until such protections apply, however,
landlords can and do refuse to rent to low-income renters with
vouchers, and this significantly impairs the utility of the HCVs.261 In
Vouchers
Fact
Sheet,
U.S.
DEP’T
HOUSING
&
URB.
DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact
_sheet [https://perma.cc/99NM-RSFP]. Even in such states, however, enforcement is
“generally weak” and landlords still often discriminate against voucher holders.
Ingrid Gould Ellen, What Do We Know about Housing Choice Vouchers?, 30
REGIONAL
SCI.
&
URB.
ECON.
1,
1–2
(2018),
https://furmancenter.org/files/What_do_we_know_about_housing_vouchers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZR8R-6FZF].
258. Socioeconomic status “is tightly linked to race, minority status, sex, and
disability,” so it is difficult to tease out the reasons that landlords may refuse to rent
to housing voucher recipients. Kinara Flagg, Mending the Safety Net Through Source

of Income Protections: The Nexus Between Antidiscrimination and Social Welfare
Law, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 201, 220 (2011). For a more thorough discussion of
the issues surrounding source of income discrimination, see Jenna Bernstein, Section
8, Source of Income Discrimination, and Federal Preemption: Setting the Record
Straight, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1407, 1412 (2010); Stefanie DeLuca, Why Don’t More
Voucher Holders Escape Poor Neighborhoods, NYU FURMAN CTR. (Oct. 2014),

http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/why-dont-more-voucher-holders-escapepoor-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/CUA3-DQYJ]; Ellen, supra note 257, at 2.
259. As of January 2019, the following states have laws prohibiting discrimination
against housing voucher holders: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION
COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A
SUCCESSFUL
HOUSING
MOBILITY
PROGRAM
6–29
(2019),
https://prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM7X-RB7Y]. There are
source of income discrimination prohibitions in California, Delaware, and Wisconsin
as well, but these do not apply to voucher holders. Id. at 6, 10–11, 28–29. In addition,
over 80 local municipalities have regulations prohibiting source of income
discrimination in rental housing. See id. at 30–128.
260. For example, the proposed “American Housing and Economic Mobility Act”
expands the Fair Housing Act along several metrics, including banning source of
income discrimination. For a discussion of how and why the Act should be expanded
to cover voucher-based discrimination, see Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice

to the Housing Choice Voucher Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination
Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 769, 772 (2010).
261. See generally J. Rosie Tighe et al., Source of Discrimination and Fair Housing
Policy, 32 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 3 (2016) (discussing and providing evidence for this
type of discrimination). There is “rampant discrimination from private landlords”
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addition, even if landlords agree to take vouchers, tenants are
financially precluded from renting in areas where housing units rent
at higher-than-median levels since the voucher will not cover rental
amounts in excess of “reasonable” market rents (median rents in the
region).262 These limitations likely contribute to the fact that only 8%
of voucher recipients live in neighborhoods where fewer than 10% of
residents are poor.263 Furthermore, because HUD oversight of
subsidized housing units is sometimes spotty, thousands of voucher
recipients live in uninhabitable homes.264
III. OPTIMIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE
The government’s job of ensuring that the nation’s housing is
sufficiently affordable is made up of at least three components: (1)
designing and implementing programs to improve housing markets;
(2) funding necessary housing programs and housing cost subsidies
for households with remaining needs; and (3) providing and enforcing
laws that guarantee adequate housing rights (for households) and
impose sufficient housing obligations on state and local governments
and instrumentalities that lead to long-term improvements in housing
equity. The debate regarding the appropriate role for the federal
government in affordable housing sometimes erroneously conflates
these components. Congress has embraced affordable housing
devolution conceptually, but seems to see it as a way of avoiding
ultimate responsibility.265 Affordable housing devolution will only

against voucher recipients. Brentin Mock, New Orleans’ Leading AffordableHousing Developer Explains Its Lack of Affordable Housing, CITYLAB (Sept. 3,

2015),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/new-orleans-leading-affordablehousing-developer-explains-its-lack-of-affordable-housing/403351/
[https://perma.cc/EQH9-WCQ3] (describing a developer’s advice to landlords in
post-Katrina New Orleans to refuse to rent to voucher recipients).
262. HUD’s Small Area Fair Market Rent demonstration explored the possibility
of defining reasonable rents for voucher purposes based on zip code rather than
region in order to allow voucher recipients better access to higher priced
neighborhoods. MERYL FINKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., SMALL
AREA FAIR MARKET RENT DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION, at v (2017); see 24 C.F.R.
§§ 888.113, 982.503 (2018).
263. Housing Voucher Policy Designed to Expand Opportunity Targets Areas
That Need It, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/housing-voucher-policy-designed-to-expandopportunity-targets-areas-that-need-it [https://perma.cc/M6PB-VFF3].
264. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
265. Congress is not solely to blame. The Trump Administration has proposed
annual budgets (for FY18, FY19 and FY20) that significantly reduce affordable
housing’s federal funding. See President Trump Proposes Drastic Cuts to Affordable
Housing Programs, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Mar. 11, 2019)
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succeed, however, if Congress remains responsible for setting
standards and providing adequate funds. Local and regional decision
makers are likely better at understanding and addressing the
affordable housing needs of specific geographic areas, and they
should be empowered and encouraged in their efforts. After all,
housing markets are inherently local, significantly shaped by state and
local markets and laws. However, federal leadership in setting and
enforcing standards of fairness is needed to ensure equitable
treatment for vulnerable populations throughout the country and to
avoid the negative external impacts that local affordability crises
create. Furthermore, the federal government is the only level of
government that can provide sufficient funding to sustainably
decrease housing inequity. Pragmatic necessity justifies federal
financial and legal responsibility for solving the housing crisis, and the
history of federal housing policy provides the compelling moral
imperative for the federal government’s continuing accountability in
fair and affordable housing.
Part III.A first explains how the federal government would have
sufficient revenues to fully fund housing needs if allocations and
priorities within housing policy were changed. Part III.B then
articulates the pragmatic, economic, and moral justifications for
reallocating policy priorities and government resources.
A. Full Funding for Housing Affordability Programs
The federal government has the financial capacity to meaningfully
invest in affordable housing creation. Like Dorothy in the Wizard of
Oz, the government has “always had the power” to fulfill this quest, if
only it recognizes how to use it.266 The federal government could
very quickly at least double or triple its investment in affordable
housing solutions merely by reallocating resources from one category
of housing expenditures, namely, those benefiting wealthy
homeowners that do not improve housing affordability, to
expenditures that do address housing cost burdens.267 Federal
[hereinafter NLIHC, Trump 2020 Budget], https://nlihc.org/resource/presidenttrump-proposes-drastic-cuts-affordable-housing-programs
[https://perma.cc/PJF2U2TC]. This communicates the executive branch’s lack of concern for the ability of
low-income households to pay housing costs and reside in habitable homes.
266. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939) (“Glinda: You’ve always
had the power to go back to Kansas. Dorothy: I have?”).
267. Robert Collinson et al., Low Income Housing Policy, in ECONOMICS OF
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 59–61 (Robert A.
Moffitt ed., 2016) https://www.nber.org/chapters/c13485.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6GS4MWP] (calculating that nearly $40 billion annual funds are allocated to means-
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housing policy today provides benefits to people who do not
financially need them.268 The impact of reallocating those benefits to
those who do, in fact, struggle to pay for housing could be designed as
essentially budget-neutral, although the wealthiest homeowners
would pay a slightly higher tax without the MID, freeing up tax
revenues to be used in subsidizing very low income households and
investing in housing and neighborhood infrastructure.269 In addition
to recapturing unjustifiable tax benefits currently subsidizing wealthy
homeowners, Congress should adopt and encourage local
governments to adopt measures to reduce administrative costs and,
through more effective delegation of program management to PHAs,
minimize multi-layered bureaucratic waste.270
The growing magnitude of need among low-income renters
provides both a moral and economic imperative for reallocation of
federal funding from homeowner subsidies toward the creation of
affordable rentals and adequately subsidizing the housing
affordability gap for the nation’s neediest households. Current
subsidies unjustifiably provide economic benefits disproportionately
to median and above-median income homeowners while the vast
majority of low-income rental households receive no federal housing

tested housing programs, like vouchers, and LIHTC expenditures make up another
$6 billion, comparing that total of $46 billion spent on affordable rentals to the
“roughly $195 billion” of homeowner subsidies created by the mortgage interest
deduction alone).
268. “Most of the government’s spending on housing, or roughly $195 billion of an
estimated $270 billion, goes toward subsidizing homeowners through the tax code.”
Id. at 61. See also Jenny Schuetz, Under US Housing Policies, Homeowners Mostly
Win, While Renters Mostly Lose, BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/under-us-housing-policies-homeowners-mostlywin-while-renters-mostly-lose/ [https://perma.cc/NWL4-AX6L].
269. In 2015, for example, the government spent $190 billion to assist in
homebuying and renting, and about three-fourths of that amount subsidized
homeownership costs for high-income households. See Fischer & Sard, supra note 6.
Also, “[l]ess than 30 percent of federal housing spending in 2015 went to renters . . . .
Owners received more than 70 percent of federal housing subsidies, despite making
up less than two-thirds of all households and just 40 percent of those with severe
housing cost burdens.” See id.; see also BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., CUT TO
INVEST: REFORM THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION TO INVEST IN INNOVATION
AND
ADVANCED
INDUSTRIES
4–5
(2012),
brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/06-mortgage-interest-deduction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3AW-YLJ7].
270. Current and prior legislative proposals have detailed numerous ways to
decrease the administrative costs of housing programs. See, e.g., Will Fischer,
Streamlining Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct.
21,
2015),
https://www.cbpp.org/housing/streamlining-federal-rental-assistance
[https://perma.cc/DN5D-XFM9].
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assistance at all.271 In addition, homeowner subsidies are provided
without any dignitary costs, while renter subsidies, when provided,
come with stigma, autonomy constraints, and possibly with onerous
behavioral mandates.272 Homeowner housing costs subsidies are
fairly invisible (delivered mostly through tax benefits and mortgage
subsidies) and impose no autonomy limitations or behavioral
requirements, for example limiting where recipients may live or
requiring them to work a certain number of hours.273 Rental housing
assistance, on the other hand, is more visible and carries a stigma.274
Subsidies delivered via vouchers or placement in designated homes
also practically limit choice concerning the neighborhood in which to
live and, sometimes, the quality of one’s home.275 Because the
majority of rental assistance recipients end up living in poor quality
neighborhoods, their opportunities for future improvements to
income and quality of life for generations to come are severely
curtailed.276 In many cases, rental housing assistance does little to
improve long-term prospects and diminish long-term need.277 Such
allocations treat some of the symptoms of unaffordable housing, but
they insufficiently address its underlying causes.

271. See supra notes 245–49 and accompanying text.
272. There is no stigma associated with claiming deductions related to
homeownership. See Kevin Gu, An Origin of Welfare Stigma, RAMAPO J.L. & SOC’Y
(2016),
https://www.ramapo.edu/law-journal/files/2016/01/An-Origin-of-WelfareStigma.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3QY-U7L8]. But stigmas associated with receiving
governmental rental subsidies are significant and well documented. See, e.g., Paul
Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial Desegregation,
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 561–62 (1999); Steven J. Eagle, “Affordable Housing”
As Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 314 (2017); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How

Government Housing Perpetuates Racial Segregation: Lessons from Post-Katrina
New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 713–14 (2011).
273. See supra notes 212–25 and accompanying text.
274. See Kristi Andrasik, When It Comes to Housing, Your Voucher is Your
REALCLEAR
POL’Y
(Oct.
3,
2016),
Stigma,

https://www.realclearpolicy.com/blog/2016/10/04/when_it_comes_to_housing_your_v
oucher_is_your_stigma_1724.html [https://perma.cc/UA7N-X64P]; Emily Badger,
How Section 8 Became a ‘Racial Slur,’ WASH. POST (June 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/15/how-section-8-became-aracial-slur/?utm_term=.e56ffeb042f2 [https://perma.cc/B6LL-MG8T]; Maria Elkin,
What Everyone Gets Wrong about Affordable Housing, NEW AMERICA (Aug. 24,
2017),
https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-174/what-everyone-gets-wrongabout-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/FE2M-2CMF]; see also infra note 305
and accompanying text.
275. See generally supra notes 255–63 and accompanying text.
276. See Richard D. Kalenberg, An Economic Fair Housing Act, CENTURY
FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/economic-fair-housingact/?agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/BH4H-LHW9].
277. See generally Boyack, supra note 10.
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Congress should immediately re-allocate funding first toward
alleviating the symptoms for those three million very low-income and
extremely low-income households with HUD-identified worst-case
housing needs — those households that allocate more than 50% of
their income to housing or live in substandard conditions or both.278
Once the worst case needs are met, Congress should channel funding
toward creating long-term solutions to the lack of affordable housing
supply in higher opportunity neighborhoods, with the expectation
that investing in sufficient affordable housing in quality
neighborhoods for all low-income households will decrease the
percentage and number of households requiring rental subsidies in
the future. The federal government should also address the needs of
the nation’s 7.5 million severely cost-burdened homeowners, many of
whom suffered wealth and housing affordability losses due to
predatory lending schemes and the fallout from the Financial
Crisis.279
Funding of housing need through national channels avoids the
problem that plagues all local funding regimes: the places with the
greatest need for government assistance produce the smallest amount
of tax revenue.280 Congressional allocations based on local needs
rather than local means smooth out the difference between localities
with fewer financial resources and those with more robust ability to
self-fund, creating a more equitable distribution of aid. Distressed
municipalities can use federal funding to build neighborhood
infrastructure, investing in improvements that, once again, will pay

278. See WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at 2.
279. See generally JAMES H. CARR ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE
BROKERS, THE STATE OF BLACK HOUSING IN AMERICA (2016),
http://www.nareb.com/site-files/uploads/2016/08/NAREB-SHIBA-REPORT-2016final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAZ8-L73N]; Sean Veal & Jonathan Spader, Nearly a
Third of American Households Were Cost-Burdened Last Year, HARV. UNIV. JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/morethan-a-third-of-american-households-were-cost-burdened-last-year/
[https://perma.cc/L3HH-LK8E]. Pending legislation proposals include aid for
struggling homeowners. For a summary of the Foreclosure Crisis and its impacts, see
supra note 61.
280. This is one reason that poor neighborhoods, and particularly neighborhoods
with the lowest-cost housing, are also neighborhoods with the relatively weakest
public schools. See INGRID GOULD ELLEN & KEREN HORN, POVERTY & RACE RES.
ACTION COUNCIL, NYU FURMAN CTR. & UNIV. OF MASS. BOSTON, HOUSING AND
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL SCHOOLS NEAR
FAMILIES
WITH
FEDERAL
HOUSING
ASSISTANCE
1
(2018),
https://furmancenter.org/files/HousingLocationSchools2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X88F-4KUV].

2019]

RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION

1247

long-term dividends in terms of greater resident opportunities,
wealth, and municipal resources.281
B. Pragmatic, Economic, and Moral Justifications for Federal
Responsibility
Pragmatics, economics, and history all warrant a significant federal
government role in improving the equities of housing markets.
Federal law limitations on state and local housing laws are essential
because local laws can be and are used to impose unjustifiable costs
on vulnerable, low-income populations.282 The most cost-effective
way to make lasting improvements in housing affordability is through
limiting the efficacy of exclusionary land use regulations, prohibiting
source-of-income discrimination by landlords, and ensuring
adequately habitable premises in low-income housing units.
Exclusionary zoning’s constitutionality should be rethought and
limited to separation of harmful and incompatible uses only; local
land use laws should not be permitted to restrict the residential
integration of disparate economic classes.283 To date, states have
found it difficult to rein in local governments from using their land
use regulations to directly or indirectly exclude low-income
households from their communities, with the notable exception of
New Jersey, where a series of lengthy and hard-fought legal
challenges has given birth to the Mount Laurel doctrine that requires
each locality to include its “fair share” of affordable housing.284 A

281. See Robert O. Zdenek, The Art and Science of Community Economic
Development, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 331, 331–33 (2004)

(reviewing and summarizing MIHAILO TEMALI, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES AND TOOLS TO REVITALIZE YOUR
NEIGHBORHOOD (2002)).
282. ADVISORY COMM’N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS.,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., “NOT IN MY BACK YARD”: REMOVING BARRIERS
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 3 (1991); Kristine Nelson Fuge, Exclusionary Zoning:
Keeping People in Their Wrongful Places or a Valid Exercise of Local Control?, 18
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 148, 151 (1996); Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner

City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the
Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 6 (2006); Henry A. Span, How the Courts
Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2001); see also U.S.
ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F.

Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
283. Andrea J. Boyack, American Dream in Flux: The Endangered Right to Lease
a Home, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 203, 208–11 (2014); see also Boyack,
Revitalizing, supra note 107, at 471–74.
284. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456
A.2d 390, 411–22, 433, 441–51 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 724–25, 732–34 (N.J. 1975). The
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renewal of traditional, constitutional protections of private property
rights at the federal court level, however, could push back against
local laws creating neighborhood exclusions and allow market forces
to naturally grow affordable housing supply.285 Local, regional
exclusions can be combatted through both federal mandates and
assisted regional coordination for housing markets that cross
jurisdictional boundaries. Regional coordination is imperative in
interconnected housing markets because exclusions in one area
impose cost externalities on other communities in the region.286
Treating multi-jurisdictional housing markets as a whole will better
address neighborhood quality concerns, residential desegregation,
and regional affordability.287 It will also enable coordination for

Mount Laurel doctrine, articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1975

case of the same name, stated that all municipalities in the state have an “affirmative
obligation” to meet their “fair share” of affordable rental housing in order to meet
regional needs. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 420. The Mount Laurel doctrine has
been foundational for fair-housing and affordable-housing advocates to push for
inclusive siting of low-income and moderate-income housing developments, and the
case and its doctrine have been frequently cited in litigation around the country. For
more details on the Mount Laurel case, its circumstances, impacts, and the continuing
struggle to apply the associated legal doctrine, see generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET
AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB (2013).
285. There are many discussions of how land use regulations affects affordable
housing. See, e.g., JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 84–89 (2d ed., West 2003)
(discussing minimum lot sizes and building setback lines); Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I–The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41
(1990) (discussing minimum lot sizes); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston,
13 J.L. & ECON. 71, 101–102 (1970) (discussing minimum lot sizes in Houston, a city
purportedly without zoning); see also Eliza Hall, Divide and Sprawl, Decline and
Fall: A Comparative Critique of Euclidean Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 915, 925–27
(2007); Michael Lewyn, The (Somewhat) False Hope of Comprehensive Planning, 37
U. HAW. L. REV. 39, 69–70 (2015); Michael Lewyn, You Can Have It All: Less Sprawl
and Property Rights Too, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1093, 1131–33 (2007); Michael Lewyn,
Zoning and Land Use Planning, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 558, 558–63 (2016); Boyack,
Revitalizing, supra note 107, at 448–57.
286. Lavea Brachman, New State and Federal Policy Agendas: Realizing the
Potential of America’s Legacy Cities and Their Regions, in REBUILDING AMERICA’S
LEGACY CITIES: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND 276–77 (Alan
Mallach ed., 2012); see also Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered,
21 J.L. & POL. 505, 532, 546 (2005); Abraham Gutman et. al., Health, Housing, and
the Law, 11 NE. U.L. REV. 251, 310–12 (2019) (discussing various regional
coordinated efforts to address housing deficiencies); Megan Haberle & Philip
Tegeler, Coordinated Action on School and Housing Integration: The Role of State
Government, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 957 (2019) (discussing how the “absence of
widespread regional solutions” has hamstrung attempts to desegregate communities
and public schools).
287. Brachman, supra note 286, at 277.
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infrastructure projects, such as public transit, that should rationally be
considered at the regional level.288
In a similar vein, federal Fair Housing law should be expanded to
prohibit housing discrimination based on a tenant’s (or home
purchaser’s) source of income, for example, using vouchers to pay
rent.289 Eliminating legal source-of-income housing discrimination
would increase the quantity and quality of homes available to housing
aid recipients, making the federal rental subsidies more effective and
more likely to achieve long-lasting improvements for the recipients.
Federal law could also be expanded to create a minimum level of
property rights protections for tenants, either through an expanded
judicial interpretation of constitutional property and civil rights or
through affirmative legislation. At a minimum, tenants across the
country should be guaranteed the right to withhold rent for
uninhabitable premises,290 be protected from retaliatory eviction and

288. Id.
289. See supra notes 248–54 and accompanying text. Although several states have
passed legislation protecting against source of income discrimination, and although
expanding FHA to cover source of income discrimination has been proposed,
Congress has not yet acted to protect voucher recipients’ ability to obtain housing.
One reason that proposals to expand FHA protections have not passed, however, has
been that the issue of source of income discrimination has been bundled with other
classifications that are more politically controversial. For example, current legislative
proposals involve expanding FHA protections to discriminatory housing actions
based on sexual preference and gender identity as well as those based on source of
income. See, e.g., Affordable Housing Crisis Act of 2018, S. 3231, 115th Cong. (2018);
American Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2019, S. 787/H.R. 1737, 116th
Cong. (2019). Although such expansions may very well be warranted, political
expediency argues that source of income discrimination should be separately
considered by Congress to increase the likelihood of the measure actually being
passed.
290. The implied warranty of habitability is part of state landlord-tenant law, but
there are significant differences from state-to-state. See generally Memorandum from
Alice Noble-Allgire to the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act Drafting
Comm. (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/Research-Memo-re50-State-Survey-of-the-Warranty-of-Habitability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QQ3V2RFD]. Although about half of the states have adopted the Universal Residential
Landlord Tenant Act, even in those states, the law pertaining to the implied warranty
of habitability in residential leases is not uniform. Id. at 14. In some jurisdictions,
tenants have an absolute right to withhold rent while residing in premises that the
tenant considers uninhabitable; in other places, a tenant can sue for a rent reduction
but must continue to pay rent (at least into an escrow account) pending court
determination of inhabitability. Id. at 16–17. There may be utility in harmonizing
such laws or at the very least creating a federal floor for fair treatment of tenants.
Several scholars have suggested legal changes that could help the implied warranty of
habitability better achieve its tenant protection purposes. See, e.g., Melissa T.
Lonegrass, Convergence in Contort: Landlord Liability for Defective Premises in
Comparative Perspective, 85 TUL. L. REV. 413, 415 (2010) (suggesting a judicial
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tenant blacklisting,291 and be ensured the right to counsel in eviction
proceedings.292 Federal law could create, and federal courts could
ensure, a residential tenants’ bill of rights.293
Federal funding provided to local governments and agencies
provides another method for incentivizing equitable and appropriate
local housing policies and programs. HUD already exercises control
over the PHAs and imposes federal policy mandates by attaching
conditions to the receipt of federal housing funds.294 The strings
attached to federal funding need to follow a well thought-out,
consistent plan for long-term systemic improvements and not change
haphazardly to reflect the political concern du jour. For example, if
new low-income housing should be built in high opportunity

reframing of harms to tenants from uninhabitable premises); Franzese et al., supra
note 101, at 42–43 (2016) (suggesting better enforcement mechanisms).
291. See Desmond, Unaffordable, supra note 11, at 4–5; Franzese, supra note 103,
at 675–76.
292. Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants
in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527 (1991);
Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1509–17 (2004); Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The

Need
to
Recognize
a Right to Counsel for
Indigent
Defendants
in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 562–76 (1988). New York

recently passed a law — “the first of its kind in the nation” — that guarantees legal
representation for low-income tenants facing eviction. Andrew Scherer, The Right to
Counsel for Tenants Who Face Eviction, N.Y. L. SCH.: CITYLAND (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.citylandnyc.org/the-right-to-counsel-for-tenants-who-face-eviction/
[https://perma.cc/69G3-S33D]. San Francisco, the District of Columbia, and
Philadelphia have all taken steps towards enacting similar supports for low-income
tenants facing eviction. Clare Pastore & John Pollock, Into the Breach: Progress on
the Right to Counsel in Civil Matters, 41 L.A. LAW. 13, 14 (2018); DESMOND,
EVICTED, supra note 11, at 303–04.
293. Currently, federal law essentially establishes only two areas of protection for
residential tenants: protection from discrimination under FHA and protection from
eviction due to landlord foreclosure in the Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act,
expanded into a permanent law in May 2018. Congress Permanently Authorizes the
Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION
(May
29,
2018),
https://nlihc.org/resource/congress-permanently-authorizesprotecting-tenants-foreclosure-act [https://perma.cc/3JAY-H6NA]. Federal law does
not mandate counsel in eviction proceedings, require habitable quality of rented
premises, or otherwise impose a floor for state landlord-tenant law. The U.S.
Department of Defense, however, is in the process of preparing and promulgating a
“Tenant Bill of Rights” creating supplemental legal tenant protections for service
personnel in rental housing. U.S. Military Plans Release of Tenant Bill of Rights,
U.S.
ARMY
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://www.army.mil/article/218198/us_military_plans_release_of_tenant_bill_of_rig
hts [https://perma.cc/J3QL-6RW9].
294. MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41654, INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC
HOUSING
11
(2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41654.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5ES-QCGP].
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neighborhoods, this mandate needs to be clear and consistent. Funds
can also be earmarked for specific purposes to achieve public policy
goals. For example, the federal government can require that state
and local governments provide emergency shelter for otherwise
homeless households. Ideally, consistency in funding allocation
requirements could be ensured by legislation clarifying HUD’s
mission and priorities.
HUD should map out specific steps that localities must take to help
dismantle the effects of generations of housing segregation rather
than affirmatively requiring PHAs to prove, essentially, that their
planned use of funds will not make racial segregation worse. It is
imperative that the federal government not only recommit to
requiring that local programs “affirmatively further fair housing,” but
also map out how to achieve FHA’s residential racial integration
mandate. Persistently segregated housing patterns create a host of
costly social problems, so de-segregation will help decrease housing
assistance needs in the long run.295 Housing segregation increases
racial tensions and violence,296 concentrates poverty,297 enables a
“secession of the successful,”298 and leads to disinvestment in
neighborhood services for essential public goods, such as parks,
libraries, and even schools.299 Desegregation can be encouraged
through strategic siting of housing options for lower-income
households,300 increasing access for minority households to higher
opportunity neighborhoods, and subsidizing mortgage capital in a way
designed to make up for decades of discriminatory credit
allocation.301

295. See generally supra notes 1, 234–44 and accompanying text.
296. See Jeannine Bell, Can’t We Be Your Neighbor? Trayvon Martin, George
Zimmerman, and the Resistance to Blacks as Neighbors, 95 B.U. L. REV. 851, 870–71
(2015).
297. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Saving Mount Laurel?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611,
1615 (2013).
298. Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the “Secession of the
Successful”: Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675,
1679–83 (2001).
299. ELLEN & HORN, supra note 109, at 1; Boyack, Detroit, supra note 108, at 604;;
Kalenberg, supra note 276.
300. See generally Boyack, Revitalizing, supra note 107.
301. The homeownership rate among black households is not only significantly
lower than that of white households, black households are the “one group that has
made no appreciable progress” when it comes to homeownership. STATE OF
HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 3. The homeownership rate should not be an end in
itself, since unsustainable homeownership has created a net decline in the wealth and
housing stability for many black households. See Reiss, supra note 1, at 1091.
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There is an economic cost to allowing unaffordable local housing
markets to persist. Local unaffordable housing creates both negative
externalities in the region and artificially represses regional economic
growth.302 Housing unaffordability imposes adverse social effects and
economic costs, locally, regionally, and nationally. For one thing,
high housing costs has lead to an increased need for various forms of
state and federal welfare assistance.303 Housing instability decreases
income, decreasing federal and state tax revenues, and increasing the
burden on federal and state social services.304 When housing
unaffordability leads to homelessness, the costs are very extreme.305
In 2015 alone, the federal government spent $4.5 billion to address
homelessness.306 In addition, housing cost-burdens drive down
economic growth by discouraging people from locating in the most
productive, but most expensive, areas of the country.307 Local
decision-makers should not be permitted to impose such negative
economic impacts on the country as a whole.

302. See DANIEL SHOAG, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, REMOVING BARRIERS TO
ACCESSING
HIGH-PRODUCTIVITY
PLACES
8
(2019),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Shoag_PP_web_20190128.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9CK-YVLK] (explaining that local and national economies are
adversely affected by barriers to entry into vibrant labor markets that expensive
housing creates); see also BEEN, SUPPLY SKEPTICISM, supra note 158, at 10–12.
303. See Jeff Larrimore & Jenny Schuetz, Assessing the Severity of Rent Burden
on Low-Income Families, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Dec. 22, 2017)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/assessing-the-severity-ofrent-burden-on-low-income-families-20171222.htm [https://perma.cc/W7HX-GJ46].
304. Id.
305. See NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA 36 (2015), http://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015state-of-homelessness.pdf [https://perma.cc/85SE-6EBW] [hereinafter STATE OF
HOMELESSNESS]. Unaffordable housing is a huge factor contributing to homelessness,
and homelessness itself is costly. See Julien P. Doucette-Préville, The Challenge of
Homelessness to Spatial Practices, 8 ONT. INT’L DEV. AGENCY J. SUSTAINABLE DEV.
111, 114–15 (2015) (discussing urban redevelopment plans addressing homeless
populations); Stefan G. Kertesz et al., Permanent Supportive Housing for Homeless
People — Reframing the Debate, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2115, 2115–16 (2016)
(explaining that even if a purely economic analysis would not justify a Housing First
approach, a broader conception of the costs of chronic homelessness would). More
than half a million people are homeless on any given night in the United States, and
more than half of them are located in the country’s highest cost metropolitan areas.
STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 34. Although recent improvements in
shelter programs for homeless individuals and families, such as the “housing first”
model, have provided important supports for homeless persons, housing affordability
remains an underlying issue in many cases, contributing to instability and intermittent
homelessness. Id.; see generally Desmond & Gershensen, supra note 19.
306. See STATE OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 305, at 4.
307. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 17–19.
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Federal housing policy of decades past provides a final justification
for decisive financial and legal actions by the federal government to
improve housing inequity. Historically, federal housing policy
cemented a geography of racial residential segregation throughout
the country.308
Federal housing policy destroyed cohesive
communities of color by enabling “slum clearance” efforts that
ultimately decreased social supports and diminished opportunities for
advancement among poor and minority urban residents.309 Federal
housing policy helped concentrate poverty into environmentally
hostile and neglected neighborhoods.310 It spurred environmentally
problematic suburban sprawl and disinvestment in America’s cities.311
Along with tax policy, it operated to transfer billions of dollars of
wealth from low-income households to reward homeownership
among the nation’s most wealthy.312 It also incentivized irresponsible
mortgage lending that destabilized the financial and housing systems
of the country (and the world) and destroyed household wealth and
housing stability throughout the nation, particularly for households of
color and low-income renters and owners alike.313 After creating
such widespread, persistent harms for the country’s most
impoverished and vulnerable households, the federal government
cannot in good faith now disclaim responsibility for improving
housing quality and affordability for the adversely impacted groups.
Adequate financial investment in affordable housing creation and
neighborhood improvement is critical for the health and future of the

308. See generally Rothstein, supra note 1.
309. Id.; see also Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 519–22 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
310. Rothstein, supra note 1, at 177–93.
311. See JACKSON, supra note 1, 190–94 (exploring the government’s complicity in
and the social costs of the phenomenon of suburbanization).
312. Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation, 93
IND. L.J. 915, 962 (2018); see also Donald A. Krueckenberg, The Grapes of Rent: A
History of Renting in a Country of Owners, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 9, 9–10
(1999) (explaining the “ideology of property” and how federal preferences for
homeownership reflect this); APGAR, supra note 77, at 5 (criticizing the government’s
subsidization of homeownership and cataloguing the harms mis-incentives to
purchase real property have created)
313. See generally CARR ET AL., supra note 279; see also Abbye
Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, 57 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1041, 1064 (2015) (cataloguing the disparate wealth destruction caused by the
Financial Crisis); Shelby D. Green, Testing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s PostCrisis Self-Preservation Policies Under the Fair Housing Act, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
477, 517–18 (2018) (explaining how government policy choices before, during, and
after the 2008 crisis created negative impacts that “were felt disproportionately by
minority borrowers”).
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United States. It also is the only way for the federal government to
start making amends for federal policy’s historic negative impacts on
low-income households and communities of color.
Setting
appropriate legal standards to protect less economically and
politically advantaged citizens (low-income households and tenants)
is wise policy. Devolution to local experts regarding specific
programmatic design and implementation makes sense, but the
federal government remains financially and morally responsible for
ensuring the success of these efforts.
IV. FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY RISK MANAGEMENT
Even though the federal government can and should play an
essential funding, coordinating, and justice-promoting role in
developing affordable housing throughout the country, reliance on
federal solutions is risky — particularly in today’s polarized political
environment.314 Despite federal government dysfunction,315 there
have recently been some small hopeful steps in the realm of federal
housing policy. First, the previously untouchable MID was slightly
modified by prospectively (and temporarily) lowering its cap.316
Second, Congress slightly increased funding for affordable housing
under the past few budgets, including finally allocating funds to the

314. See generally DARREL M. WEST, DIVIDED POLITICS, DIVIDED NATION:
HYPERCONFLICT IN THE TRUMP ERA (2019). Polarization is reflected differently in
state and local politics. See Richard Florida, Are Local Politics as Polarized as
National?
Depends
on
the
Issue,
CITYLAB
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.citylab.com/life/2019/04/polarization-cities-education-labor-publicopinion-taxes/587746/ [https://perma.cc/C2Z5-U2AA]; Amalie Jensen et al., City
Limits to Partisan Polarization in the American Public (Mar. 2019) (unpublished
paper), http://williammarble.co/docs/CityLimits-Mar2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/29EKWRTR] (showing “affordable housing” as an issue that is relatively more polarizing
in some localities, but enjoys a relative consensus of opinion in others, compared to
the consistently partisan issues of labor unions and education).
315. See M. Akram Faizer, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: A Potential Cure
for the Trump Phenomenon, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 61, 68 (2016); Mihir Zaveri et al.,
The Government Shutdown Was the Longest Ever. Here’s the History, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longestgovernment-shutdown.html [https://perma.cc/33LL-V2EQ]. Although news stories,
opinion pieces, and articles about federal government dysfunction during the Trump
administration are legion, federal government dysfunction is not a recent
phenomenon. See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE GOVERNING CRISIS:
EXPLORING
SOLUTIONS
(2014),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/dysfunction 20V7 2005 2
012.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP6L-W3VU].
316. See supra notes 222–32 and accompanying text.

2019]

RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION

1255

Housing Trust Fund.317
In addition, community development
innovations, such as the provisions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 for local development of “Opportunity Zones,” may indicate an
increased willingness to invest in housing and neighborhood
infrastructure.318 But recent federal actions and inactions have also
created sizable problems and concerns for affordable housing policy
and funding now and in the future. Taking the same general
approach as in previous years of his administration, President Trump
has proposed a budget for fiscal year 2020 that cuts funding for HUD
by $9.6 billion (an 18% reduction of its budget), eliminates funding for
the Housing Trust Fund and public housing capital repairs, and
significantly reduces funding for the Housing Choice Voucher
program through raising tenant payment responsibilities.319 The
House Appropriations Subcommittee’s proposed 2020 budget, on the
other hand, renews or increases funding for all rental housing
assistance programs, supportive housing programs, and programs
addressing homelessness.320 Another worrisome development is
HUD’s refusal to implement the Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing (AFFH) Rule it created in 2015 to further the purposes of
the Fair Housing Act. Instead of taking steps to address increasing
residential segregation, HUD Secretary Carson announced that HUD
will “reinterpret” the AFFH Rule, presumably to undercut the need

317. See generally supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text; Senate Committee
Approves Robust Funding for Affordable Housing in FY 19, NAT’L LOW INCOME

HOUSING COALITION (June 11, 2018), https://nlihc.org/resource/senate-committeeapproves-robust-funding-affordable-housing-fy19-0 [https://perma.cc/BCM8-ALGK].
318. See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Opportunity Zones: Can a Tax Break for Rich
People Really Help Poor People?, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/14/opportunity-zones-can-taxbreak-rich-people-really-help-poor-people/ [https://perma.cc/Q4RB-ATKX]; Lori
Chatman, Opportunity Zones: What They Are, Why They Matter, AFFORDABLE
HOUSING FIN. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.housingfinance.com/news/opportunityzones-what-they-are-why-they-matter_o
[https://perma.cc/XYS8-RLQP];
Opportunity Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP, https://eig.org/opportunityzones
[https://perma.cc/8JHU-WF62] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019 7:34 PM); Catalina Vielma,
Opportunity Zones and Tax Credits: A Match Made In . . . ?, AFFORDABLE HOUSING
FIN. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.housingfinance.com/finance/opportunity-zones-andtax-credits-a-match-made-in_o [https://perma.cc/85C5-36RN]. For a more cynical
analysis, see Gbenga Ajilore, How a Tax Break Meant for Low-Income Communities
Became a Mini Tax Haven for the Rich, TALK POVERTY (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://talkpoverty.org/2018/12/13/tax-break-low-income-opportunity-rich/
[https://perma.cc/A4SJ-R323].
319. NLIHC, Trump 2020 Budget, supra note 265.
320. See House Releases Robust FY2020 Housing Spending Bill, NAT’L LOW
INCOME HOUSING COALITION (May 22, 2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/housereleases-robust-fy2020-housing-spending-bill [https://perma.cc/N5FV-KXUC].
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for any affirmative integration efforts.321 There are other worrisome
housing developments too. For example, HUD proposed a new rule,
implementing a Trump executive order, that creates unrealistically
onerous work requirements for low-income housing subsidy
recipients, the overwhelming majority of whom either are already
working full time or cannot work due to a disability or need to care
for a family member.322
Politicized agency actions and dysfunction in the federal
government threaten not only its ability to make new laws and
funding allocations, but also the ability of the government to operate
in the ordinary course. Disagreements regarding appropriations led
to the longest federal government shutdown in history from
December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019.323 The shutdown negatively
impacted federal employees and contractors whose salaries were
deferred or reduced by inhibiting their ability to meet housing costs
and other expenses.324
The shutdown also interrupted HUD

321. See Kriston Capps, The Trump Administration Just Derailed a Key Obama
on
Housing
Segregation,
CITYLAB
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/the-trump-administration-derailed-a-keyobama-rule-on-housing-segregation/549746/ [https://perma.cc/G9KS-EBEG]; House

Rule

GOP Members Call for HUD to Rescind AFFH Rule, Secretary Carson Says HUD
will “Reinterpret” the Rule, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Apr. 30,

2019),
https://nlihc.org/resource/house-gop-members-call-hud-rescind-affh-rulesecretary-carson-says-hud-will-reinterpret [https://perma.cc/JM8X-HM2C].
322. Kriston Capps, Why HUD Wants to Raise the Rent, CITYLAB (Apr. 25,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/hud-ben-carson-work-requirementsrent-hikes/558920/ [https://perma.cc/QM29-CYUF]. The proposed work requirement
is unrealistic and will be ineffective because (a) the vast majority of extremely lowincome renters already work in low-wage jobs; (b) many low-income aid recipients
are unable to work because of age (26% are seniors) and/or disability (22% are
disabled); and (c) the overwhelming majority of non-elderly/disabled housing aid
recipients who are not already working full time are either full-time students or
single-adult caregivers to young children or a household member with a disability.
NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 9; see also NLIHC, Trump 2020 Budget,
supra note 265.
323. This 35-day shutdown of the federal government arose from appropriations
disagreement with respect to funding a border wall. Zaveri et al., supra note 314.
324. Salary interruptions for federal employees caused worries with respect to
employees’ ability to make monthly rental and mortgage payments for housing.
Letter from Campaign for Housing and Community Development Funding to Sen.
McConnell
et
al.,
(Jan.
8,
2019)
[hereinafter
CHCDF
Letter],
https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/files/chcdf_letter_re_government_shutdown_
010819.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V2W-3BSL]. Federal employee housing payments due
in January 2019 alone were estimated to be over $400 million in aggregate. Shawn M.
Carter, Workers Going Unpaid during the Shutdown Owe $438 Million in Rent and
CNBC
(Jan.
18,
2019),
Mortgage
Payments
This
Month,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/federal-workers-who-arent-being-paid-oew-438million-for-housing.html [https://perma.cc/6P8J-3VJP]; see also Liz Frazier Peck, The
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operations and reduced the efficacy of affordable housing
programs.325 For example, the critical repairs and upkeep for public
housing units that had been planned for December and January had
to be deferred,326 and over 1000 project-based rental assistance
contracts expired during the shutdown, leaving over 40,000 extremely
low-income households with no housing assistance.327 Funding

Real Financial Impact of the Government Shutdown on Workers, FORBES (Jan. 14,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizfrazierpeck/2019/01/14/the-real-financialimpact-of-the-government-shutdown-on-workers/#596d26c242b5
[https://perma.cc/JTK8-9TJR]. News reports during the shutdown bear witness to
widespread worry and even panic among those who are to some extent dependent
upon federal housing assistance or management. See, e.g., Suzy Khimm & Laura
Strickler, ‘There’s No Money’: Shutdown Freezes HUD Funds for Low-income
Senior Citizens, NBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/whitehouse/there-s-no-money-shutdown-freezes-hud-funds-low-income-n957386
[https://perma.cc/C7LZ-4XKL]; Tracy Jan & William Wan, Food Stamps, Rent Aid
and the Safety Net for American’s Poorest at Risk as Shutdown Drags On, WASH.
POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/food-stampshousing-subsidies-and-other-services-for-vulnerable-americans-in-jeopardy-asshutdown-drags-on/2019/01/09/e025549c-1374-11e9-803c4ef28312c8b9_story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/4J2F-3WGH]; Khushubu
Shah, ‘We Are Being Held Emotionally Hostage’: Shutdown Hits Affordable
Housing,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/10/government-shutdown-affordablehousing-hud-trump [https://perma.cc/A9RU-9PL4]. A statement issued by the Trump
Administration advised landlords with federal employee tenants to cover any unpaid
rents “with reserves” and suggested that federal employees could offer to perform
upkeep services in kind in lieu of making rental or mortgage payments. See Mariana
Alfredo, A Government Agency Shared Tips for Employees to Send to Landlords
While the Shutdown Leaves Them without Paychecks, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2018
2:51 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/government-shutdown-agency-sharedtips-for-employees-to-send-to-landlords-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/5X4Q-Z8LT].
325. See generally Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) in the Event of a
U.S.
DEP’T
HOUSING
&
URB.
DEV.,
Government
Shutdown,
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/GENERALFAQS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TJ93-9E6K] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); CHCDF Letter, supra note
324. HUD was shuttered during the government shutdown and Deputy Secretary
Pam Patenaude, the highest-ranking HUD official with any housing experience, quit.
Jacob Gaffney, HUD Deputy Secretary Pam Patenaude Resigns, Ends 35-Year
Career
in
Housing,
HOUSINGWIRE
(Dec.
17,
2018),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/47714-hud-deputy-secretary-pam-patenauderesigns [https://perma.cc/CZP3-NTAN].
326. ; Glen Thrush, Shutdown’s Pain Cuts Deep for the Homeless and Other
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
21,
2019),
Vulnerable
Americans,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/us/politics/government-shutdown-housingservices.html [https://perma.cc/LS5H-JJMG]; CHCDF Letter, supra note 324.
327. Brakkton Booker, Thousands Face Threat of Eviction After HUD Contracts
Expire Due to Shutdown, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/11/684414651/thousands-face-threat-of-eviction-afterhud-contracts-expire-due-to-shutdown [https://perma.cc/Y9TQ-WAP2];; Expired or
Expiring HUD Project-Based Rental Assistance Contracts (December 2018 to
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reductions and delays in project-based developments impacted the
provision of associated supportive services such as assistance for
disabled individuals and seniors who cannot live independently.328
The shutdown also put financial pressure on the private landlords and
other organizations that serve as key partners for federal housing
programs.329 Diane Yentel, director of the National Low Income
Housing Coalition, condemned the shutdown, stated that it was
“incredibly reckless to risk the homes of some of our country’s
poorest seniors, people with disabilities, and families with children as
perceived leverage for a fight that has nothing to do with them.”330
Today’s highly politicized federal government sector may suggest
that, even though the federal government should, in theory, take

February 2019), NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Shutdown-by-State.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RNH6FN7A]; Impacts of Government Shutdown on Affordable Housing Programs,
CAMPAIGN FOR HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. FUNDING (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/FY19_Shutdown_Factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R25P-BAWA]; CHCDF Letter, supra note 324. Extremely lowincome households, by definition, have an income that is below 30% of the average
median income. The median income of a four-person extremely low-income
household in 2017 was $17,050. WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at
1.
328. CHCDF Letter, supra note 324.
329. The effects of a shutdown outlast the weeks during which HUD and other
government agencies are shuttered. Lengthy shutdowns create market uncertainty,
raising transaction costs and increasing the hesitancy of various partners regarding
working with the government in the future. The very real economic costs of
unpredictability are particularly keen in contexts like affordable housing where there
is extensive partnering of public and private entities and dependence on
certifications, funding, and management from federal government actors. See, e.g.,
Thrush, supra note 326. Our increasingly privatized low-income housing system is
dependent upon cooperation and participation of private landlords, and “the
experience [of the protracted shutdown] could make private landlords less likely to
take part in federal housing programs.” Audrey McGlinchy, As Shutdown Drags On,
Low-Income Housing Providers in Austin Worry Funding for Rent Could Run Out,
TEXAS STANDARD (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/asshutdown-drags-on-low-income-housing-providers-in-austin-worry-funding-for-rentcould-run-out/ [https://perma.cc/BQ9R-5UA2].
330. Sanjana Karanth & Arthur Delaney, Some Renters Are Already Facing
Eviction, Thanks to the Shutdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/shutdown-low-income-renters-housing-programssection-8-eviction_n_5c3e1823e4b01c93e00e1a86 [https://perma.cc/JYE5-T7UC]. The
shutdown resulted from disagreements between Congress and President Trump
regarding border security. Peter Lawrence, House Approved 2019 Omnibus

Appropriations Would End Shutdown, Increase HUD Funding but Wall Funding
Impasse Prevents Enactment, NOVOGRADIC: HUD RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 8,
2019),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/house-approved-2019omnibus-appropriations-would-end-shutdown-increase-hud-funding-wall-funding
[https://perma.cc/EX6E-HRVL].
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responsibility for providing adequate financial, legal, and policy
support for affordable housing, actually relying on federal agencies to
fulfill this responsibility is unwise. If a particular administration is
hostile to Congressional affordable housing goals, it can effectively
undercut the achievement of those goals by staffing (or understaffing)
decisions regarding government agencies.331
Considering the
willingness of certain segments of the federal government to use
housing programs as pawns in a political power play suggests that
trusting the federal government to simply do the right thing may be
hopelessly naïve.332
There are some ways to mitigate the risk of reliance on the federal
government to consistently and correctly do its job, but these require
bold steps by Congress in passing targeted legislation that would
narrow the scope of federal agency discretion and mandate specific
outcomes and funding adequacy for affordable housing. Specifically,
some of the affordable housing mandates that Congress should
consider include:
•

•
•

Shoring up property rights protections in order to rein in local
land use regimes that unjustifiably restrict the supply and
location of affordable housing and otherwise constrain market
efficiencies, impose economic harms, and effectively reentrench patterns of residential segregation.333
Guaranteeing particular legal protections for tenants
individually and low-income households as a group.334
Expanding the Fair Housing Act to include source-of-income
discrimination.335

331. For a fascinating look at the role of agency rulemaking and inaction in the
context of separation of powers and the blurry line between “law” and “not-law”
actions by the government, see David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative
Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 293 (2015).
332. Professor Steven Eagle, for example, doubts that the federal government can
or will take steps to improve affordable housing. See generally Steven J. Eagle,
“Affordable Housing” as Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301 (2017).
333. See generally SHOAG, supra note 302; see also supra notes 283–88 and
accompanying text.
334. For example, shoring up state protections of premises habitability. See supra
notes 96–106, 290–93 and accompanying text. Another critically important tenant
protection that could be ensured is a right to legal counsel in evictions. The presence
or absence of an attorney in an eviction proceeding significantly affects the outcome,
and more than 90% of tenants lack legal counsel in that context. See Desmond,
Unaffordable supra note 11, at 5.
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Requiring greater accountability in the use of HUD funds to
further Fair Housing purposes.336
Repealing the MID while legally mandating that all increased
revenues from its elimination be allocated to fund affordable
housing initiatives.337
Expanding supply-producing initiatives, such as the LIHTC
program, to address affordable supply deficits338 and the
expiring affordability periods of existing low-income housing,339
specifying that the majority of new affordable housing units be
created in higher quality neighborhoods.340
Mandating sufficient funding to cover the affordability gap, at
least with respect to all very low-income families.341
Guaranteeing publicly provided shelter programs for the most
vulnerable populations (extremely low- and no-income
households that are homeless, disabled, or elderly).342

Congress could also invest in long-term improvements to housing
equity through a variety of initiatives that combat past discrimination
335. See supra notes 257–62, 289 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of and lack of protection against source-of-income discrimination by
private landlords in a majority of states).
336. This would effectively mandate the substance of HUD’s 2015 AFFH Rule.
See supra note 321 and accompanying text. Currently, the AFFH Rule is vulnerable
to agency “reinterpretation” and implementation discretion. See id.
337. See supra notes 219–29 and accompanying text (discussing the cost and impact
of the mortgage interest deduction).
338. See supra Section II.C (discussing the need and efficacy of supply-side
supports for affordable housing rehabilitation and production).
339. See supra notes 199–203, 211 and accompanying text (discussing the problem
of expiring affordability periods).
340. See supra notes 204–05, 214–15 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of siting in the context of affordable housing, particularly for improving
long-term outcomes of persons residing in affordable housing units).
341. See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy of
cost subsidies for the nation’s most impoverished households). See generally WORST
CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21. See also supra Section I.C (discussing
shared characteristics and challenges of lowest income households and barriers to
improvements income).
342. See supra notes 37, 155, 178, 307–08 and accompanying text; see also
LAUVENA STATEN, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY
PROJECT, PENNY WISE BUT POUND FOOLISH: HOW PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE
HOUSING CAN PREVENT A WORLD OF HURT 11–28 (2019); Stefan G. Kertesz et al.,
Permanent Supportive Housing for Homeless People — Reframing the Debate, 375
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2115, 2115–16 (2016). Note that “the number of worst case
[housing] needs has increased by 40.6 percent since 2007, when the recession began,
and by 65.6 percent (3.29 million households) since 2001.” WORST CASE HOUSING
NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at 8.
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and extreme income inequality. For example, long-term
improvements in housing equity and affordability could be assisted
by:
• Providing funding for infrastructure investment to
rehabilitate and improve poorer quality neighborhoods
while specifically preserving residency of current lowincome households located there.343
• Taking steps to increase pay equity and adequacy for all
workers.344
• Providing childcare and healthcare supports for parents,
particularly single parents with young children.345

343. See Boyack, Revitalizing, supra note 107, at 448–49 (discussing how
neighborhood improvements in areas of poverty concentration can create improved
outcomes for low-income households if displacement is avoided); see also Elizabeth
Kneebone, The Growth and Spread of Concentrated Poverty, 2000 to 2008-2012,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 31, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/the-growthand-spread-of-concentrated-poverty-2000-to-2008-2012/
[https://perma.cc/ZT437QVH] (discussing the neighborhood effects of concentrated poverty in
neighborhoods with poor education, health, and physical infrastructure).
344. Unaffordable housing is both a problem of high housing costs and of low
incomes. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Exploiting the Poor: Housing, Markets, and
Vulnerability, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 458 (2017); Desmond, Unaffordable, supra note
11. Part of the reason that housing is becoming less affordable is that incomes are
growing at a slower rate than rents. Thus, a sustainable solution to unaffordable
housing will require efforts to make markets more responsive to need as well as
investment in growing incomes. Brenda Richardson, America’s Housing
Affordability Crisis Only Getting Worse, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brendarichardson/2019/01/31/americas-housingaffordability-crisis-only-getting-worse/#79d2e2d104b3
[https://perma.cc/8EE2FLKH].
345. Improvements in support for single-parent households, including better
childcare, healthcare, and parental leave, will pay dividends in available income and,
thus, housing affordability. See generally GINA ADAMS ET AL., URB. INST.,
STRATEGIES TO MEET THE CHILD CARE NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME PARENTS SEEKING
EDUCATION
AND
TRAINING
(2016),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/84326/2000938-Strategies-toMeet-the-Child-Care-Needs-of-Low-Income-Parents-Seeking-Education-andTraining.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4TV-XMG8]; Kelli A. Komro et al., Creating

Nurturing Environments: A Science-Based Framework for Promoting Child Health
and Development within High-Poverty Neighborhoods, 14 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM.
PSYCHOL. REV. 111 (2011); Elizabeth A. Mulroy & Terry S. Lane, Housing
Affordability, Stress and Single Mothers: Pathway to Homelessness, 19 J. SOC. &

SOC’Y WELFARE 51 (1992). HUD and state agencies do have specific programs that
aim to support the housing needs of single parents; see, e.g., HUD Public Housing for
Single Mothers, GRANTS FOR SINGLE MOTHERS, http://singlemothersgrants.org/hudpublic-housing-for-single-mothers/ [https://perma.cc/S6AN-NSNA] (last visited Oct.
6, 2019, 1:20 PM).
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In today’s antagonistic political environment, it is increasingly
irresponsible for Congress to pass the buck when it comes to setting
policy objective and legal mandates. Giving housing imperatives the
force of law would keep agencies from playing politics with people’s
lives.
To avoid reliance on agency discretion and being caught in the
crossfire of political power struggles, Congress will have to actually
pass detailed legislation regarding affordable housing. The last
several bills attempting to improve laws regarding affordable housing,
however, have never even been brought to a vote.346 Legislative
impotence might be improved if Congress moves away from
considering issues in a bundled, omnibus bill that includes a wide
variety and huge number of legal mandates. It may be more effective,
as well as more transparent to constituents, if Congress addresses
housing issues one at a time, in shorter, targeted, more
understandable legislation. Single-issue legislation might be able to
accomplish in baby steps what never-passed omnibus bills do not. For
example, the recently proposed American Housing and Economic
Mobility Act includes numerous legal improvements to our housing
system,347 but this bill risks dying in committee based on a handful of

346. See, e.g., Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 3045, 111th Cong.
(2009); Common Sense Housing Investment Act of 2013, H.R. 1213, 112th Cong.
(2013); Housing Opportunity through Modernization Act of 2016, H.R. 3700, 114th
Cong. (2016); Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2017, S. 548, 115th
Cong. (2017); American Housing and Mobility Act of 2018, S. 3503, 115th Cong.
(2018); Affordable Housing Crisis Act of 2018, S. 3231, 115th Cong. (2018);
Affordable Housing and Self-Sufficiency Improvement Act (AHSSI), NAT’L LOW
INCOME
HOUSING
COALITION
(Jun.
2012),
https://www.smgov.net/uploadedFiles/Departments/HED/Housing_and_Redevelopm
ent/Housing/Housing_Commission_Agendas/2012/Attach 20C 20AHSSIA_FS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4XR-EFWL]. Currently, the American Housing and Economic
Mobility Act of 2019, S. 787, 116th Cong. (2019), is still in committee.
347. For example, the proposed act would expand the Housing Trust Fund to
adequately preserve affordable housing units at risk of obsolescence, ban housing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, and
source of income, direct HUD to establish regional consortia to reduce the cost and
increase the effectiveness of regional housing voucher administration, establish
incentives for local government reduction of zoning barriers to housing development,
fund grants for infrastructure and community development, rehabilitate and build
housing in Native American tribal areas, expand funding to create 380,000 affordable
rental homes and homeownership subsidies for rural areas, fund supportive services
in low and middle-income neighborhoods, create an emergency housing fund for
places where housing costs are rapidly increasing, strengthen the Community
Reinvestment Act to ensure credit access for low and moderate income borrowers,
provide down payment assistance to first-time homebuyers in formerly redlined
areas, and provide relief to homeowners whose equity was destroyed by the financial
crisis. American Housing and Economic Mobility Act, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING
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controversial issues included in it.348 On the other hand, the Landlord
Accountability Act introduced in the House by New York’s
Representative Velasquez focuses on the single issue of rental
discrimination based on the use of Section 8 vouchers.349 If Congress
could successfully enact smaller, specific bills, Congress may start to
meet its responsibility of effectively shaping federal affordable
housing law and policy.350
Housing programs and incentives today are often necessarily
responsive to immediate and dramatic housing needs, but Congress
must take a longer view and also invest funds in improving
neighborhood quality, affordable housing location, the sufficiency of
gap funding, and residential desegregation. Addressing these issues
helps cure the disease of housing unaffordability, not just treat its
symptoms.
Improving neighborhood quality, residential racial
integration, and housing instability among low-income households
will lead to improved household outcomes now and in future

COALITION (Mar. 13, 2019), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Warren-HEOMBill.pdf [https://perma.cc/F32Z-UM5F]. There are good arguments that would
support the passage of any one of the Act’s mandates, but if the entire omnibus bill
cannot be passed, none of these improvements would become law. It would be better
to successfully pass some of these initiatives than fail to pass all of them.
348. See Kriston Capps, Elizabeth Warren’s Housing Crisis Plan Hints at
Reparations,
CITYLAB
(Jan.
4,
2019),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/01/elizabeth-warren-housing-plan-redliningracial-justice-reparations/579268/ [https://perma.cc/BG95-AV89]; Madeline Carlisle,
Elizabeth Warren’s Ambitious Fix for America’s Housing Crisis, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/elizabeth-warrens-fixamericas-housing-crisis/571210/ [https://perma.cc/6E7N-DWYT]; Donna Kimura,
Warren Introduces Massive Housing Bill, AFFORDABLE HOUSING FIN. (Sept. 26,
2018), https://www.housingfinance.com/policy-legislation/warren-introduces-massivehousing-bill_o [https://perma.cc/4HBJ-MY3N]. For a summary of changes between
the 2018 and the 2019 version of the bill, see Pete Harrison, An Update on Elizabeth
Warren’s Housing Plans, DATA FOR PROGRESS (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2019/3/15/an-update-on-elizabeth-warrenshousing-plan [https://perma.cc/T978-4SX9].
349. Perhaps it is overly optimistic to think that even short, single-issue bills could
actually be enacted into law, however. H.R. 323 is still stuck in committee, and a
similar resolution was never brought to a vote in the 115th Congress. See, e.g.,
Landlord Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 202, 115th Cong. (2017); see also H.R.
323, 116th Cong. (2019).
350. Another example of taking “baby steps” toward housing systemic
improvement is the Safe Housing for Families Act introduced earlier this year by
Senator Kamala Harris and Representatives Jesús García and Joe Cunningham. This
short bill focuses on requiring functioning carbon monoxide detectors in public and
assisted housing and is likely to be uncontroversial and, hopefully, adopted. Safe
Housing for Families Act, S. 755, 116th Cong. (2019); Carbon Monoxide Alarms
Leading Every Resident to Safety Act of 2019, H.R. 1690, 116th Cong. (2019); see
Agricultural Worker Program Act of 2019, S. 175, 116th Cong. (2019).

1264

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

generations, eventually reducing the number of cost-burdened
households and intensity of their unmet housing needs. Residential
segregation, for example, is rampant and limits economic potential
individually and as a society. Segregation also “reduces social
cohesion and intergroup trust, increases prejudice, and erodes
democratic participation.”351 It will take committed, consistent
investment to undo residential segregation, de-concentrate poverty,
and improve deficient neighborhood infrastructure.
But such
investments are necessary for the lasting improvements to housing
affordability that are the federal government’s responsibility to
achieve.352
CONCLUSION
Unaffordable and poor-quality housing is costly and unfair for the
many households who struggle to pay for shelter and never obtain a
stable, quality place to call home. Unaffordable housing is also bad
for the country as a whole: It is costly, destabilizing, and
unsustainable.353 The United States is the wealthiest country in the
world, and yet ranks far behind many other developed countries when
it comes to quality of life for its poorest citizens.354 It is unjustifiable
to cite lack of funding as an excuse for treating only some of the
symptoms of housing instability and ignoring its underlying causes,

351. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 36.
352. For additional discussions of the necessity of increased federal involvement in
solving affordable housing problems, see, for example, OFFICE OF U.S. SENATOR
MARIA CANTWELL, ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
HOMELESSNESS: THE HOUSING TAX CREDIT 4–7 (2016); HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
TOOLKIT, THE WHITE HOUSE (2016); CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, A
RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR RENTAL HOUSING FINANCE: ENVISIONING THE FUTURE
OF THE U.S. SECONDARY MARKET FOR MULTIFAMILY RESIDENTIAL RENTAL
MORTGAGES (2010); Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal
Housing Administration in the New Millennium, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 357, 366–70
(2000); Boyack, Equitably, supra note 31, at 132–59.
353. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 6.
354. Beverly Gologorsky, In One of the Richest Countries in the World, Extreme
Poverty
is
on
the
Rise,
NATION
(June
18,
2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/one-richest-countries-world-extreme-poverty-rise/
[https://perma.cc/LD9A-2BWY]. “America, it seems, is becoming something like the
world’s first poor rich country.” Umair Haque, Why America is the World’s First
Poor Rich Country, MEDIUM (May 23, 2018), https://eand.co/why-america-is-theworlds-first-poor-rich-country-17f5a80e444a [https://perma.cc/4W8T-3JWW]. The
United States is currently ranked #17 in the world by U.S. News based on quality of
life. Quality of Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/news/bestcountries/quality-of-life-rankings [https://perma.cc/JR7F-GN4M] (last visited August
18, 2019).
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particularly when significant public subsidies are already being
allocated to populations that do not have unmet housing needs.355
It is within our financial capacity to significantly ameliorate the
housing instability that millions of Americans face daily, and there are
ample practical, economic, and moral justifications for the federal
government assuming a more responsible role in ensuring that
affordable housing for all becomes a reality. Affordable housing is a
complex problem with different solutions required in different
locations. Some places primarily need an increase of supply, other
places need more income supports and subsidies, and other places
struggle more with deficient housing and neighborhood quality.
Responsible devolution can be the answer, allowing specifically
tailored responses to local needs, but only if backed by the full
financial and legal support of the federal government.
Congress can erect an improved affordable housing legal
framework by shoring up property rights of renters and owners and
mandating investment in long-term neighborhood solutions as well as
adequate supports for critical short-term household needs. The
federal government’s failure to act will lead in the opposite direction,
resulting in increased homelessness, income- and family-destroying
housing instability, and intractable poverty throughout the country.
The federal government must not walk away from a problem that, in
large part, it helped to create.356 Irresponsible devolution would be
personally devastating for low-income households, inhumane and
politically destabilizing, and would rob our country of its most
precious resource: its human capital.

355. See supra notes 219–29 and accompanying text (discussing the cost and impact
of the mortgage interest deduction).
356. See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 83–124 (2004); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY 28–42
(2009); Ta-Nehisi Coats, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-forreparations/361631/ [https://perma.cc/G66K-RZYM]; JACKSON supra note 1, at 289–
96; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 107, at 51–57; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177–
93.

